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ABSTRACT
My doctoral research develops a deeper understanding of the promises of algo-
rithmic interventions for the data economy inspired by algorithmic realism: an
algorithmic framework cognizant of political, porous, and contextual aspects of
the social world. I design, evaluate, and deploy algorithmic interventions aimed
as anticipatory and mitigation measures against ethical issues of different do-
mains of the data economy using three case studies. In each case study, the con-
tingencies and fluidity of the data economy are accounted for and embraced in
the designs. Specifically, through the development and evaluation of a human-
centric labeling framework for machine learning, anticipatory models of pri-
vacy preferences for the smart home, and a technology probe on transparency
of profiling in online behavioral advertising, I show how algorithmic interven-
tions can promote ethical practices, balance conflicting forces, and promote user
trust in the data economy. Findings illuminate a path of ethics, opportunities for
increased user participation amidst power imbalances, and mutual benefits of
such interventions in light of the prevailing forces of the data economy. How-
ever, findings also reveal a number of challenges such interventions may face,
mainly around feasibility, countering economic forces, and mismatched or con-
flicting expectations between users and service providers of the data economy.
I discuss such challenges and offer future research directions around feasibility,
algorithmic authority, conflicting forces, mismatched expectations, and shared
accountability in highly decentralized data economy systems.
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Technological innovations around the world gave rise to the data economy,
where great value is derived and highly profitable businesses are run from
the accumulation and use of personal data at a scale never possible before.
A common example is when people, knowingly or not, contribute with their
data in exchange for benefiting from free-to-use websites, apps, and Internet
services. While a key enabler of technological advancement, the establishment
and growth of the data economy is constantly challenging long-held notions of
ethics, privacy, and freedom, subjects which become increasingly important as
technology is rapidly advanced, adopted, and relied upon for everyday mat-
ters all around the world. This rapid and unpredictable pace of advancement
brings about inevitable realities of (1) algorithmic authority, dehumanization,
and discrimination, (2) surveillance capitalism, and (3) power imbalances.
1.1 The Data Economy’s Inevitable Realities
Algorithmic authority, dehumanization, and discrimination The increased de-
ployment of machine learning models in recent years revealed serious issues of
discrimination in automated decisions that carry and amplify existing biases
from the social world (e.g., [27, 97]), which when present at a large scale, can
cause harm and challenge significant progress made around social justices and
equality in matters of race, gender identities, and people belonging in vulnera-
ble and marginalized groups [32, 122]. These issues stem from increasing algo-
rithmic authority established by new automated processes, while overlooking
1
how they might reinforce and perpetuate issues of the social world. Such an au-
thority is inherently flawed considering the reality around how these algorithms
come to exist. For instance, within the process of implementing automated de-
cisions, people from all over the world are hired to complete microtasks aimed
at labeling data used to train automated models that perform content moder-
ation, speech recognition, and sentiment analysis. As the demand for labeled
data grew, dehumanization effects [98] became prominent when data labels are
taken at face-value and the humans behind such data are largely overlooked.
For example, who are they? Where do they come from? As an example, a deep
economic crisis in Venezuela [119] led to the rapid devaluation and instability of
the country’s currency, leading many people from that country to seek income
in a more valuable, stable currency. In turn, a disproportionate amount of peo-
ple who label data in a crowdsourcing platform for machine learning are based
in Venezuela. This essentially means that a disproportionate amount of people
giving subjective judgments for image and content moderation and audio sam-
ples for speech recognition systems likely share similar cultural roots, values,
language, and other human traits, which could lead to carry-over biases when
models are deployed for different purposes in varied places of the world. This
is a limitation largely overlooked in the process of labeling data, yet it encom-
passes an inevitable reality of the available workforce on that platform. Such
overlooking is perhaps the result of the formalism of data labels at face-value.
Surveillance capitalism From a different angle of the data economy, as peo-
ple look to improve and optimize their increasingly busy daily lives, the pre-
dominant business model in the consumer technology market is the bidding
and targeting of personalized advertisements based on people’s inferred inter-
ests, lifestyle, and needs. Online Behavioral Advertising (OBA) has become
2
progressively sophisticated and ubiquitous in the daily lives of Internet users.
Over the years, Internet companies – whose primary business models rely on
targeting ads – have spanned and stretched the boundaries of user tracking and
profiling. Today, data from users’ behaviors, interests, and identities captured
from personal computers, smartphones, wearables, and devices installed at a
person’s home [132] are collected, processed, and used for targeting individ-
uals. This has resulted in a scenario of surveillance-capitalism [178], brought
upon consumers as a consequence of relying on free-to-use services heavily en-
gineered for satisfaction and convenience, trading privacy as a commodity in
exchange [38, 101]. It is also believed that consumers’ decisions are often in-
fluenced by cognitive biases and ineffective, compliance-driven, and deceptive
[8] and/or rigid consent architectures [3]. As a result of being “in the dark”
about certain data practices, users create (often inaccurate) folk theories about
the inner workings of OBA [176], often believing their devices’ microphones are
eavesdropping on their conversations [118], and growing ever more frustrated
and resigned about the data practices of the Internet [165].
Power imbalances Rightfully so, as new technologies are introduced, con-
sumers fear that their data will be collected and used for purposes they do not
intend, and feel like they are being spied on without consent [16, 103, 174]. For
example, the advent of smart, Internet-connected devices for home automation
challenges the long-held notion that the home is a private place where indi-
viduals should have the right to be left alone [36]. Growing tensions over the
possibility of secondary use, appropriation, and outright sale of data to third
parties leads consumers to purposefully avoid such devices [25], or, when they
purchase such devices, to think that they are being eavesdropped and spied
on [101]. Because billions of people have come to rely on such technologies
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to stay in touch with friends and family or to meet daily needs (e.g., search,
ride-hailing, physical navigation), people often describe a state of resignation
and distrust toward Internet companies and technologies, in which the nega-
tive consequences are justified by their reliance on such tools and their inability
to exercise control; a feeling of “giving up” [5, 101, 165]. This power imbalance
also enables Internet companies to be selective, incomplete, vague, and insuffi-
cient when providing transparency to users [14]. While power imbalances are
already significant, new Internet technologies are likely to continue reinforcing
them. For example, experts predict that while individuals may be generally
concerned about their home’s privacy being threatened by always-on, always-
listening Internet-connected devices, optimism bias – the tendency for people
to underestimate the likelihood that they will be affected by a negative event –
will mainly drive adoption of these devices [131]. Adoption may also be heavily
influenced by increasingly inexpensive devices, a legislation framework whose
emphasis is to not stifle innovation, and the increasingly reduced offer of non-
Internet connected devices in the consumer market.
These are complex issues whose origins can be traced to the inevitable, pre-
vailing reality of economic forces that the data economy has now benefited from
– and reinforced – for decades. It is likely that the “winning forces” of the data
economy will continue to prevail, and perhaps it is time they ought to be em-
braced as a significant part of the reality for which to design, research, and leg-
islate against, as opposed to imagining a different data economy in principle.
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1.2 Engaging Reality in Algorithmic Work
1.2.1 Acknowledging Reality
Exposing the reality about how algorithms work can lead to promising out-
comes. For example, studies by Eslami et al. [59, 60] have shown that increased
transparency about how social curation and filtering algorithms work or one’s
algorithmic identities in OBA can help break down algorithmic authority –
which when first established even leads users to justify the algorithm’s mistakes
– and elicit beneficial algorithmic disillusionment – when users learn about the
limitations of algorithmic processes they previously thought were perfect and
omniscient. This approach stands, partly, in contrast with the idea that perhaps
the most profound algorithms which become a part of daily life should be like
cars in that most drivers do not need to know precisely how cars and engines
work in order to use them effectively, or as best put by ubiquitous computing
pioneer Mark Weiser, “The most profound technologies are those that disappear. They
weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from
it.” [169]. Weiser’s view draws meaningful discussions about the role of ubiq-
uitous computing and the advent of the data economy. On one hand, Weiser’s
statement is reflective of new technologies that have “woven into the fabric of
everyday life” such as electricity. It can be argued that the Internet, along with
its infrastructure, fits this role. On another, the opaque algorithmic processes
people have come to rely on are constantly shaping the fabric of everyday life in
meaningful but also concerning ways. For example, with the increasing reliance
on and acceptance of Internet-connected home devices, will our homes become
smarter and more efficient, but a place where privacy is no longer expected?
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1.2.2 Algorithmic Realism: Embracing Reality
Green and Viljoen argue that an expansion of thought is needed in how com-
puter scientists are approaching the harmful effects of algorithmic processes
[78]. In their paper, the authors argue that most algorithmic interventions aimed
at preventing and mitigating harm encompass a process of “algorithmic formal-
ism,” which in their view fails to capture the inevitable realities of the social
world and “recognize [its] contingency and fluidity.” As an alternative, the au-
thors propose an epistemological and methodological framework referred to as
“algorithmic realism,” which draws upon a historical expansion of thought in
legislation in the United States from “legal formalism” into “legal realism.” This
reform was eventually needed when practitioners came to realize that certain
aspects of the social world are inevitable and that the legal framework must
also “anticipate the behavior of actors looking to take advantage of the law.”
Algorithmic realism offers a mode of thinking about algorithmic interventions
that accounts for and embraces the realities and fluidity of the social world. Its
foundations lie in having algorithmic interventions be (1) political, (2) porous,
and (3) contextual. These three aspects fundamentally challenge the inherently
objective, neutral, internal, and universal qualities of algorithms.
I find this framework of thinking very appropriate for approaching the is-
sues of the data economy. Conflicting economic forces, purposefully opaque
data collection and use processes, and emerging power imbalances are all part
of its underlying reality [5]. Therefore, in the vein of algorithmic realism, these
aspects should not only be accounted for, but embraced, perhaps engaging crit-
ical design [26] that anticipates and mitigates undesired individual and societal
outcomes. Further, I posit that the realities of the social world in which the
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data economy is inserted are prone to prevail and therefore anticipatory and
mitigative mechanisms that embrace such realities should be given more con-
sideration. This means developing algorithmic interventions that acknowledge,
expose, and embrace the realities of the data economy as a part of design, rather
than dispensing effort into envisioning alternate, preferable realities. For exam-
ple, instead of leaving it up to consumers to make rational, privacy-protecting
smart home purchase decisions, one should instead assume that secondary use
is not only likely but potentially inevitable, and propose mechanisms that an-
ticipate and give users visibility and choice about what happens in such a case,
illuminating a feasible path for (1) developers who wish to gain users’ trust and
respect their choices, and (2) legislators who can enforce specific ways to imple-
ment mechanisms that respect users’ privacy.
1.2.3 Algorithmic Realism in the Data Economy
Accordingly, in this dissertation, I empirically uncover a deeper understand-
ing of the feasibility, effects, and challenges of algorithmic interventions that
account for and embrace the contingencies and fluidity of the data economy. I
design, evaluate, and deploy three algorithmic interventions aimed as antici-
patory and mitigation measures against societal and individual issues of ethics
and privacy from different angles of the data economy. Combining these algo-
rithmic interventions, I show that they can be applied to exercise and enforce
ethical practices, balance conflicting forces, and promote user trust in the data
economy. Most importantly, in conceptually embracing the realities of the data
economy, I attempt to unearth pragmatic directions in research, design, and pol-
icy which can alleviate underlying ethical issues and power imbalances.
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Specifically, this dissertation applies the thinking of algorithmic realism as a
way of approaching design and research in the data economy. I design and eval-
uate algorithmic interventions in three domains of the data economy: crowd-
sourcing labeling for machine learning, smart home devices, and online behav-
ioral advertising, and present them as three case studies of generative research.
In doing so, I present methodological contributions and practical design impli-
cations from such interventions. Each design accounts for the realities of each
domain; they are critical designs in which the circumstances and contingencies
of the domain in which they are placed are not only carefully considered, but
also embraced as part of the design space. Applying the thinking of algorith-
mic realism, the underlying goal of the methods and artifacts presented in this
dissertation is to develop mechanisms to both prevent and mitigate undesired
individual and societal outcomes. Namely, these undesired outcomes are un-
ethical pay and algorithmic bias in machine learning labeling, the challenging of
long-held notions of private spaces in the widespread adoption of smart home
devices, and the user distrust, resignation, and chilling effects currently found
in OBA. I show that these interventions can be applied to exercise and enforce
ethical practices, balance conflicting forces, and promote user trust in the data
economy, ultimately benefiting different stakeholders in each domain while al-
leviating tensions between them. I then discuss the benefits, drawbacks, and
future avenues of exploration for algorithmic realism in the data economy.
Crowdsourcing Labeling for Machine Learning In this case study, the al-
gorithmic intervention embraces the reality of the possibility of sample biases
due to the skewed demographics of the available workforce that are a byprod-
uct of the circumstances of the social world, such as an economic recession, and
observed dehumanization effects resulting from data labeling processes. The
8
algorithmic intervention is a human-centric labeling framework for machine
learning which can anticipate and expose potential biases in the contributor
sample who might be available to complete a task at a given time, and give
requesters the opportunity to specify the level of desired diversity in demo-
graphics in order to mitigate such biases. The framework also allows crowd-
sourcing platforms to account for and optimize the data labeling process to the
benefit of contributors, such as maximizing hourly pay, task novelty, or skill
development, which can mitigate power imbalances between requesters and
contributors. Through a controlled field experiment of this framework with
1,919 contributors providing 160,345 judgments, I show that its use can miti-
gate biases in the resulting contributor sample while maintaining work qual-
ity and minimizing the pay gap when launching tasks aimed at labeling data
sets for machine learning applications. I discuss a potential shift needed: from
recruiting contributors based solely on their historical accuracy (i.e., a formal-
ist, process-centric strategy) to recruiting them based on desired human traits
(e.g., a realist, human-centric strategy). This work reveals new challenges such
as the ability for a requester to use the framework to discriminate and exploit
the workforce, and the implications of recruiting based on demographics such
as having to collect personal profiles from the workforce (e.g., gender identity,
age, etc.) in order to recruit contributors for a task based on human traits.
Smart Home Devices In the second case study, the algorithmic intervention:
(1) assumes widespread adoption of smart home devices due to cognitive biases
and economic incentives, (2) acknowledges the likely possibility of secondary
use of data collected in smart homes for developer profit, and (3) embraces the
possibility that some users are willing to trade convenience for privacy as a
commodity [2]. The intervention’s goal is to promote ethical data practices by
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respecting users’ choices. This case study involves the development and eval-
uation of a combination of machine learning models that can anticipate and
prevent likely unacceptable data uses in the smart home based on data from a
factorial-design online survey of 698 US-based users. The models can also in-
corporate the malleability of privacy preferences by accounting for how a user’s
preference might change based on the presence or absence of different transmis-
sion principles [121] that are known to affect people’s privacy decision-making.
One of the models also allows a developer to learn how much monetary value
is assigned to the privacy of a user, allowing them to engage such values in the
process of sustaining their business models (e.g., Would this consumer take a
discount in exchange of allowing us to share their data? Would they pay a fee for
increased privacy protections?). Findings suggest users have concerns over the
collection and use of data reflecting their habits and lifestyle, and that appropri-
ation and secondary use may not be acceptable for most, even considering that
the biggest market players rely on ad-targeting revenue to sustain their busi-
nesses. I show that it is possible to predict individual, personalized preferences
for hundreds of thousands of scenarios, along with what might change a user’s
original decision. The privacy valuation analysis shows that consumers are loss
averse when it comes to the monetary value they assign to privacy, assigning
higher values when scenarios indicate they have privacy, and that they expect
privacy by default. Once again, one undesired possibility introduced by this
intervention is that once users’ privacy preferences are learned, profit-seeking
developers might use the models to identify and exercise the upper bounds of
what is acceptable for their users, which may lead to further exploitation.
Online Behavioral Advertising The third case study presented in this dis-
sertation embraces the reality that users can hate, accept, or even like ads
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[114, 163], yet keeping accurate and up-to-date profiles for the purposes of tar-
geting are inherently not part of their primary goals, since ads belong on the
sidelines of user activities. It also embraces the reality that user profiling is in-
herently opaque, and that ad-targeting is an inevitable, increasingly prominent
and ubiquitous reality of the Internet. Considering these aspects of the reality
in OBA, I set out to investigate effective, practical ways to enable users to an-
ticipate and prevent undesired profiling and even control profiling processes.
Specifically, I conducted a two-week field deployment of a technology probe
with 25 US-based Internet users. The technology probe’s main goal was to pro-
vide increased and in-situ (i.e., in the moment) visibility and control over pro-
filing taking place in online and offline activities that may inform targeted ads.
Findings from this study suggest that increased visibility of profiling may en-
able users to anticipate and speculate how their actions trigger ads being shown,
and that their desired level of engagement with their ad-targeting profile de-
pends on their attitudes towards ads in the first place. For instance, opportu-
nities exist where users would manually input aspects of their profile in order
to benefit from ads more if that is something they value. Most importantly,
users have the expectation that algorithms should “figure things out” in deter-
mining when an inference might be inaccurate, no longer relevant, off-limits, or
stems from an unusual activity. When potentially being targeted based on in-
accuracies, users were mixed about correcting such inaccuracies. On one hand,
some thought inaccuracies can be a way to obfuscate their profile, while others
thought their ad-targeting profiles should reflect their perceived identities for
the sake of identity performance or in order for them to benefit from relevant
ads. Finally, some users expressed desire in having the pieces of their profile
be general, while wanting very specific explanations for profile items or ads do
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not immediately fit their mental models or ads for which they cannot trace back
to originating actions at a first glance. Overall, I show that there are benefits in
leveraging opportunistic moments for engagement with people’s ad-targeting
profiles which could lead to more trustworthy and positive experiences with
profiling and ads. However, limitations exist with regard to feasibility and a
potential reinforcement of power imbalances. As ads become ever more perva-
sive in online interactions, such as having to watch an ad before a video or in
between mobile game plays, it is in the best interest of users and ad networks to
serve more relevant ads, and my findings provide concrete ways in which users
can be invited to participate more actively in monitoring and composing their
own ad-targeting profiles.
Combined, these findings illuminate a path toward more ethical practices in
the data economy, opportunities for increased user participation where power
imbalances exist, and mutual benefits of such interventions in light of the data
economy’s prevailing forces. The findings also reveal a number of challenges
such interventions may face, mainly around feasibility, conflicting economic
forces, and mismatched and conflicting expectations between users and service
providers in the current state of the data economy. I discuss such challenges and
offer a research directions around feasibility, algorithmic authority, conflicting
forces, mismatched expectations, and shared accountability in highly decentral-
ized and ubiquitous data economy systems.
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1.3 Outline
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the
background, foundations of the data economy and associated challenges, along
with definitions of privacy and algorithmic realism. Chapters 3 to 5 each present
one case study and algorithmic interventions that acknowledge and embrace
the realities of different facets of the data economy. Then, Chapter 6 presents a
discussion on the central themes and challenges of the three case studies, in ad-
dition to future directions for research, design, and policy in the data economy.
1.4 Summary of Contributions
Specifically, my work contributes to the fields of Human–Computer Interaction
(HCI), Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp), and Usable Privacy and Security
(UPS). The main contributions of my work are:
• Three case studies of algorithmic realism in different domains of the data
economy. Together, these case studies reveal a number of benefits and
challenges from designing algorithmic interventions that account for and
embrace the contingencies and fluidity of the data economy’s social world.
• A research agenda based on the findings from the case studies that revolve
around the feasibility of ethical practices, breaking down algorithmic au-
thority, acknowledging and countering prevailing economic forces, em-





2.1 The Data Economy
The advent of the information age has fundamentally shaped the way humans
conduct their daily matters, forever changing the rhythms and ways of life. It
can be said that technological advancements enabled significantly more conve-
nient and efficient lives, while also making people all the more dependent on
information technologies by the day. Today, people can seamlessly buy and
sell products and services, communicate with friends and family, navigate the
physical world, book a vacation rental, get a ride somewhere, along many other
countless possibilities that novel business models and reliable technology in-
frastructures can afford. Without question, much can be said about the benefits
that the advent of the Internet, digital economies, smartphones, and increas-
ingly smart, connected devices have to offer. However, because it is feasible
to do so, behavioral traces of daily matters from billions of people all over the
world are captured, processed, and re-purposed to generate monetary value
and sustain incredibly successful businesses that make some of the most valu-
able public companies in the world: as of December 2020, Google and Facebook
combined are worth a market capitalization of over $2,000,000,000,000 [66, 67]
– clearly, the data economy is working. In benefiting from free-to-use, heavily
engineered and infrastructure-demanding services, whether they are aware of
it or not, users are contributing their share in the economic transaction by en-
abling other businesses to bid for and target a few minutes of their increasingly
busy and technology-dependent daily lives.
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People’s benefits are arguably compounded by the rapid unfolding of the
information age driven by the accumulation of data along with computing ad-
vancements and breakthroughs, which make it trivial (for most users) for their
face and speech to be recognized and routes to work and home be optimized,
for example. Such phenomena also enabled institutions to become efficient, au-
tomating tasks that can now be handled solely by computing processes. For
example, algorithms now mediate, moderate, and even censor online commu-
nities where only human intervention was successful before [88]. However, this
is only made possible by contribution humans get paid to make in order to in-
directly “teach” algorithms how to perform such tasks via marketplaces also
known as crowdsourcing platforms. Beyond the trivial tasks for the sake of
convenience, algorithms also assist in decisions that have more significant indi-
vidual and societal impacts, from deciding if someone may be a risky borrower
for a bank loan to profiling individuals for criminal activities [122]. One thing is
certain: our reliance on algorithms has rapidly increased, from the most mun-
dane to the most sophisticated of our individual and collective lives. More and
more so, algorithms are becoming a profound part of human activity, and as
observed by ubiquitous computing pioneer Mark Weiser, “weav[ing] themselves
into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it.”
Despite such benefits, the realities of the social circumstances in which the
information age rapidly emerged have morphed into new, significant issues that
can do great harm to individuals and societies around the world: surveillance
capitalism, amplification of human biases, automated discrimination, large-
scale interference of democratic processes, widespread security vulnerabilities
and data breaches, and power imbalances are now a part of the reality created
by the information age. Rightfully so, even before computers and algorithms
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were so ubiquitous, Weiser himself warned about potential negative conse-
quences of such profound technologies, saying that while they “offer all kinds
of convenience [they] could be a source of real harm in the wrong hands,” further ex-
plaining that such wrong hands could use said ubiquity to “make unpleasant use
of the same information that makes invisible computers so convenient” [169]. In this
section, I present the state of the data economy with regard to some of such
unpleasant uses and harms.
2.1.1 Problems of the Data Economy
Ubiquitous tracking and ever-expanding possibilities
The commoditization of data carries a major drawback: with consumers increas-
ingly seeking convenience, markets can drive and stretch what can be consid-
ered part of the transaction if consumers always opt for convenience, generat-
ing power imbalances, information asymmetry, and adverse selection scenarios
[10]. This has certainly occurred in the marketplaces of the data economy. First,
the advent of e-commerce in the late 90s led to personalized and targeted offers
when people went online to shop. The first boundary was transcended: when
consumers physically visited a store, it was certainly difficult to gauge near-
buys or intentions. But then it became possible to capture consumer intentions
with more precision, taking their behavior as a predictive factor. For example,
visiting certain product pages may be taken as intention to purchase. In the
early 2000s, free-to-use and effective search and email services were key drivers
of Google’s success, and once again the picture of consumers’ intentions and
behaviors was enhanced. In the late 2000s, the impressive growth in adoption
16
of smartphones and social networking platforms created ways in which con-
sumers can be tracked and profiled when they are out and about – with location
tracking becoming a pervasive and ubiquitous process – and when users are en-
gaging with their social connections and topics, businesses, and events they like
on social media. In the last decade, Internet-connected wearables, appliances,
and electronics for the home enabled more ways of tracking and profiling in-
dividuals. Such multi-faceted, comprehensive tracking of individual behaviors
enable more accurate profiling, which has contributed to growing tensions in
existing and new technologies. In addition, a justified concern on the amount
of power and knowledge data economy companies have on users is common-
place: Google runs the most popular search engine and email service, the most
popular mobile operating system – Android, YouTube, and one of the most pop-
ular voice assistants for the home. They also run an ubiquitous ad network that
tracks and targets users nearly everywhere they go. Facebook owns the Face-
book, WhatsApp, and Instagram apps, through which they are able to capture
different behavioral traces from users in how they connect and communicate
with others and engage with news and content in different ways. Over the
years, the prominence and pervasiveness of ads has also increased and have
become more integrated with users’ content consumption. To say the least, to
match the added convenience of such products and services, the contribution of
users in such transactions has certainly increased, bringing about surveillance
capitalism [178]. This development also raises questions of information asym-
metry and power imbalance when users’ own data are being monetized, yet
the level of transparency and control they have into the underlying processes of
how they are contributing is questionable at a minimum. It is clear that busi-
ness is good, with trillion dollar valuations a reality of companies that monetize
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heavily on user data, which leads some to argue that users are not getting their
fair share in the process. This has fundamental implications to the adoption
and use of future technologies, and historical precedents on technology break-
throughs that came to be a part of people’s lives suggest that boundaries will
continue to be spanned and stretched in favor of the economic interests of ser-
vice providers. For example, in 2014, Facebook acquired Oculus, the virtual re-
ality platform, and has been focused on developing the platform ever since. One
may wonder what is to come as new technologies get developed and adopted
by the masses, and how the growing tensions around surveillance capitalism
might impact their adoption, and, subsequently, how they may alter the ever
spanning boundaries of how consumers are going to be tracked, profiled, and
targeted in the future, and what choice they will have in the process.
Distrust, Resignation, and Power Imbalances
Admittedly, many users are aware of and wish to escape surveillance capital-
ism while still keeping the utility of technology. Users feel that such practices
are creepy and invasive, and that they would like to be able to exercise more
control over them [9, 163]. However, in many cases, users are arriving at a state
of conformism and resignation. A study of the ubiquity of targeted advertising
libraries in mobile apps found that users feel helpless about where their data
ends up when they install mobile apps, especially when some apps cannot be
replaced [165]. In the same study, participants commented that they are aware
of privacy violations in mobile apps, yet they still choose to use them because it
affords them unique convenience, since some apps can be irreplaceable. In pon-
dering users’ impressions of seeing their data unexpectedly end up in the hands
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of major Silicon Valley enterprises, the authors comment on whether users have
a feeling of mutualism or something they refer to as “Silicon Valley Syndrome”
– an allusion to Stockholm Syndrome – when participants noted that while they
feel helpless and threatened, they have grown dependent on such technologies.
What seems to be developing is a scenario of great distrust in Internet com-
panies, with people speculating that their phones are eavesdropping on their
conversations without their consent upon seeing eerily accurate ads about top-
ics that they only remember talking out loud about [118]. Such issues of distrust
are also affecting new technologies attempting to break into consumer markets,
such as Internet-connected devices for the home. Surveys of US consumers
show that many choose to stay away from such devices with the fear of be-
ing spied on or having their data be used for purposes they do not intend [16].
Such tensions are justified: Amazon has been reportedly selling people’s door-
bell camera data to local law enforcement agencies [95].
Facilitated by the lack of comprehensive regulations and ineffective consent
architectures whose priorities are rooted in compliance, businesses are able to
“run wild” on the possibilities of what people reportedly have “agreed” to. The
lack of specifics in legislation leaves it up to the discretion of companies the
amount of transparency and control they provide consumers, and efforts have
been shown to be (seemingly) intentionally selective, vague [14], and even de-
ceptive [8]. While service providers have attempted to ramp up transparency
and control efforts by providing users with more privacy settings and controls,
prior works show that either such efforts have only gone so far as compliance,
or they are insufficient and unsatisfactory. For example, in user studies of ad
explanations, such explanations have been shown to be selective, vague, and
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incomplete, failing to serve their very own purpose of explaining [60]. As new
technologies threaten to worsen these already present power imbalances, legis-
lation has been shown to be vague about how precisely companies should be
giving consumers transparency and control about their data use practices [57].
Algorithmic authority and its harms
Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming increasingly ubiquitous in daily life,
embedded in consumer application, finance, law enforcement, and education
domains [122]. This is possible due to a dramatic increase in their accuracy
brought by complex model architectures such as deep learning [75]. This high
accuracy, however, is fundamentally paired with low interpretability, rendering
deep learning almost impossible to “understand” for humans. Perhaps not sur-
prisingly, these models pick up on undesirable biases present in the data such
as sexism and racism [27, 97], but due to their impenetrable nature, these biases
are usually uncovered only after models are deployed. Trained machine learn-
ing models have shown biases and discrimination traits that likely transferred
from the data labeling process completed by humans, reflecting and amplifying
discrimination and marginalization toward certain groups. It is clear that while
AI is bringing unprecedented advances to our lives, it also brought about unde-
sired harm. Rightfully so, researchers are actively investigating how to fix these
problems, with conferences such as ACM FAccT (Fairness, Accountability, and
Transparency) devoted entirely to these issues.
Solutions to biased decisions in AI are only starting to emerge. Several ap-
proaches have been proposed in the fields of image classification and natural
language processing. For example, [82] relies on blurring gender identity from
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an image so that the machine learning model can “focus” on other visual cues
instead. In another example, [30] counter-stereotypical (e.g., male nurse, female
engineer) examples were used in the process of generating a final sentence from
a word-embedding algorithm. While these approaches provide feasible solu-
tions to the problem of implicit bias, they are designed as solutions to a partic-
ular machine learning use case, building on the characteristics of that use case,
with no general approach being established so far. One common trend seems
to be the idea of preventing a model to make decisions based on protected at-
tributes, such as gender, age, or race of an individual. The protection of such
attributes is included and regimented by legislation in many countries around
the world (e.g., Equal Opportunity Employment in the US). Often the approach
is to also prevent a given model from learning too much from protected at-
tributes, thus “protecting” them from bias in automated decisions [32]. Many of
the proposed solutions are deeply rooted in algorithmic formalism, that is, they
operationalize concepts of fairness and bias into mathematical properties that
can be optimized, just like the accuracy of a model.
One example of the such an approach is Kusner et. al.’s work [100]. The
authors derived a framework based on causal reasoning to show that by sam-
pling counterfactuals from a dataset where everything else is held equal but the
level of a protected attribute is different, a model can be trained to make fair
decisions. The authors demonstrate the effectiveness of their approach to fairly
predict law school success, and estimate arrest record, among other applica-
tions, at the price of a minor decay in the performance of the models in which
counterfactual fairness was reached.
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2.2 Privacy
Much of the discourse on the data economy centers around the framework of
privacy. For example, the lack of transparency leads individuals to feel that their
privacy was violated when they cannot determine how certain information was
obtained to target them. Other times ads are shown based on information users
deem sensitive and private. In this section, I introduce the most prominent def-
initions of privacy from the literature. Privacy is a complex and nuanced con-
cept. Its meaning is known to differ under different cultures and geographies.
The following definitions represent largely Westernized views of privacy.
2.2.1 Definitions of Privacy
Privacy as a right In their seminal article in the Harvard Law Review journal,
Warren and Brandeis defined general privacy as “the right to be left alone.”
[166]. This notion of privacy has influenced legal cases and opinions in the
context of the constitution of the United States, such as court cases involving
searches and seizures, abortions and embryos, privacy and the press, and pri-
vacy in the workplace [154]. According to Smith et al. [154], such cases gener-
ated (1) the need for more specific definitions than the “right to be left alone”
and (2) the idea that the state should be the one to protect the privacy of their
citizens. However, it was understood that no single definition of general pri-
vacy could be achieved in the legal sense, and scholars disagree about whether
the state should or should not have a say on the privacy of individuals. This has
historically been the argument in the United States, with the idea that the state
should not interfere on this matter due to market-based economic perspectives.
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The expectation is that if the state interferes too much, it would lead to a stifling
of innovation. The consideration of the economic perspectives about privacy,
often argued for by libertarians, make up another popular definition of privacy:
privacy as a commodity.
Privacy as a commodity Libertarians believe that privacy should not be an
absolute right an individual possesses, but that it should be subject to the eco-
nomic forces that drive cost-benefit and trade-off analyses [38]. In this view, pri-
vacy becomes part of economic transactions where consumers would consider
relinquishing information that would otherwise be considered private when the
expected benefits outweigh potential costs. I would argue that this is very much
in line with today’s ecosystem of privacy in an interconnected world, where
consumers will indeed trade privacy for convenience. A major drawback of
privacy as a commodity is that markets can drive and stretch what can be part
of the transaction if consumers always opt for convenience, generating power
imbalances and information asymmetry [10], which has certainly occurred.
Privacy as a state Westin introduced the concept of general privacy as a state,
through four substates: anonymity, solitude, reserve, and intimacy [170]. Such
definition was later adopted and received contributions from Schoeman, who
defined privacy as “a state of limited access to a person,” [146] and Weinstein,
who defined privacy as a “state of being apart from others” [168]. When privacy
is deemed a state, it raises the question of seeking after such a state, and that the
state may range from minimum to maximum privacy [154]. However, this static
approach fails to recognize the nuanced and contextual nature of privacy issues.
Privacy as a control First introduced by Westin’s [170] and Altman’s general
theories of privacy [12], this defintion is best captured by Altman’s explanation
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as “the selective control of access to the self.” Margulis proposed a unified defi-
nition of privacy as a control, noting “Privacy, as a whole or in part, represents
the control of transactions between person(s) and other(s), the ultimate aim of
which is to enhance autonomy and/or to minimize vulnerability” [109]. While
this view suggests that privacy is control, researchers have come to adopt this
definition but understand privacy as the ability to control. This understanding
also guides principles of fair information practices on choice, awareness, and
consent in the US.
Summary Since privacy can mean many things under different circum-
stances, one would be erroneous to adopt a single definition of privacy when
engaging in the discipline. Instead, these definitions can be used to understand
how they fit into the reality of the society in which the matters take place. For
example, it may be reasonable to say that Europeans may lean toward think-
ing that privacy is a right and that the state should protect it from the abuse that
may result from economic forces. In the United States, it seems that privacy may
be a commodity while also being the ability to control. On one hand, individu-
als think that they should have the ability to control and therefore feel like their
privacy is being violated, but on the other hand, they continue to adopt tech-
nologies that change the boundaries of information collection and contribute
to increased collection of personal data – all in the name of convenience. Al-
ternatively, privacy is better understood and approached as a concept highly
sensitive to its context [121].
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2.2.2 Prominent Theories of Privacy
Contextual Integrity Theory Nissenbaum argues that static definitions of pri-
vacy fail as a framework, and that privacy is better approached as a notion of
contextual integrity [121]. This concept states that activities that violate the
norms of specific contexts, more specifically the norms of information gather-
ing and dissemination appropriate to that context, and that cross the governing
norms of distribution within it, constitute a privacy violation. A classic example
in the United States is when a cashier asks a shopper their email for a receipt,
and then shares their email with third parties for targeted advertising. Accord-
ing to this framework, this violates the individual’s privacy because it violated
the norms of dissemination around this context – the customer would not ex-
pect their email to be used for purposes other than receiving a receipt. This
framework engages appropriateness, distribution norms, and also subsequent
changes that may occur to them.
Boundary Regulation Theory Palen and Dourish defined a framework to
approach privacy based on boundary regulation [128]. The authors build upon
Altman’s definition of privacy as a control, which states that privacy is the “se-
lective control of access to the self” [12], that privacy comprises of a bound-
ary regulation process in which people attempt to manage their accessibility
from “openness” to “closedness,” depending on contextual factors. According
to their approach, such a framework would afford the understanding of pri-
vacy as “dynamic response to circumstance,” and that such response is defined
by tensions between competing needs. In their argument, information tech-
nologies play an important role in this process because they have the ability to
disrupt, span, and establish new boundaries. An example given by Palen and
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Dourish in their paper involves a shared calendar. Such a shared calendar can
be of great benefit in enhancing the productivity in the workplace, but their in-
troduction can lead to the spanning of disclosure boundaries. In their example,
they noted that an employee could derive patterns from said shared calendars
when a meeting room booked by top executives and human resources staff, per-
haps hinting that layoffs may be looming.
Similarly, Petronio proposed the theory of communication privacy manage-
ment [130], in which privacy disclosures are approached as a dialectical process
that people engage in while believing that they have a “right to own and regu-
late access to their private information,” choosing whether to disclose or conceal
information depending on the circumstances, including “who others are.”
Privacy and Economics
Acquisti argues that privacy can be better approached from an economics per-
spective, and that even then it can be difficult due to the uncertainties and un-
knowns that take place around transactions [2]. The economic perspective on
privacy states that individuals will always make cost-benefit assessments and
will provide information according to their judgement on whether expected
benefits will outweigh risks and costs. This makes the assumption that indi-
viduals are in the position to correctly assess what are the risks and costs, which
is not true in today’s world [3]. For example, when a consumer buys a product
online and provides their personal data for a transaction, they may have pon-
dered that the benefits of doing so may have outweighed the cost of information
disclosure. However, the customer is not aware of what the merchant intends
to use the information that they just provided for the transaction. This can gen-
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erate issues of uncertainty, unknowns, and information asymmetry, where one
party has advantage over the other and therefore can manipulate the transac-
tions for their own benefit [10].
Acquisti also argues that information asymmetry raises problems to the eco-
nomic analysis of privacy scenarios because designing appropriate economic
incentives and privacy enhancing technologies becomes difficult in light of the
unknowns. I concur with this argument and posit that this encapsulates what
drives adoption of most technologies we have come to be reliant on, that we
incorrectly assess risks and costs, and that they are not communicated prop-
erly. For example, when visiting a social network site, does a user know that
their fine-grained mouse and keyboard interaction could be used to infer their
emotions? If they did know, would they refrain from using such a website?
Privacy valuation studies have showed evidence that when benefits and
costs are prominent in a transaction, some users will be willing to trade their
privacy [6, 24, 46, 79, 134, 135, 136]. For example, Anderson et al.’s study on the
value of location privacy suggests that under some circumstances, users may be
explicitly willing to assign a monetary value to their privacy. In such cases, how-
ever, individuals have been shown to be loss averse; they value privacy more
when their original stance indicates they have privacy than otherwise [24, 79].
These studies highlight the importance of empowering users to take control of
their privacy and prevent power imbalances around information disclosures.
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Cognitive and Behavioral Hurdles in Privacy Decisions
According to contextual integrity, privacy is a construct that can be better ap-
proached by expectations and norms under specific contexts, and that a vio-
lation of privacy is observed when activities are not in line with such norms.
Acquisti et al. summarized a number of hurdles that may cause users to behave
in ways that may go against their attitudes and preferences [3]. The authors
grouped them in three major categories: incomplete and asymmetric informa-
tion, heuristics and bounded rationality, and cognitive and behavioral biases.
Incomplete and asymmetric information is best represented by the used car
purchase scenario. When buying a used car, the dealer has more information
about the car than the potential buyer, which puts the dealer at a position of
advantage and creates an information asymmetry scenario. The same holds
when an online shopping website collects personal information from the user
to complete a transaction, in that only the merchant knows what exactly they
will use the information for.
Heuristics and bounded rationality mean that humans are often easily con-
vinced that the convenient choice presented was made to their best interest. The
authors present the scenario of when an employer chooses a default savings
plan presented by their employer, thinking that the employer have made this
choice to the employee’s benefit, therefore it must be the best choice. This also
applies to online interactions, where users often believe that the default settings
are in their best interest, which may pose implications to their privacy when
conflicting economic interests take place e.g. data can be sold to data brokers.
The authors also present a number of biases that affect the ability of users to
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make rational choices: anchoring, loss aversion, framing, hyperbolic discount-
ing, optimism bias and overconfidence, post-completion errors, and status quo
bias. In my opinion, the most interesting to be described are loss aversion, hy-
perbolic discounting, and optimism bias.
Loss aversion means that people will always value assets more when they
have it than whey they do not, and the same applies to privacy. Grossklags and
Acquisti [79] and Acquisti et al. [6] found that people will accept more money
to disclose personal information than they are willing to pay in order to regain
control over the very same personal information [6]. Indirectly, this means that
people will be tempted to value privacy more when they have it than when they
do not, which is an important implication to consider when we assume that pri-
vacy is already at risk when defaults are not in the best interest of users, and
users behave against their best interest when given enough incentives. Hyper-
bolic discounting has to do with immediate gratification: people prefer imme-
diate monetary gains despite the long term risk of facing privacy threats. This
has also to do with the inability for people to correctly assess privacy risk when
engaging cost-benefit assessments.
Optimism bias implies that people will engage in unsafe practices and ac-
tivities because they believe bad things will not happen to them. An example
of this is computer users being careless about how they browse the Internet be-
cause they believe antivirus software will protect them. Often people may also
believe that they will not be a target of an attack and therefore do not adopt
safe practices such as two-factor authentication. Optimism bias also affects a
person’s judgment in regards to confidence and trust in an entity.
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2.2.3 Policy and Legislation
Fair Information Practices With the growing demand to regulate privacy pro-
tections, the US government put in place a number of practices that serve as
guidelines for the protection of the privacy of individuals when entities col-
lect and process personal information [74]. They are called Fair Information
Practices [40], and consist of (1) Notice/Awareness, which involves providing
notice about information practices to consumers; (2) Choice/Consent, which
should give consumers choice about what personal information is collected and
used; (3) Access/Participation, which enables consumers to access their own
data in a readily manner; (4) Integrity/Security, which defends that data must
be secure and accurate, protected from unauthorized access; and (5) Enforce-
ment/Redress, which states that there should be means for consumers to self-
regulate, compensation of individuals for private violations, and government
enforcement [40].
While the proposed Fair Information Practices were well-intentioned, they
serve merely as suggestions and guidelines, which many criticize. The main
criticism is that the creation of these principles could have gone beyond merely
suggestions, and that the government should have had implemented laws and
regulations to actually enforce them.
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (EU-GDPR) In Eu-
rope, privacy has been historically developed and approached as a right. In
1995, the European Parliament and Council proposed a directive to protect in-
dividuals in the processing of personal data as well as to introduce regulations
to ensure the “free movement” of an individual’s data: Directive 95/46/EC.
This directive introduced three principles: transparency, legitimate purpose,
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and proportionality [49]. Its scope was limited to operations with personal data
within the European Union, and relied upon member states to translate them
into regulations, that is, by definition the directive was not legally binding un-
less translated into regulations. In 2018, the European Union put in place a num-
ber of regulations, presented as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
which were effective on May 25th, 2018. The goal of GDPR is “to protect all EU
citizens from privacy and data breaches in today’s data-driven world” [73]. The
enforcement of GDPR superseded directive 95/46/EC. The regulations apply to
any entities that collect or use data from EU citizens, regardless of where they
are in the world. To enforce the proposed regulation, GDPR holds that a fine
of up to 4% of the annual global turnover or €20 Million (EUR), whichever is
greater, will be imposed to companies who violate the regulation. The GDPR
has introduced rights to EU citizens defined as Data Subject Rights: (1) breach
notification; (2) right to access; (3) right to be forgotten; (4) data portability; (5)
privacy by design; (6) Data Protection Officers. Compliance to these regula-
tions have led many companies to implement settings and tools that were made
available to all of their users, EU citizens or not. For example, many social net-
working websites have made available features that allow a person, regardless
of being an EU citizen, to download all of their data.
2.3 Transparency of Algorithmic Processes
Beyond fixing or attempting to “debias” algorithms in formal ways, an emerg-
ing research effort is in tackling the opaqueness of algorithms. Researchers from
the field of AI and HCI have turned their attention to the visibility and explain-
ability of algorithmic processes. Prior studies in this area have shown that when
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using opaque algorithms, users create their own theories of how they work and
attempt to manipulate them accordingly [59]. However, often times such the-
ories are inaccurate and tend to carry the idea that algorithms are all-present,
all-knowing artifacts, and that they are rarely wrong; a sort of algorithmic au-
thority. Users even tend to justify the algorithm’s mistakes without being able
to acknowledge that they are in fact limited [60]. When increased visibility into
how algorithmic processes work, users naturally break down feelings of algo-
rithmic authority and show disillusionment – the realization that algorithms
they thought to be originally perfect are far from it in reality. Emerging works
suggest that beyond explanation, users would like to be able to provide feed-
back about decisions made by algorithms and expect that they will take their
feedback into account [155]. A pattern has surfaced which suggests that over-
reliance on algorithms can lead to algorithmic authority that makes a big part
of how they come to cause harm, and that the solution might be to implement
enough transparency and feedback mechanisms which enable users and algo-
rithms to converge into desired experiences.
2.4 Algorithmic Realism
To inform future algorithmic works that attempt to mitigate the harms of al-
gorithmic interventions. Green and Viljoen introduce the idea of algorithmic
realism [78]. According to the authors, algorithmic interventions should look to
eschew technological determinism and solely formalist modes of reasoning in
order to be able to “recognize the contingency and fluidity of the social world.” This
idea comes as a critique to algorithmic interventions that attempt to undo or
prevent harm which still cannot break out from formalist, rigid orientations of
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how algorithms must operate. They argue that algorithmic interventions should
have political, porous, and contextual orientations in order for them to effectively
anticipate and mitigate harm. The political mode of reasoning means to shift
the effort from objectivity and neutrality into recognizing that algorithmic in-
terventions are inherently political. That is, designs can be affirmative, critical,
and even “anti-oppresive.” Porous means that algorithmic interventions should
be able to account for and embrace the fluidities and realities of society, predict
the possibility of harm and “develop anticipatory mechanisms to prevent or mitigate
those outcomes.” Contextual means that the mode of operation of algorithmic
interventions should expand from a universal view on their validity into being
cognizant of context, that is “the social relations, activities, and histories that shape
any particular setting.” Algorithmic realism was heavily inspired by a histori-
cal reform in the US legal system that expanded the legal thought from legal
formalism into legal realism, when practitioners came to understand that rigid
orientations rooted in formalism and universalism were no longer sufficient as
a framework for justice. The authors further note that algorithmic realism is not
to be seen as a replacement to formalism, but as an expansion to the framework
of thinking when designing algorithmic interventions.
A critical realist orientation [17, 29, 39] may also prove beneficial in ap-
proaching the problems of the data economy in particular, since the participa-
tion of users in such an economy is arguably reductionist. For example, an apt
realization within the critical realism thinking is that “it focuses on the underly-
ing structure rather than the observable surface,” and accordingly, a critical re-
alist perspective allows “things” be seen as a broader category of powers, forces
or relations [68]. This mode of thinking has been beneficial to approaching dis-
ability studies and the design of assistive technologies, with the shift from in-
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Study Domain Acknowledged realities
#1 Crowd-sourced ML labeling Skewed workforce demographics
Dehumanization of crowd work
#2 Smart home devices Widespread adoption despite concerns
Possibility of secondary use
Consumer privacy valuations
#3 Profiling in OBA Pervasive profiling and ad-targeting
Opaque processes
Mixed acceptance and utility
Unmotivated user
Table 2.1: Summary of the embraced “realities” of each domain in concep-
tualizing and designing algorithmic interventions.
dividual into society, and the emergence of social constructionist rather than
reductionist views of disabilities [124]. Further considering the distinctions of
domains held by critical realism of the empirical, the actual, and the real, it can be
said that the data economy is largely driven by the mechanisms and structures
of the socioeconomic world (the real), which produce the infrastructures and
technologies (the actual), which users experience (the empirical). Perhaps in the
case of the data economy the empirical is a purposefully selective subset of what
makes the actual and the real domains of the data economy, causing numerous
problems. Perhaps more aspects of the actual and the real should be brought into
how users experience these technologies. Other realism perspectives could also
be brought from the domain of the arts into the current power structures of the
data economy: social realism is a characteristic of works of art which embodies
critiques of power structures by drawing attention to sociopolitical aspects of
the working class [7]. Perhaps algorithmic works for the data economy ought
to acknowledge and embrace power imbalances favoring corporate institutions
by taking a critical stance on such power imbalances.
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Accordingly, the algorithmic interventions presented in this dissertation
align with this mode of algorithmic realism thinking, and provide empirical
evidence of their effects, challenges, and new questions that may inform future
design and research of such algorithms that attempt to capture and embrace the
potentially inevitable realities that arise from social, economic, and political as-
pects of society. Specifically, a summary of the aspects of the realities of each
domain can be found in Table 2.1.
The proposed optimization algorithm in Chapter 3, which recruits crowd-
sourcing contributors for labeling tasks based on human traits, embraces the
reality of the possibility of sample biases due to the skewed demographics of
the available workforce that are a byproduct of the circumstances of the social
world, such as an economic recession and observed dehumanization effects in
data labeling processes. It then provides ways in which potential harms can be
mitigated, both by enforcing ethical pay and communicating such realities to
requesters so that they can create a plan to mitigate unintended negative conse-
quences from the process and the outcome of labeling their training data.
In Chapter 4, the proposed models to predict personalized privacy prefer-
ences for secondary uses of data collected in smart homes inherently recognize
the possibility of such uses and attempt to promote ethical data practices by
respecting users’ choices. Their design was also inspired by the looming mass-
adoption of such devices even in light of privacy tensions, driven by economic
incentives and biases in individuals’ privacy decision-making. The algorithms
also incorporate contextual factors that capture the malleability of people’s pri-
vacy preferences in order to anticipate how a change in the circumstances may
impact people’s preferences. One of the algorithms even goes as far as support-
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ing the estimation and operationalization of a person’s privacy valuations in the
context of the smart home in order to incorporate it into device-purchase trans-
actions. For example, how much users would be willing to take as a discount in
order to allow secondary use, or how much they would be willing to pay extra
for a device that comes with privacy protections by default?
In Chapter 5, the technology probe deployment of profiling in OBA acknowl-
edges the underlying reality of ad-targeting: users can hate, accept, or even like
ads, yet keeping accurate and up-to-date profiles for the purposes of targeting
are inherently not part of their primary goals in interacting with information
technologies, since it is expected that ads belong on the sidelines of user activ-
ities. The probe deployment also embraces the reality that user profiling and
targeting are an inevitable, increasingly prominent and ubiquitous reality of the
Internet. The research design also embraces the state of resignation and power
imbalances challenging users, and the ubiquity of profiling with regards to the
coverage of user activities. Embracing this reality, the probe’s goal is to iden-
tify concrete directions that stand at a meaningful intersection of utility, trust,
and feasibility of increased user participation in OBA processes. The deploy-
ment’s goal was to observe participant’s behaviors and elicit their responses to
increased transparency and control of profiling possibilities in OBA, and situ-
ate them with regards to the most desired features of transparency, acknowl-
edging the aforementioned reality of users potentially feeling helpless but not
motivated enough, or not being given enough visibility and control, to act. The
research design also captures the ever-expanding aspect of OBA as new tech-
nologies and capabilities are introduced by using “speculative inferences” that
do not necessarily represent actual practices but that are feasible to implement,
such as inferring sleep data, modes of transportation, and a person’s mood.
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These interventions are presented as empirical explorations of algorithmic
interventions that can both anticipate and mitigate problematic aspects of the
data economy in both more established (e.g., OBA, data labeling) and emerging
contexts (e.g., the smart home).
2.5 Summary
A combination of policy vagueness, prevailing market forces, biases in people’s
decisions, and people’s growing dependence on technologies suggest that the
data economy is bound to continue reinforcing profit over principle, and as a
result further implicating existing issues around surveillance capitalism, power
imbalances, and opaque algorithmic processes. For this reason, it is necessary
to expand the toolkit of design and research to account for, embrace, and oper-
ationalize these realities in order to anticipate and mitigate harmful technology
uses, illuminating the path forward on what new challenges lie ahead in do-
ing so. Algorithmic realism offers a framework of thinking that enables such a
toolkit. Paradoxically, just as users conform with and are forced to accept the
reality, researchers and designers ought to assume it might be too late to re-
imagine the ways these technologies operate in principle and start looking into
ways of embracing and incorporating reality into the effort of anticipating and
mitigating the threats and harms such realities have caused or could introduce.
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CHAPTER 3
A HUMAN-CENTRIC FRAMEWORK FOR MACHINE LEARNING
LABELING
3.1 Introduction
This chapter draws heavily on a paper published at CHI 2019 [23]. I had the
primary role in this research. Specifically, I conceptualized, developed, and
evaluated the algorithmic intervention presented in this chapter, in addition to
writing the research paper. I conducted this research while participating in a
2018 industry summer internship at Figure Eight, a crowdsourcing platform for
machine learning formerly known as CrowdFlower. The company was later
acquired by and merged into Appen. I worked under the guidance of the pa-
per’s second author, Dr. Monchu Chen, who was my mentor in this research.
For these reasons, I use the pronoun “we” throughout the chapter, and “our
platform” when referring to the crowdsourcing platform. For newly added per-
sonal reflections or additions, I use the pronoun “I.”
With the growing popularity and use of crowdsourcing platforms e.g., Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk [116] (AMT), Figure Eight [65], Task Rabbit [159], came
along what researchers refer to as dehumanization effects in crowdsourcing
[71, 98, 86]. These occur when task requesters overlook the human aspects of
those working on the tasks, also known as workers, due to the short time com-
mitment between requesters and workers, and the very nature of crowdsourc-
ing. As a result, issues such as underpayment [80], “boring” tasks [98, 141],
and difficulties finding “good” work [80, 86, 162], have been observed in these
platforms. These have serious consequences because many depend on doing
38
tasks to secure their income [142], which leads to more competition for tasks,
and more often than not, a small number of workers (i.e., the most active) sub-
mitting a large fraction of the work available [80].
The recent surge of machine learning applications in many domains resulted
in increasing demand for manually labeled data used to train algorithms for a
variety of purposes, from recognizing speech, to moderating Internet content,
to developing self-driving cars. However, as machine learning models become
ubiquitous, so do their impacts on people’s lives. For example, a biased machine
learning model can make unfair decisions about a person, such as preventing
them from being contacted for a job interview, classifying their gender incor-
rectly, or inhibiting their own personal voice assistant from recognizing their
speech due to their accent, age, or gender. These issues raise the question of
bias and ethics and how they can be addressed in the many stages of develop-
ing and using machine learning in the wild.
Rightfully so, the issue of algorithmic bias has received much attention lately
from the perspective of when a model does not learn or cover enough different
cases [15, 97, 129, 161, 177]. Nonetheless, with a few exceptions (e.g., [55, 56,
147]), another perspective on bias remains largely unexplored: potential biases
introduced in the process of labeling training data. For example, it is known
that the demographics of crowd workers may skew toward female and people
in developing countries, given the opportunity to earn money in more valuable,
foreign currencies [142]. Thus, training data can carry implicit biases from these
subgroups because they are the majority available to provide labels, which can
lead to most judgments being made by people who speak the same language,
share the same gender, or are in a timezone where it is business hours when
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a task is launched. These biases can greatly impact different use cases, such
as audio collection, content moderation, sentiment analysis, among other tasks
where subjective judgments from humans are needed [20, 51, 55, 127, 147], and
may be perpetuated via transfer learning [97, 129, 161], a popular practice in
deep learning where a model can be repurposed and reused [129]. Therefore,
a way to mitigate these biases must be developed so that requesters can create
unbiased datasets for machine learning, since gold-standard datasets obtained
via crowdsourcing can carry cultural biases from crowd demographics [147].
We also believe the very nature of crowdsourcing for machine learning con-
tributes further to dehumanization effects because the crowd is used for simply
“filling in” labels to an unstructured, unlabeled dataset. In addition, a (much
needed) common practice in these platforms is to use historical accuracy on
“gold” units (i.e., units for which a label is previously known) or acceptance
rate of previous tasks as a proxy for quality in order to filter out bad actors. In
doing so, crowdsourcing becomes more and more process-oriented rather than
person-oriented, although the latter has been deemed a better alternative for sev-
eral reasons (e.g., [71, 115]). Consequently, a potential solution to address ethical
issues in crowdsourcing for machine learning must encompass ethical issues in
the product (i.e., the dataset) and the process of collecting data, which include
implicit biases, underpayment, boredom, and incompatible tasks.
With this in mind, we propose a framework considering human factors in
the process of labeling data for machine learning, addressing issues of crowd
bias and ethics. Our framework was evaluated on our platform: Figure Eight
[65] 1 (f.k.a. CrowdFlower), a platform primarily designed to support crowd-
sourcing tasks for gold-standard data used for machine learning. Requesters
1https://www.figure-eight.com/platform
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upload unstructured/unlabeled data and launch labeling tasks to the crowd.
We present the design and evaluation of the framework, which allocates la-
beling tasks to workers, referred hereafter as “contributors,” based on different
human-centric criteria such as contributor demographics and minimum wage
in their country. We implemented the framework into the Figure Eight plat-
form and evaluated it using three different machine learning use cases, with
different requirements, namely, image categorization, content moderation, and
audio transcription. We show that the use of our framework can mitigate demo-
graphic biases in contributor samples and increase contributor hourly pay. We
discuss how our framework can be extended and used to promote transparency
of human factors and “rehumanize” crowdsourcing.
3.2 The Realities of Crowdsourcing
In this section, I describe a number of contingencies and limitations of the social
world of crowdsourcing which informed and motivated my work. These issues
take place in the platform and can affect both the process and the product of the
labeling task. I believe these scenarios also occur in other platforms since their
causes lie on the inherent nature of crowdsourcing work.
External Socioeconomic Forces. Due to a major economic crisis in
Venezuela, a large number of contributors sign up to crowdsourcing platforms
seeking to earn money in a more stable currency while improving their quality
of life. This supply of contributors results in an uneven distribution of countries
of origin in the available workforce, leading to large volumes of data being la-
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Figure 3.1: Left: Countries per task (only tasks not targeting a country):
about 15% of all tasks are labeled by at most five distinct coun-
tries. Right: Average judgment time for seven use cases (white
dot = average): time spent on task varies greatly by use case
and individual.
same language, live in the same country (see Figure 3.1 - left). This can not only
lead to biases in the resulting datasets, but decreased satisfaction when tasks
are not in line with abilities of contributors in that country (e.g., language pro-
ficiency), leading to work being rejected and contributor frustration. Therefore,
uneven distribution of demographics in the workforce must be accounted for so
that potentially unwanted biases can be mitigated during task assignment. For
example, in an audio-collecting task for Natural Language Processing (NLP)
applications, diversity of countries, gender, and age may be desirable so that
models can generalize well.
Incompatible Abilities. Completion times vary greatly from one contribu-
tor to another. For example, while completion times of most contributors doing
a task may center around some value, the distribution of completion times can
be very wide (see Figure 3.1 - right), which can lead to underpayment for those
who spend too long completing a task, while those who are more skilled may
not have enough tasks to complete or may even find the tasks boring. This must
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be taken into consideration so that contributors are not assigned tasks that are
not in line with their ability to complete them. This is an issue because contrib-
utors may be spending too long doing tasks for which they are not qualified,
while missing out on other available tasks for which they may be.
Time Zone Bias. A task is launched by a researcher whose time zone is
Eastern Standard Time at 12PM. The task then gets mostly completed by con-
tributors in Western Africa and Eastern South America, and does not include
contributors from Central Europe, for example. If language or cultural differ-
ences matter (e.g., audio collection), the dataset will be heavily biased because
of the time the task was launched and the available workforce at that moment.
To reuse the NLP example from the first scenario, it is possible that even with
a biased dataset, a model trained on it may get used in the U.S. or Europe, by
English-speaking users. In the same scenario, it is also possible that contributors
from Eastern United States will attempt to take on the task, which may not have
been priced appropriately. This means that while contributors in Venezuela will
benefit from completing the task relative to the minimum wage in their country,
contributors in the U.S. will be largely underpaid.
Bias in Subjective Judgments. Several machine learning applications deal
with subjective opinions, such as sentiment analysis, image and content mod-
eration. In many cases, when collecting training data for content moderation
that attempts to filter out offensive and inappropriate content, it is important
to allow the dataset to include opinions with diversity of gender and age. To
make this example clearer, take an online platform used mostly by males. A
machine learning model will be trained on data collected by a crowdsourcing
platform which has over 70% of its available workforce as male. The model
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may be biased toward a “male view” of what may be considered offensive or
inappropriate. In addition, cultural background such as religious or political
views can affect subjective judgments, so it is equally important that diversity
in crowdsourcing goes beyond demographics.
3.3 Related Work
Dehumanization in Crowd Work. Several issues related to dehumanization
effects in crowdsourcing have been observed and addressed in prior works, in-
cluding underpaid contributors (e.g., [80, 98, 86, 142, 162]), incompatible tasks
(e.g., [22, 87, 52, 93, 94, 98, 115, 152]), tedious work (e.g., [87, 72, 141, 151]), and
power imbalance (e.g., [144, 171]). As a result, human factors in crowdsourc-
ing have been increasingly discussed by researchers. For instance, in reviewing
human-centric issues in crowdsourcing, Gadiraju et al. [71] argue that human
factors must be considered so that the humans behind the crowdsourcing tasks
can be properly accounted for. These issues are largely overlooked by design-
ers of crowdsourcing tasks, also known as requesters, as the established prac-
tice is to consider quality alone (e.g., accuracy, work approval rates), although
human-centric approaches have been shown to improve contribution quality
(e.g., [115]).
Nonetheless, solutions proposed in the past have addressed these individual
ethical issues in isolation, whereas we hope the design of our framework will
accommodate solutions for most of these issues simultaneously.
Biases from Crowd Work. In regards to biases originating from crowd work,
several prior works have looked at biases introduced by the process of labeling
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via crowds (e.g., [20, 35, 51, 55, 56, 120, 125, 127, 147]). More related to the bi-
ases of interest in this work, it has been suggested that cultural differences in
the crowd can affect algorithmic accuracy when gold-standard datasets used in
machine learning applications are created via such crowds [51, 147], and that
such differences may be introduced by implicit associations from different de-
mographics. For example, Dong and Fu found that European-Americans and
Chinese contributors can tag images differently [55]. In regards to gender, Otter-
bacher et al. [127] found that subjective judgments can be affected by contributor
attitudes, showing that sexist people are less likely to detect and report gender
biases in image search results. In another example, Nguyen et al. [120] showed
that gender detection is difficult because of implicit associations and social con-
structions that take place in the annotation process. These issues are especially
relevant when crowdsourcing is used to label data that are used by machine
learning models, and therefore are addressed by our framework.
While the issue of dataset bias has been extensively investigated from the
perspective of the data samples themselves (e.g., [15, 97, 129, 161, 177]), for ex-
ample, when a facial recognition dataset does not include samples of faces from
people of different races and ethnicities, prior works so far have only hinted and
encouraged researchers to study the impact of biases in contributor demograph-
ics in crowdsourcing (e.g., [147, 160]). Our framework considers these human




In addition to prior works, the issues presented in the previous section (The
Realities of Crowdsourcing) have been observed in our platform and thus have
greatly motivated our design. For example, the hiring of contributors can be
affected by temporal changes in the available crowd and/or the demographics
of those drawn to each platform [125]. For instance, a major economic crisis
in Venezuela caused many people to sign up to our platform in order to earn
money in a more stable currency, biasing the available workforce when most
contributors are from the same country, culture, and speak the same language,
which can be problematic for Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks. These
can not only bias the contributor sample, but also cause underpayment and frus-
tration when available tasks are incompatible with the skills of those attempting
to complete them, with completion times varying greatly for any given task (see
Figure 3.1). Biases can also be introduced because of the time of the day when
a task is launched, being completed by those located where it is business hours.
Such demographic biases can also pose issues to data relying on subjective judg-
ments of a subgroup [120, 127] in tasks such as sentiment analysis and content
moderation. For example, a machine learning model used for content modera-
tion would be trained on data collected by a crowdsourcing platform which has
over 70% of its available workforce as male. The model may be biased toward
a male view of what may be considered offensive or inappropriate. In addi-
tion, cultural background can affect subjective judgments [55], which may pose
issues when tasks involve judgments on politics and religion.
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Our intention in showing these scenarios is to make clear where the motiva-
tion for our work comes from. It is also to show that more often than not, histor-
ical accuracy or acceptance rates alone are far from sufficient when dealing with
tasks that aim at collecting training data for machine learning models. These
scenarios are not hypothetical – they do take place often in our platform. In ad-
dition, as has been shown elsewhere [98, 71], relying on process-centric metrics
such as accuracy leads to dehumanization effects in crowd work. With this in
mind, we present our framework, which mitigates these issues in the process of
data labeling for machine learning, but also in crowd work more broadly.
3.4.2 Design
The framework’s ultimate goal is to help a requester meet desired arrangements
for a task, allowing them to specify different settings related to human factors
before launching it – with transparency. That is, the requester will be able to
see how different arrangements for demographic distributions impact one an-
other as well as what biases could be introduced in the training data or likely
ethical issues (e.g., underpayment). Our philosophy is that, instead of taking
sides and defining which biases are wanted and which are not, our approach is
to let a requester decide how “diverse” or “skewed” the distribution of a certain
contributor demographic must be for a given labeling task. To illustrate when
certain biases may be desirable or undesirable, consider a requester who wants
to label comments for an online discussion forum in which the number of male
and female active users is close to equal. It is important for this requester that
the training data for the model performing the content moderation include the


















Figure 3.2: Example task configuration for two use cases. For audio tran-
scription, gender and contributor age are not as relevant as con-
tributor skills, experience, and language. For content modera-
tion, diversity of gender, age, and country is more important
than skills, experience, and language.
Likewise, diversity may be needed when collecting training data for a personal
voice assistant in form of audio, where variations of accent, gender, age, and
native language are crucial. In a different scenario, consider a requester collect-
ing training data for a search relevance model to be used in an online shopping
website where 90% of the user base is female. For this requester, gender bias
may be desirable in the training data.
In being transparent, not only requesters can make decisions about trade-
offs, but they are also made aware of potential biases or ethical issues that may
be introduced if a task is launched at any point in time, thus mitigating po-
tential dehumanization effects. We believe that mitigating biases and ethical
issues in this process are parallel goals to rehumanizing crowd work, and that
such a framework will ultimately contribute to rehumanizing crowd work via
increased transparency in regards to how human factors affect the work to be
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completed on the platform and the resulting labels that will later be used in
machine learning models.
Figure 3.2 shows examples of different arrangements for two different la-
beling tasks. By setting Experience to uniform, the framework will show the
tasks to contributors with different levels of experience in the platform. By set-
ting Skills to uniform, contributors with different sets of skills obtained through
working on different types of tasks will be selected. When specifying a skewed
metric, the requester is asked to select which values to be used along with the
percentage (e.g., 80% male, 20% female). While targeting workers by demo-
graphics has been a feature of crowdsourcing platforms, differently, our frame-
work attempts to automatically optimize the final distribution of demographics
(e.g., uniform).
Once an initial configuration is given, our framework then attempts to “ap-
proximate” the desired configuration for the task, essentially translating the task
assignment process into a multi-objective optimization problem, doing the best
possible to achieve the desired distribution of contributors working on a task.
Besides allowing requesters to specify arrangements, the framework can also
have defaults for which it always optimizes, such as minimizing underpay-
ment and maximizing the historical accuracy of those who are selected. The
framework also allows different “goals” for different use cases (e.g., sentiment
analysis, audio transcription, image moderation) as well as for new metrics to be
added easily in the future (e.g., optimize for task novelty, optimize for learning).
We note that a limitation of such framework is that in promoting transparency,
requesters could intentionally misuse it to do the opposite of what the frame-
work strives for, for example, by allowing them to exclude people who identify
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with one gender, or less experienced contributors. However, we believe that
more often than not, doing so may result in machine learning models that do
not perform well on the intended target audience. In our study, we used the
framework to ensure diversity of contributor gender, age, country, minimize the
pay gap, and maximize historical accuracy of contributors hired for the tasks.
3.4.3 System Implementation
We implemented the proposed framework as a live system in the back-end
of our crowdsourcing platform: Figure Eight [65]. We created a system with
Python that automatically and iteratively selects contributors who are online
for a task so that the “right” contributors (based on the desired arrangement)
for the task are hired at every optimization step until the task is complete (i.e.,
all needed labels are provided).
An optimization step consists of obtaining data from our databases about
what contributors are online at a given time, along with their demographics,
as well as data about contributors who already worked on the task, along with
their demographics, and then selecting suitable contributors so that the desired
arrangement is successfully achieved via a multi-objective optimization algo-
rithm. At each step, after identifying optimal contributors for the task, the sys-
tem attempts to hire contributors by creating Manual Custom Channels 2, which
is a feature in our platform to target contributors by their respective contributor
IDs. For example, if a uniform distribution of gender is desired and currently




will automatically attempt to hire more females in order to “approximate” the
desired configuration.
The demographics we used were voluntarily provided by contributors when
they created an account on our platform and were obtained through protected
and authenticated access to our own databases. Such data about our platform’s
contributors were not publicly available to requesters at the time of our study.
The selection process consists of qualifying a contributor for a task so that only
those selected at that step can work on the task next. In our study, the selection
of contributors took place every 20 minutes after the task was launched, until
the task was complete. Algorithm 1 describes the underlying task assignment
procedure:
Algorithm 1: Contributor-Task Assignment
1: while task not complete do
2: current ← set of contributors who worked on task
3: online← set of online contributors
4: selected ← ∅
5: states ← set of states {S tate0 . . . S taten} if onlinei is added to current for
each contributor in online
6: selected ← Pareto-optimal set of best n online contributors when n con-
tributors are added to current as given by Pareto-optimal states in states
7: recruit(selected)
8: end while
where n is in the range [0, sizeof(online)) and statei is defined by points in
multidimensional space composed of metrics to be optimized, such as normal-
ized entropy of a probability distribution (e.g., distribution of gender, country,
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and age) and continuous variables (e.g., mean historical contributor accuracy,
percentage of minimum hourly wage, size of set current∪ selected, used as objec-
tives to be minimized or maximized. Objectives could have different weights,
but we used equal weights in our study. The normalized entropy of a proba-
bility distribution was used because it grows as the distribution gets closer to
uniform. We used the algorithms provided by PyGMO [137] to obtain Pareto-
optimal solutions. In the very first time, current is a random sample of online
contributors. In subsequent steps, until no one worked on the task, this random
sample is used as current.
Due to the fact that not all contributors have provided demographic data
when they signed up, local optima could occur when a distribution is already
uniform, leading the framework to recruit those who did not provide a demo-
graphic as to not change an already optimal distribution. To deal with this, the
framework temporarily disables the goal for which the distribution is already
uniform at a given step. Nonetheless, demographics for about 65% of contribu-
tors in our platform have been voluntarily provided.
3.5 Evaluation
3.5.1 Study Design
The goal of our study was to evaluate the impact of the framework in mitigating
demographic bias (e.g., gender, age, country) in the resulting contributor sam-
ple, while optimizing the pay according to minimum wage and keeping compa-





































































































































































































































































































and a between-subject design. That is, we selected one previously completed
task from three popular use cases in our platform, namely image categorization,
content moderation, and audio transcription, and relaunched these tasks in our
platform under two conditions: without our framework (i.e., the baseline condi-
tion) and with our framework. The task for each use case is an actual task which
was completed in our platform in the past, created by different requesters. The
original tasks were launched about 3 months prior to the baseline and frame-
work tasks. By relaunching them, we repeated the tasks with the same set-up
(i.e., the same data provided in the original task, the same pay, the same num-
ber of judgments requested). Two of the three tasks were created by academic
institutions while the other was created by an Internet company. The choice of
use cases and tasks was also influenced by their potential to evaluate different
goals for each task. For example, in the image categorization task, we set up
the configuration to approximate uniform distribution of countries, gender, and
age, whereas for the audio transcription task, which consisted of transcribing
audio to text, we set up the framework to maximize the percentage of the pay
according to minimum hourly wage in each country. In our study, we took the
role of the requester by setting up these different configurations for each task,
since our system was implemented in the back-end of our platform. This means
we did not involve any requesters in our study. In considering different condi-
tions, we also considered the original task in our analysis as a condition which
we refer to as original, ultimately comparing three conditions: (a) the original
task, (b) the baseline task (without the framework), and (c) the framework task.
To maintain contribution quality, by default, all tasks were set to maximize the
mean historical accuracy of contributors on ground-truth units. Tasks (b) and (c)
were launched on the same week (which led to 393 contributors working on at
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least two tasks). We included task (a) (i.e., the original task) for each use case for
a more conservative analysis in which we expected tasks (a) and (b) to produce
similar results. Table 3.1 shows the configurations we used for each task. For
the Audio Transcription baseline and framework tasks, we filtered contributors
so that only those from countries whose English is one of the official languages
were considered (90 countries). We did this for two reasons: (1) it makes sense
for the task, and (2) we wanted to observe the framework at work when a filter
was also in place.
3.5.2 Tasks
The image categorization task consisted of showing profile photos of users to
contributors and asking them to provide the gender, ethnicity, and an emoji that
closely matched the skin tone of the person in the photo, via multiple choice
questions, for 10,000 data units. Contributors were paid $0.01 (USD) per judg-
ment provided for this task, doing 10 judgments at a time. If this task ends
up with skewed contributor demographics, a model classifying people would
carry biases from that group. For example, the judgment of Black or White may
differ between contributors in India and the U.S.
The content moderation task involved contributors judging whether a re-
sponse to a forum post contained toxic content, also asking contributors to mark
whom the attack was targeted to (e.g., a user on the thread, a group of people),
with multiple choices, for 4,022 data units. In this task, contributors were paid
$0.25 (USD) per judgment, at 5 judgments at a time. If this task has skewed con-
tributor gender, a model may not classify content deemed toxic to other genders.
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Finally, the audio transcription task consisted of having participants provide
text to match audio recordings which they listened to (e.g., “Tom is talking about
the fee”), for 119 data units. Participants were compensated with $0.10 (USD)
per judgment, giving 5 judgments at a time. Given the time to do this task, if pay
gap is not optimized, contributors from countries where the minimum wage is
far greater than what the tasks pays will be largely underpaid.
3.5.3 Data Analysis
In our data analysis, we compared the distribution of demographics of individ-
ual contributors who worked on the tasks as well as the continuous variables to
be maximized (e.g., historical contributor accuracy, percent of minimum hourly
wage). We also evaluated the impact of the framework on contribution qual-
ity by comparing accuracy of judgments provided to gold-standard data. In
addition, we evaluated the difference in the distribution of labels given by in-
dividual contributors in each condition. This was so that we could understand
whether the demographic optimization made by the framework would change
the number of decisions made in favor of one label or the other. In the future,
rather than counting the number of contributors in each subgroup, it may also
be beneficial to control by number of judgments, if some contributors can pro-
vide more judgments than others.
In order to assess a contributor’s quality/trust, our platform keeps track of
historical accuracy on ground truth/gold units provided by requesters to val-
idate the quality of their work as they undertake tasks. These data instances
are called “test units” and are randomly picked and presented to contributors
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as Test Questions 3 in “quiz mode” (i.e., before labeling begins as a qualifica-
tion step) and “test mode” (i.e., as attention checks during labeling). Our plat-
form integrates these ground-truth units automatically in the process of com-
pleting the task in order to assess the quality of the contributions and deter-
mine whether the work will be accepted, also using the all-time accuracy of
contributors on these data units as an indicator of a contributor’s work qual-
ity/reputation [11].
Therefore, in order to assess and compare the quality of contributions when
using the framework, we considered two metrics. The first is the historical ac-
curacy of a contributor on ground-truth units of all previously completed tasks.
This was automatically optimized for along with the other metrics in the system
(see Table 3.1). In addition to using contributors’ historical accuracy as a metric
for their work quality, we also evaluated the percentage of “incorrect” judg-
ments on each test unit (i.e., ground-truth data) provided in each study task for
quality control. These units were originally provided by the task requesters and
were used in all of the conditions evaluated in our study. The content modera-
tion task had 84 of such units, the image categorization task 87, and the audio
transcription had 20. Accordingly, we evaluate and compare the mean percent-
age of incorrect responses in all conditions to assess contribution quality.
Due to its experimental and exploratory nature, our system was not imple-
mented in our main production technology stack and therefore it did not have
access to our production databases in real-time. Nonetheless, our system is a
live system and integrated into our platform using our data and infrastructure.




a data warehouse that was “behind” at least 8 minutes – the delay to migrate
from production to the data warehouse – with no guarantee of synchronization.
This caused a throughput issue specific to our implementation. More specif-
ically, this caused our task assignments to target some contributors who may
have gone offline at each step, greatly impacting throughput of the framework
tasks. For example, the original image categorization task took 25.5 hours to
complete, with the baseline finishing in 33.4 hours. We stopped collecting judg-
ments for the framework task after 145 hours (29.4% complete). This task also
had the slowest throughput due to the low pay assigned by the original re-
questers. Similarly, the content moderation task had the original complete at 34
hours, while we stopped collecting judgments after 87.7 hours (36% complete)
in the framework task.
To accommodate for the throughput limitation in our data analysis, we
capped the number of contributors in the original and baseline conditions to
match the number of contributors who contributed to the framework task, tak-
ing the first n contributors from the other conditions, where n is the number of
contributors who worked on the framework task before we paused it. Doing
so is also beneficial for visualizing how biases may start taking place as soon
as the tasks are launched without the framework, when most contributors who
are online will complete the task very quickly. In the end, our data analysis had
297 contributors (96% of total in the finished original task) when analyzing the
first launch of the image categorization task, and 184 (50% of total in original)
contributors when analyzing the second. For the content moderation, the cap
was at 206 contributors (36% of original). We also report the final state of the
finished original tasks (e.g., distribution of demographics, average percent of
minimum wage).
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For the calculation of percentage to the minimum wage in our analysis, we
first calculate the hourly pay of a contributor given by the pay per judgment
divided by the average judgment duration in seconds, multiplying the result
by 3,600 (number of seconds in an hour). Then, we divide this amount by the
minimum hourly wage in the contributor’s country. During the task assign-
ment steps, this quantity was set to be maximized, with the reference average
judgment duration being the average judgment duration of those who already
worked on the task as a proxy for the expected pay, or the average judgment
duration of the contributor in the past 30 days, if no one worked on the task
before. We obtained minimum hourly wages by country from the International
Labour Organization [126] and converted to U.S. Dollars using the quantmod
[143] R package, which uses Yahoo Finance.
3.6 Results
The framework was able to mitigate potentially unwanted demographic biases
introduced by the labeling crowd while minimizing underpayment and keeping
comparable contribution quality. We present the results of our study compar-
ing the tasks launched originally, the tasks launched without our framework
(i.e., the baseline condition), and the tasks launched with our framework. We
emphasize once again the tasks in the three conditions followed the exact same
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Image Categorization − Contributor Countries
Figure 3.3: Left: Percentage of contributors from each country in the three
conditions for the image categorization task. Middle: Percent-
age of contributors from each age group in the image catego-
rization task. Right: Percentage of contributors from each gen-
der in the three conditions for the content moderation task. De-
mographics in baseline and original tasks were biased by de-
mographics of online active users of the platform.
3.6.1 Demographic Biases
Our results show that the framework was successful in approximating the dis-
tribution of different demographics to the configuration for each task, effec-
tively minimizing the likelihood that the distribution of any demographic was
very skewed towards a certain subgroup. This is further supported when we
look at the differences among the original task and the baseline task. In other
words, despite being launched several months apart, the original and the base-
line tasks yielded very similar results. Figure 3.3 shows differences in the demo-
graphics of contributors who worked on the tasks, which are described in more
detail below.
Country of Origin. When using the framework in the image categoriza-
tion task, contributors from 74 unique countries provided judgments, whereas
this number was 33 in the baseline task and 39 in the original task. The coun-
try from which most contributors came from was the same in the three condi-
tions: Venezuela. However, the percentage of contributors from Venezuela was
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18.5% with the framework, compared to 59.3% in the baseline and 60.6% in the
original. In the finished original task, contributors from 39 distinct countries
provided judgments, with the top country (Venezuela) having 60.7% of contrib-
utors.
Gender. The distribution of contributors from each gender was closer to
uniform in the framework task for image categorization, with 50.3% being male
and 49.7% being female, whereas the distribution was 72.7% male and 27.3%
female in the baseline task, and 68.3% male and 31.7% female in the original
task. Even in the finished original task, 67.5% of contributors were male and
32.6% female.
Likewise, the framework was also effective in the content moderation task,
for which when using the framework, 47.8% of contributors were female and
52.2% male, whereas 74.1% of contributors were male and 25.9% of contributors
were female in the baseline condition, and 70.3% being male and 29.7% being
female in the original task. This was similar in the finished original task for
content moderation, with 72.9% being male and 27.1% female.
Age. The distribution of contributor age in the framework task for image
categorization was also closer to uniform, with the age group with the most
contributors being between (20,30] years old with 22.5%, with other percentages
being 20.2% (30,40], 18.6% (40,50], 17.8% (50,60], 17.1%, and 3.9% (60,70]. In the
baseline condition, 41.8% of contributors were between 21-30 years old, with the
same age group having 40% of contributors in the original task, in other words,
the age distribution very skewed toward individuals in their 20s. Results were































Image Categorization − Pay Gap
Figure 3.4: Density of percentage of minimum wage for image categoriza-
tion (left) and audio transcription (right) tasks. Means are rep-
resented by vertical lines. When using the framework, contrib-
utors were compensated closer to minimum wage when pay
is low (left) and completed more profitable work when pay is
already good (right).
These results suggest that when tasks are launched in our platform without
the intervention of the framework, the distribution of demographics of those
who will work on the task are likely to be biased towards the demographics of
the active users in the platform (e.g., Venezuela, 21-30 years old, male), and the
framework mitigates this.
3.6.2 Pay Gap and Quality
In addition to optimizing the distribution of contributor demographics, the
framework also attempted to minimize underpayment in two tasks, while max-
imizing historical accuracy of those recruited for all tasks. Our results show that
the framework can minimize the pay gap of contributors working on the task,
paying contributors closer to minimum wage in their country when the task pay
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is low, and making the task more profitable when the task pay is already good
– without changing the pay of the task. Also, even when optimizing the dis-
tribution of demographics, the framework was still able to select high-quality
contributors for the task, albeit a slight decrease on accuracy of ground-truth
labels was observed.
Pay Gap. We optimized the task to minimize the pay gap in two use cases:
image categorization (Launch 2) and audio transcription. Minimizing the pay
gap may also be referred to as maximizing the percentage of the pay relative to
the minimum wage in each contributor’s country. Figure 3.4 shows the compar-
ison of the pay gap among the conditions.
More specifically, for the image categorization task, we launched a second
task with the framework optimizing for the same demographics as before, but
this time around also adding the percent of the minimum hourly wage as a met-
ric to be maximized. This new framework task resulted in the mean percentage
to the minimum wage of 44.9% (Mdn = 22.7%, SD = 48.2%, Min = 1%, Max =
284%), with this figure being higher than the other three conditions: the first
framework task had 28.1% as average percent to minimum wage (Mdn = 16.2%,
SD = 35.8%, Min = 0.2%, Max = 237%), the baseline task at 28.3% (Mdn = 35.5%,
Min = 1.1%, Max = 201%), and the original task having contributors being paid
an average of 31.5% the minimum wage of their country (Mdn = 15.5%, SD =
43.7%, Min = 1%, Max = 220%). The finished original task had mean percent of
minimum hourly wage at 25.7% (Mdn = 14%, SD = 36.6%, Min = 0.5%, Max =
219.7%).
For the audio transcription task, we targeted only English-speaking coun-
tries. In addition to filtering by country, the framework configuration only had
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percent of minimum hourly wage and historical accuracy to be optimized. The
average percentage of the minimum wage in the framework task was 471%
(Mdn = 306%, SD = 603%, Min = 3%, Max = 2760%), while being 407% for the
baseline condition (Mdn = 173%, SD = 521%, Min = 22.8%, Max = 1730%), and
346% in the original task (Mdn = 163%, SD = 462%, Min = 17.5%, Max = 2150%).
Two reasons that percentages are high in the audio transcription task: (1) the
task pays better and (2) most contributors were recruited from countries with a
very low minimum hourly wage relative to the U.S. Dollar e.g., Ghana ($0.17),
Egypt ($0.23), India ($0.25), Pakistan ($0.47), Kenya ($0.77).
Quality. In addition to optimizing for demographics and hourly pay, the
framework attempted to maximize the historical accuracy of those who were
selected for the task, serving as a proxy for quality or trust in the contributor.
For both the image categorization and content moderation task, the historical
accuracy of contributors was comparable and sometimes even higher when the
framework was used. For example, in the framework task for image categoriza-
tion, the average historical accuracy was 0.9, compared to 0.86 in the baseline
condition and 0.89 in the original task. For the finished original task, the mean
historical accuracy was 0.89.
Similarly, in the content moderation task, the accuracy in the framework task
was higher at an average of 0.97, being 0.87 in the baseline task, and 0.87 in the
original task. In the finished original task, the mean historical accuracy was
0.87.
The accuracy of contributors in the audio transcription task with the frame-
work is unknown because none of the 24 contributors had historical accuracy
on file, but this number was 0.81 for the baseline task, and 0.86 for the original.
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These results suggest that even when optimizing for human factors, the
quality of contributions is comparable. In other words, by using our frame-
work, we did not recruit more contributors who are historically “untrusted” or
“inaccurate” (e.g., bots, random clickers).
On other hand, when comparing the percentage of incorrect judgments
given to the test units (i.e., the ground-truth data), tasks where the framework
was used showed a slight increase in incorrect judgments given to ground-truth
data. More specifically, framework tasks had an average of 10% of incorrect
judgments per test unit (Mdn = 8%, SD = 10%, Min = 0%, Max = 67%), while
this number was 5% for the baseline (Mdn = 3%, SD = 8%, Min = 0%, Max =
55%), and 7% for the original (Mdn = 4%, SD = 8%, Min = 0%, Max = 38%). In
other words, framework tasks had a 5% increase in incorrect responses given to
ground-truth units provided by the original requesters compared to the baseline
and 3% compared to the original tasks.
3.6.3 Distribution of Labels
In addition to more evenly distributed demographics among selected contrib-
utors, the resulting data (i.e., the labels) provided by contributors were also
different when the framework was used. We looked at individual judgments
provided by contributors on the same units (i.e., rows) of the data.
The image categorization task consisted of providing the skin tone and eth-
nicity for a profile photo of a person. The distribution of skin tones given by
contributors in the framework task was different from the original and base-
line condition, with fewer judgments given for the two extremes of skin tone.
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For example, while the original and baseline tasks resulted in 16.6% and 21%
of judgments assigning 3 as the skin tone on a scale of 1 to 5, the framework
resulted in 24%. Likewise, both the original and baseline tasks resulted in 15.3%
of judgments assigning 5 as the skin tone, compared to 10.9% in the framework
task. The distribution of ethnicity given by contributors was very similar, with
the differences being within 1% among each category. This was likely due to
the dataset being unbalanced, with more photos of White and Black/African
American individuals.
In the content moderation task, for which the judgment is more subjective,
the distribution of content deemed toxic in the framework task was very differ-
ent from the other two tasks (i.e., the original and the baseline). In the frame-
work task, which attempted to select contributors so that the final distribution
of gender was closest to uniform, 40.3% of the judgments indicated that the
content in the comments was a personal attack or deemed toxic, with 56.8%
otherwise, and 2.9% unsure. Differently, the baseline task had 34.2% of the con-
tent marked as toxic, 65.3% otherwise, and 0.5% unsure, and the original task
had 33.4% marked as toxic, with 64.8% marked otherwise, and 1.7% unsure.
In other words, more content was marked as toxic by contributors when judg-
ments were distributed more evenly among contributors of both genders. We
do not claim causation in this result, but we do highlight how it can benefit sce-
narios where training data must be aligned with potential moderation scenarios
where a model must not be biased by views of any one gender.
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3.7 Discussion
Our results show that our framework can mitigate biases in the resulting con-
tributor sample while maintaining work quality and minimizing the pay gap
when launching tasks aimed at labeling datasets for machine learning applica-
tions. This has important implications for the effectiveness of machine learning
applications in the real world [147], especially when subjective opinions and
judgments are involved in the process of data labeling. We discuss our results
in more detail and directions for future work.
3.7.1 Moving Beyond Historical Accuracy
In our platform, contributors are leveled based on their historical accuracy e.g.
Unleveled, L1, L2, and L3. This is also a common practice in other crowdsourc-
ing platforms (e.g., AMT) where often acceptance rates are used in an attempt to
obtain high-quality responses [11]. Our study shows that accuracy and accep-
tance rates alone are not appropriate indicators of training data quality and that
the human behind the label must also be considered in order to mitigate issues
of bias that can limit the performance of machine learning models used in the
wild. In addition, in our study, contributors from any level were recruited so
long as they were optimal as determined by the framework, without launching
the tasks to any particular level. Therefore, our results indicate that it is possible
to maintain work quality while mitigating biases.
Our framework was designed in a way that allows other goals to be easily
incorporated. Its implementation will always attempt to make the best possible
67
choice at a given time, making trade-offs as needed. One potential goal that
could be introduced is the idea of skill ladders proposed by Bigham et al. [87].
For example, for a task that requires no special demand of cognitive abilities,
such as image categorization of objects, one goal in the framework could be to
select contributors so that the final distribution of contributor experience ap-
proximates a uniform distribution. This gives newcomers the opportunity to
gain experience while mitigating scenarios where most labels are provided by
the few most experienced contributors, which is commonplace.
Still on the idea of growth and engagement, contributors could be selected to
maximize task novelty, that is, the percentage of contributors for which a task is
very dissimilar from other tasks completed before, thus preventing contributors
from getting stuck doing the same work for long periods of time. One caveat
is that it is likely that contributors may spend more time doing an unfamiliar
task, which can introduce conflicting situations when, for example, maximizing
hourly pay is one of the other goals.
Among many possible improvements to our framework, one of them is
adding the ability for it to automatically identify demographics that need to be
optimized. For example, in identifying that the judgments about the same data
units given by male and female contributors differ, it could learn that it is impor-
tant to recruit with diversity in this case. This would help alleviate throughput
issues and avoid incorporating unnecessary goals into the optimization process.
When implementing the framework, we argue that it must be done with
transparency in mind so that not only requesters can make more informed de-
cisions about biases and ethics, but also be made aware via soft paternalistic
nudges [145] to encourage desirable behavior. For example, a requester launch-
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ing a task within a U.S. timezone may be nudged that the price that they are
setting for a task may be incompatible with the contributors available at the mo-
ment, which are in the U.S. Possible solutions may include suggesting to raise
the pay or launching the task when the pay is more in line with online contrib-
utors’ minimum wage. More importantly, when implemented, the framework
could help requesters construct a recruitment plan based on historical data from
the platform, automatically identifying potential biases and desired configura-
tions to mitigate them under different use cases (e.g., audio collection, sentiment
analysis), creating effective templates and defaults that minimize issues of bias
and ethics by design. In exercising transparency in this manner, crowd work
could be rehumanized, especially when used for machine learning purposes.
Nonetheless, designers must be careful so that purposeful misuse such as ex-
cluding subgroups (e.g., gender) and unethical hiring (e.g., paying less than
minimum wage) can be prevented. One idea is to enforce defaults such as al-
ways maximizing the percentage to the minimum hourly wage, and nudge re-
questers about exclusions and sample biases prior to launching a task.
Given that a large fraction of unpaid work is due to the time finding tasks
[80], when our framework is implemented, contributors could be notified that
they have a task for which they qualify based on the configuration set up by
the requester – even if they are offline. For example, a contributor over 60 years
old may receive an e-mail asking for their contribution because the task needs
a perspective from that age group. This could reduce their effort spent finding
good work (see [86, 162, 96]) and motivate them to work on the tasks [141].
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3.7.2 Conflicts and Trade-offs
In any multi-objective optimization problem, conflicting states are likely to oc-
cur. This motivated our choice of applying Pareto-optimal selection so that these
trade-offs could be accounted for. In turn, when conflicting states are present,
labeling throughput can be affected. For example, consider a setup where the
number of distinct countries is to be maximized while also minimizing the pay
gap. In our platform, this can occur when most contributors online are from
countries that would make the pay gap minimal, but selecting them would in-
troduce contributor country bias.
As observed in our experiment, there are trade-offs between labeling with less
bias and completing the task faster. For example, because the distribution of the
available workforce is inherently biased towards the active users of the plat-
form, it is possible that during many steps the number of optimal contributors
to be selected will be small, which in turn contributes to longer task comple-
tion times (i.e., takes longer to obtain all labels). For this reason, we created
a neural network model to forecast the changes in the demographics 24 hours
into the future. This model helps with the problem of throughput, by choosing
launch windows that are in line with the desired configuration for a task. For
example, the framework could schedule to launch a task at the time the number
of distinct countries is the largest within the next 24 hours, if the desired ar-
rangement for a task is to maximize contributors’ number of distinct countries.
Another potential solution to reduce throughput is to maximize the likelihood
that a contributor will do a task when they are assigned, based on historical
data, but one must be careful with biases in doing so, in case the majority of
contributors who are more likely to work on it are from the same country.
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Although minor, our findings point to a possible decrease in contribution
quality when using our framework, as indicated by a 3-5% increase in the av-
erage percentage of incorrect responses given to ground-truth units in the tasks
where our framework was used. This may have had to do with the fact that the
framework tasks did not necessarily recruit the most active/experienced con-
tributors because they would certainly bias the demographic distribution by
being a from single country and/or gender. This increase in incorrect responses
may translate into additional costs for task requesters and should be further
explored in the future.
In experimenting with the initial demographics selected for our study, we
came across a limitation where we did not have a reliable source of a demo-
graphic – the language of contributors. We had the language in which they
use the platform as well as the language from their browsers, but we decided
that this was not enough to be able to secure a selection criterion, therefore not
using it in our study. This raises an interesting implication, which is, while it
is possible to improve crowdsourcing by considering human-centric attributes
such as demographics, it will also require platforms to collect more personal
data, which may raise questions related to the privacy of contributors. In ad-
dition, contributors connected to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) may mask
their country, which may result in ineffective hiring.
Our choice of optimizing the selection process in real time – considering
only online users – was so that we could assign tasks to both newcomers and
active contributors. Given that contributors spend a considerable amount of
time trying to find good tasks to work on, an alternative approach would also
assign tasks to those who are offline, potentially sending them a notification
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that they have a good task waiting for them. Nonetheless, this would require
careful thought, or exclusion of certain groups can occur (e.g., only recruiting
active users in the last 30 days).
3.7.3 Limitations and Future Work
The personal data used in our experiments are voluntarily provided by con-
tributors. Although about 65% of contributors do provide demographics, not
all contributors do so, and there is no verification for it. This can lead to cases
where the framework recruits contributors with missing data because it will not
affect an optimal state. This may cause biases that are not possible to visualize
once a contributor whose gender or age is unknown is recruited. Nevertheless,
given the formative nature of our experiment we find that this is an acceptable
limitation, given that the framework would be able to perform equally well
if demographics were available for all contributors. We decided to consider
contributors with missing data in order to increase throughput, otherwise we
would not be able to collect enough data for our experiments.
Given that this was a research endeavor, our implementation was done caus-
ing the minimum disturbance possible to our platform. When our framework is
incorporated into the platform in a more seamless way (i.e., part of the consoli-
dated technology stack), the limitation of throughput will be greatly mitigated,
for example, with shorter intervals between steps, giving it a quicker response
time and targeting contributors who are actually online.
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3.9 Conclusion
Manual data labeling for machine learning can engender carry-over biases, de-
humanization, unfair compensation, and incompatible task assignments. These
realities are entangled with the socioeconomic world in which crowdsourcing
work is situated, and are arguably inevitable. To mitigate these, we designed
and evaluated a crowdsourcing framework, introducing more transparency and
helping requesters anticipate problems and achieve their labeling goals with
human factors in mind. We conducted several crowdsourcing experiments on
a popular crowdsourcing platform with 1,919 contributors, collecting 160,345
judgments for labeling tasks for machine learning use cases. We show how
our framework can mitigate demographic biases in contributor samples and in-
crease contributor hourly pay. Most importantly, we show that human-centric
recruiting of contributors can serve as an alternative to more formal meth-
ods such historical accuracy or acceptance rates of previously submitted work.
However, this algorithmic intervention introduces new risks, such as collecting
contributor demographics, trade-offs between bias mitigation and task through-
put, and the potential for requesters to discriminate and exploit contributors.
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CHAPTER 4
MODELS OF FLUID PRIVACY PREFERENCES FOR THE SMART HOME
4.1 Introduction
This chapter draws heavily on a paper published at PETS 2019 [24]. Like the
research presented in Chapter 3, I also had the primary role in this research.
Specifically, I conceptualized, developed, and conducted the survey and algo-
rithmic evaluations in this chapter, in addition to writing the research paper. I
worked under the guidance of Professor Joon S. Park and Professor Yang Wang,
who mentored me in this research. Dr. Yaxing Yao made contributions to the
analysis of open-ended responses and writing a literature review for the paper.
For the reasons above, I use the pronoun “we” throughout the chapter. For
newly added personal reflections or additions, I use the pronoun “I.”
The promise of technology that can make life easier inside one’s home drives
the concept of the smart home. Smart home devices include thermostats, door
locks, and a variety of other devices that can be remotely controlled and are
Internet-connected, with some even listening all the time (e.g., voice-activated
assistants). The ubiquitous adoption of these devices challenges the centuries-
old notion that the home is a private, protected, and intimate place, and gen-
erates user privacy concerns that stand in the way of widespread adoption of
smart home devices, especially because they can enable monitoring in otherwise
personal spaces [99, 117].
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4.1.1 The Realities of the Smart Home
Experts believe that although consumers are worried about privacy, optimism
bias will outweigh privacy concerns and ultimately drive adoption of these de-
vices [131]. Optimism bias refers to underestimating the chances of being sub-
ject to a negative event. For example, people may think that they will not be
a target of security attacks or privacy breaches, therefore engaging in unsafe
practices such as reusing passwords and not adopting security tools such as
two-factor authentication. Smart home device adoption is indeed rising: in
2017 alone, 20 million Amazon Echo devices and 7 million Google Home de-
vices were sold [37]. These numbers are expected to continue growing signif-
icantly as smart home devices offer more features and convenience at a low
cost. A recent report by Juniper Research predicts that stand-alone voice assis-
tants are expected to be part of 55% of US households by 2022, with a number
of installed devices to achieve 175 million [91]. Such widespread adoption of
smart home devices could critically change entrenched norms around informa-
tion flows [121] and create opportunities for large-scale appropriation of data
collected inside one’s home, thus threatening the privacy of individuals in un-
precedented ways. It is also the case that secondary use may be inherently the
goal of the most popular devices offered for the smart home, such as the Google
Voice Assistant and Amazon Alexa – while they offer convenience, Google’s de-
vice expands profiling capabilities through the use of the assistant, and Amazon
attempts to boost sales and target consumers with product offers.
Many developers are being wary and marketing their products with privacy
in mind, but privacy tensions remain around data practices in the smart home.
Such tensions are justified by the potential for abuse, misuse, and appropriation
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of user data. For example, while developers may say they will not sell user data,
nothing stops them from changing their policy in the future and using data
collected originally for automation, to serve unforeseen, secondary purposes
(e.g., targeted advertising). In fact, lead developers already use such data for
that purpose, such as Google with the Google Home Mini. Amazon has also
been reportedly selling people’s doorbell camera data to local law enforcement
agencies [95]. Such data practices puts developers at an advantage, being able
to commoditize user data and amplify their knowledge about one’s life inside
their homes, creating “sequels” to Web and smartphone tracking.
From a theoretical angle, according to Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity
theory [121], activities that violate information gathering and dissemination
norms expected in a given context, and that cross the governing norms of dis-
tribution within it, constitute a privacy violation. Contextual integrity theory
also holds that notions of privacy also rely on ethical concerns that arise over
time. Therefore, one could argue that if such extensive appropriation is to take
place without a regard to the privacy norms appropriate to the context (i.e.,
people’s homes), then they will pose serious consequences that violate societal
principles and values in regards to privacy, ultimately resulting in the spanning
of long-settled boundaries [128]. Therefore, preventing improper information
flows becomes a necessity in order to alleviate privacy tensions, develop user
trust toward smart home devices [174], and ultimately, protect the home’s long-
held privacy norms at a societal level [174].
To address this need, we present machine learning models that can be used
by developers to derive actionable steps toward respecting the privacy of users
in a personalized way. We developed three models from survey data: (1) a
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model that can predict allow/deny preferences based on one’s current informa-
tion privacy inclinations as well as personal and home attributes, purposes of
use, and devices that may be involved in a given smart home information flow
(AUC .868); (2) a model that can predict, for each information flow, what cir-
cumstances can change users’ original preferences (e.g., what if data are [not]
transmitted securely? what if data are [not] collected frequently?) (AUC .899)
and (3) a model that can be used for predicting how much (in US dollars) users
would be willing to pay extra for added privacy protections or accept as a dis-
count/refund to allow collection/sharing of data (RMSE 12.459). By using these
models, smart home developers can not only obtain fine-grained, personalized
user preferences on a large scale, but also identify potentially inappropriate data
practices based on such preferences and unveil actionable steps in order to re-
spect the privacy of users.
4.2 Related Work
In collecting smart home privacy preferences via a survey, automatically pre-
dicting preferences and their changes, and learning the privacy value in the
smart home, we situate our research in light of prior works on privacy pref-
erences in the Internet of Things (IoT), modeling of privacy preferences, and
privacy valuations.
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4.2.1 Privacy Preferences in the IoT
Broad IoT. Because the IoT has the potential to significantly increase sensing
capabilities, user concerns about privacy are commonplace. This has motivated
researchers to look into user preferences regarding data collection in IoT envi-
ronments on a large scale. Notable studies of this nature are Lee and Kobsa’s
[103] and Naeini et al.’s [117]. These studies were conducted as combinatorial
scenario-based surveys with the goal of identifying the impact of different con-
textual factors on privacy decisions, such as where data collection takes place,
what data types (e.g., video, photo) are involved, who collects the data, reason
for data collection, and the retention period following the data collection. These
studies revealed that privacy preferences vary greatly based on the data types
(e.g., video, biometrics), purpose of use, entities (e.g., government), whether
information flows are used for safety, convenience, and the benefit of the user,
and whether the data are inferred or not. Both studies also indicate that users
are mostly uncomfortable with information flows at private places such as the
home. These studies are foundational in regards to privacy preferences and ex-
pectations of users in the broad IoT and provide avenues for further research.
Unlike these studies, our survey focuses exclusively on the smart home, and
explores different contextual factors that may influence privacy decisions more
deeply, such as users’ Internet privacy concerns, comfort levels toward manu-
facturer, third parties, and government, personal and home attributes (rather
than data types like video, image or voice), purposes of use, and situational fac-
tors known to change privacy decisions in other domains (e.g., the Web, smart-
phones). By “zooming into” the smart home, we evaluate preferences in light
of the impregnability of the home [121] and the potential for secondary use.
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We evaluate personal and home attributes because they are directly associated
with knowledge of activities inside the home, which users are uncomfortable
with [36]. In addition, the tracking of device attributes and events may also
lead to physical safety vulnerabilities [42], so we include device states, actions,
and events as attributes in our scenarios. This way we can know, for exam-
ple, if users would be comfortable with the use of personal, device, and home
attributes for the purpose of targeted advertising.
Smart Home. A number of previous studies have focused on specific devices
in the smart home environment, hinting at different factors that may affect peo-
ple’s privacy perceptions towards them. For example, there have been studies
about smart home technologies for elders [43], assistive technologies [50], smart
toys [113], and smart home devices in general [174]. Such prior case studies
hinted that certain factors can cause user privacy concerns more than others,
and that users are overall uncomfortable with potential monitoring of their ac-
tivities inside the home. While these studies focused on specific use cases such
as smart toys and assistive technology for older adults, they reveal one inter-
esting discrepancy about users’ choices involving the benefits that smart home
technologies can bring and the privacy issues raised by adopting such technolo-
gies. For example, some choose privacy over benefits [50], while others’ needs
will outweigh any privacy concerns [44], with trust toward the manufacturer
being important (e.g., [174]).
Apthorpe et al. [16] proposed a combinatorial method to obtain privacy
norms in the smart home based on the contextual integrity privacy framework.
Their methodology is very similar to Lee and Kobsa’s [103] and Naeini’s [117],
and ultimately most similar to our own survey’s methodology (i.e., the survey
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we conducted to collect our training data), given its highly contextual approach
to capturing privacy norms in the smart home. They conducted a study which
revealed that people may be uncomfortable with entities other than the man-
ufacturer accessing smart home data, and that consent and the ability to use
the data for emergencies contribute the most toward increased comfort. On the
other hand, targeted advertising and permanent storage contributed the most
toward discomfort.
In conducting a similar survey, we followed their recommendations mov-
ing forward, such as considering data practices in the smartphone domain and
their transfer into the smart home, and considering attributes associated with
other people at the home (e.g., guests). The authors, however, did not at-
tempt to model personalized privacy preferences with machine learning, and
they did not consider pre-established Internet privacy concerns of users (e.g.,
IUIPC [107]) in their data collection methodology, which we do. In addition,
the major differences from Apthorpe et al.’s survey to ours are that we cover a
more comprehensive list of attributes, purposes of use, and situational factors
that can influence privacy decisions identified previously in the smartphone
[104, 165, 102] and online behavioral advertising domains [114, 163]. These sit-
uational factors are especially relevant in the smart home because IoT devices
vary greatly in their sensing capabilities as well as the entities behind them,
for example, involving companies of many sizes and backgrounds which may
provide different levels of stability, security, and reliability [83].
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4.2.2 Modeling Privacy Preferences
Other Domains. With the growing number of devices, apps, and resources
users have to manage daily, protecting individual privacy can be challenging
and burdensome. For this reason, recent works in other domains, especially mo-
bile phone app permissions, have proposed effective ways to use machine learn-
ing to assist users in managing privacy preferences (e.g., [105, 173, 172, 123]).
These works have focused on developing and evaluating tools that predict pref-
erences about app permissions for the user, essentially making a decision on
their behalf. Such studies also indicate that through a small number of ques-
tions, a large number of preferences can be accurately obtained, effectively re-
ducing user burden. Authors also advocate for models to account for purposes
of use, uncertainty, contextual factors, and the malleability of privacy prefer-
ences (e.g., avoid one-shot, binary decisions). More importantly, as pointed by
Olejnik et al. [123], in developing future automated privacy management, it is
important to identify what data flows are likely to “defy” users’ expectations
in a given context. We agree, and further argue that asking the types of “what
if?” questions like we do in our work enables developers to not only capture the
malleability of privacy preferences, but also gain user trust; an important factor
in the smart home. In addition, Liu et al. [105] assert that privacy assistants can
be used in domains where privacy configuration is an issue, with one of such
domains being the IoT, where devices lack contextual cues, for instance, having
small screens or no screens at all.
While these research efforts were conducted in different domains, their find-
ings indicate that modeling privacy preferences is a promising approach, and
many relevant implications can be learned from them. One common aspect of
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these works is that they use behavior data to train machine learning models,
whereas we use data capturing expectations/attitudes. This poses a limitation
to our models in that they may learn from expectations and attitudes rather
than behavior, and traditionally, these are known to differ. This discrepancy
is also known as the privacy paradox, which reflects a deviation between at-
titudes and behavior when it comes to privacy decisions. Nonetheless, these
works have also suggested that data from expectations have been effective in
making privacy recommendations, and that such models could be adjusted as
behavior data are collected over time [105, 173]. We note, however, that the
limited contextual cues in IoT devices make it difficult to gather behavior data
(e.g., no or small screens [105]), in addition to the fact that, at the time of this
writing, there is no established permission model for the IoT. From these prior
works on modeling privacy preferences, we learned that automated decisions
for privacy management can reduce privacy violations, but such decisions must
consider context and the malleability of privacy decisions. Our machine learn-
ing pipeline incorporates these aspects, and in a new domain: the smart home.
There have been attempts, however, to model privacy settings in the IoT more
broadly, which we describe next.
IoT. Regarding modeling privacy preferences in the IoT, the closest work to
our own is Bahirat et al.’s [19], where authors evaluated models based on Lee
and Kobsa’s survey data [103], which capture user preferences in the IoT, in
order to create user-facing privacy-preserving profiles. Combining clustering
algorithms with decision tree models for classification, the authors reached 82%
accuracy in predicting user preferences that could be used to derive IoT users’
privacy settings. The authors used three variables about each scenario to rep-
resent a user’s attitude: risk, comfort, and appropriateness, averaged across 14
82
scenarios, and created decision trees with entities and data types.
Besides offering increased performance in preference prediction (5% in-
crease) and being focused more specifically on smart home rather than the IoT
more broadly, our work offers a number of meaningful advantages compared
to Bahirat et al.’s. First, our approach enables more convenient collection of user
features (four scenarios vs. 14). Second, by using validated privacy constructs
such as the Internet Users’ Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) scale [107],
we also capture each user’s existing attitudes/concerns toward online privacy.
Third, one of our models enables the prediction of potential changes in comfort
levels. Last, but not least, one of our models enables the prediction of monetary
value associated with privacy in the smart home.
While our work offers these advantages, Bahirat et al.’s decision-tree ap-
proach is more interpretable – a requirement for user-facing tools – whereas our
models can be used by developers in the back-end on a large scale, not to strictly
enforce default settings, but to assist in identifying acceptable data practices for
their users.
4.2.3 Value of Privacy
One aspect of privacy decision-making is that it often involves cost-benefit as-
sessments from users. In fact, some argue that this relationship between privacy,
costs, and expected benefits, warrants approaching privacy from an economics
perspective (e.g., [2]). In this aspect, the smart home domain has two interest-
ing, distinct characteristics compared to other domains: (1) devices are paid for,
rather than free-to-use and (2) they are inserted into a privacy-by-default en-
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vironment i.e. the home. The former puts a price tag on the expected added
convenience such devices can offer, and the latter poses a risk, thus making for
an interesting research case.
Studies of privacy valuations often measure the dollar value associated with
privacy by involving choices of either selling/disclosing and protecting per-
sonal information, for example, by offering discounts and/or extra protective
features in a “willing-to-accept” and “willing-to-protect” manner (e.g., [79, 6]).
These studies have shown that people would accept more money to disclose
personal information than they would be willing to pay to protect the very same
information. They also indicate that people give more value to privacy when
they already have it than when they do not (i.e., they are loss-averse). Previous
studies have also looked into interdependent privacy valuations, such as the
privacy value of a friend’s data (e.g., [135, 136, 134]). Such studies show that
people will put more value on their own privacy than the privacy of others, but
that people’s assessments also depend on context, such as whether information
from their friends is really necessary.
In our scenario-based survey, we adopt the willingness-to-accept and
willingness-to-protect approach to learn people’s privacy values associated
with the purchase of a smart home voice assistant costing $49 (USD), and later
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Figure 4.1: Survey Workflow. Participants responded and reviewed four
randomly generated scenarios representing information flows,
in addition to one economics-related scenario involving a voice
assistant, IUIPC questions, and demographics.
4.3 Method
Our goal was to create machine learning models that could predict personal-
ized, appropriate privacy preferences about different information flows, as well
as identify circumstances that could change such preferences. For example,
would the user allow the use of their indoor location for targeted advertising?
What if consent is obtained for doing so? How much would a user pay for ex-
tra privacy protections? Such models could be used by a developer to exercise
privacy-preserving data practices and gain user trust in the smart home. De-
velopers can reproduce our steps to collect training data from their user base
and create similar models of their own. To obtain such data, we conducted a
scenario-based factorial online survey with participants based in the US, which




We conducted a factorial vignette study similar in design and structure to
Naeini et al.’s [117] and Apthorpe et al.’s [16]. We used Amazon Mechanical
Turk (AMT) to conduct the survey with US-based participants. The survey con-
sisted of asking users for comfort levels, allow/deny choice, and notification
frequency for four randomly generated information flows with combinations of
attributes, purposes, and devices. A full list of these components can be found
in appendix Table A.1, and the rationale behind their choice can be found in
the appendix Section A.1.1. In addition to collecting original preferences, par-
ticipants were asked to review situational factors, inspired by prior works, that
could make them more or less comfortable with the scenarios.
Besides responding to each information flow, we asked participants a
scenario-based economics question about a voice assistant, asked them to com-
plete the Internet Users’ Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) questionnaire
[107], and collected demographics. In the economics scenario, participants had
to enter how much they would be willing to pay extra for added privacy protec-
tions, or take as a discount in the purchase (or refund) to allow the manufacturer
to collect and share their data involving a $49 (USD) voice assistant.
Participants were asked to explain every response provided to the survey
through mandatory open-ended text fields (e.g., answers for each information
flow, situational factors, and economics-related scenario). Such responses were
used to check the data provided by respondents for quality and consistency.
We manually checked each open-ended response, and removed all data from 25
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participants whose answers were not meaningful and/or seemed like random
copy-paste. We also included an open-ended, mandatory field at the end of the
survey to gather feedback from participants about things that were unclear or
any issues that they faced throughout the survey. Although we closely moni-
tored each response to this question, participants did not raise any concerns. In
fact, many praised the quality of our experiment through such field. We manu-
ally provided bonuses for participants who took longer than average to finish.
In the end, our survey collected data from 698 participants, with a median
time to complete of 19 minutes. Participants were compensated with $1.50
(USD) for taking the survey. We recruited participants from the United States
with over 95% approval rate on previously submitted work in the AMT plat-
form. As an additional qualification step, participants were introduced to smart
home devices based on the Wikipedia definition1 and a photo of a smart home
device (a smart thermostat). Then, they were asked to select three devices they
thought to be a smart home device, from photos of six devices including a DSLR
camera, a desk lamp, a blender, a smart thermostat, a voice assistant, and a
smart bulb. Only participants who selected the three smart home devices were
allowed to complete our survey. In the end, we collected preferences for 2,792
scenarios, with four scenarios answered per participant.
Survey Workflow
In this section, we provide details about our survey workflow, summarized in
Figure 4.1.
1. Scenarios. First, participants were presented with the four scenarios, one
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_automation
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at a time. Two of the scenarios had a random device involved for which the
attribute was device-related (e.g., device states, device actions, device status).
For half of the participants, assigned randomly, the purpose in the information
flow was deliberately omitted, since in realistic settings the purpose of data col-
lection is not always clear, which can make users uncomfortable. Below is a
scenario example:
“The manufacturer/developer of your smart home device is accessing or inferring
[age of people at home], for example, [the age of all the people who visit and live
in your home]. They are using this information for [company revenue], for example,
[for the profit of a company who is behind your smart device (e.g., manufacturer,
retailer, etc.)].”
Depending on the information flow/scenario, the content inside square
brackets would change to indicate the attribute, attribute description, purpose,
and purpose description, exactly as in Table A.1 (appendix). Following the pre-
sentation of the vignette, participants were asked to provide their level of com-
fort with the given scenario, on a scale of 1 to 5 (i.e., very uncomfortable to very
comfortable). Then, participants were asked to also provide levels of comfort
in the same scale should the manufacturer share the data with a third party,
and with the government (one comfort level for each). Following comfort lev-
els, participants were asked to indicate whether if given the choice, they would
allow or deny the information flow, and how frequently they would like to be
notified about it: “never,” “only the first time,” “once in a while,” or “always.”
2. Review. Then, after collecting comfort levels, choice, and notification
preferences for each scenario, we asked each participant to review a number of
situational factors and check which ones would make them more comfortable
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(if originally indicated uncomfortable i.e., 1-2) or less comfortable (if they origi-
nally indicated comfortable i.e., 3-5) with the scenario. These situational factors
were inspired by prior works in the domains of online behavioral advertising
and smartphones and are known to affect people’s privacy preferences toward
information flows (e.g., if manufacturer is well known, if user can benefit from
data collection, etc.). Participants were asked to select at most three (enforced)
from a list of 13 factors (Table A.1 in appendix). In addition, participants were
asked to give a comfort level, in the same scale, if their identity (e.g., their name,
address, or other identifiable information) were used in the original information
flow, given that this was known to cause discomfort from previous studies (e.g.,
[117]).
3. Economics. For the economics-related scenario, each participant was ran-
domly assigned to one of the four conditions: (1) purchasing a voice assistant
and paying extra for added privacy protections; (2) purchasing a voice assistant
and getting a discount for fewer privacy protections; (3) owning a voice assis-
tant and paying a one-time fee for added privacy protections and (4) owning
a voice assistant and accepting a refund for fewer privacy protections. For all
four conditions, participants were first introduced to a voice assistant with a
photo of Amazon’s Alexa and a brief description, where no indication of the
brand/entity behind the product was given. Each scenario posed the voice as-
sistant as costing $49 (USD). In this portion of the survey, added privacy was de-
scribed as “more privacy controls and protections such as limited collection and shar-
ing of your personal information,” and fewer privacy protections was implicitly
expressed as “allowing the manufacturer to collect and share personal information.”
We did not explicitly frame the questions with “fewer privacy protections” not
to prime participants. Instead, “fewer privacy protections” was implicitly cap-
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tured by the combined framing of the scenarios and questions, in the following
format:
“Consider a scenario where you [are looking to purchase a voice assistant that
costs OR had a voice assistant for which you paid] £49 (USD). The voice assis-
tant [has OR has little to no] privacy controls and protections against collection and
sharing of your personal information”
where the content inside square brackets is defined based on each partici-
pant’s scenario condition.
After the scenario was presented, participants were then asked to enter the
amount corresponding to the question in their condition (i.e., pay extra when
purchasing, paying one-time fee after purchase, discount when purchasing, re-
fund after purchase). For example:
“How much would you be willing to take as a discount off the price tag in exchange
for allowing the manufacturer to collect and share personal information in the future?
Please specify the amount in dollars (number entry)” (example for condition 2: dis-
count at purchase)
4. IUIPC. Following the economics-related scenario, we asked participants
to answer IUIPC questions regarding Awareness, Collection, and Control [107].
These allowed us to gauge the level of Internet privacy concerns of our partici-
pants, as well as to have machine learning features representing existing privacy
concerns.
5. Demographics. Finally, we asked participants for demographic informa-
tion such as gender, age bracket, whether they owned a smart home device, time
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spent on the Internet weekly, income bracket, marital status, household size,
and whether they had children. Table A.2 (appendix) shows the demograph-
ics of participants – 49% of survey participants indicated they already owned a
smart home device.
4.3.2 Machine Learning Models
Below we describe in detail our machine learning experiments, including goals,
data collection and preparation, feature engineering, and model selection and
evaluation.
Overall Goals. With data from our survey, we were first interested in pre-
dicting allow or deny (binary) preferences given a user’s stated privacy attitudes
(IUIPC), attributes, purposes, devices, and comfort levels involved in different
information flows. Second, we wanted to be able to identify which factors – for
a given information flow – would change the original preference of a user to-
ward being more or less comfortable (binary). Third, we wanted to predict how
much (numerical) a user would be willing to pay extra or accept in exchange for
“more” or “fewer” privacy controls either at or after the time of purchase. More
importantly, we wanted to be able to model user preferences without requiring
too much information from the user. That is, we were interested in knowing
how accurately a model would be able to predict allow/deny preferences, fac-
tors that could change their preferences, and privacy value in US Dollars, with
minimum user effort. This means a potential user of our models would com-
plete the IUIPC questionnaire and give their comfort levels for four randomly
generated scenarios – the same number of scenarios in our survey – from which
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we would take the average comfort levels to use as features, and generate com-
binations of scenarios with the different attributes, purposes, and devices to
serve as personalized preferences. We would also identify, using combinatorics,
which factors – when present – would change original preferences, and how
much one would be willing to pay extra/accept for added/fewer controls.
Pros and Cons. The main advantage of our approach is the ability for devel-
opers to gather potential preferences for a large number of scenarios and distill
actionable steps from them. Informally, it is a way to ask “what if?” questions
in order to understand what may or may not be appropriate for a particular
user. Our approach can also be used by developers to align their practices with
privacy expectations of their users on a large scale. For example, by using our
pipeline, developers can quickly identify whether a new data practice (e.g., use
age of people at home for home automation) would be considered appropriate
by their user base, that is, what percentage of users would or would not allow
the new practice, and what can be done from the developer’s standpoint that
can make users more comfortable about it. When communicated correctly, such
a practice could also increase consumer trust and drive adoption.
A major disadvantage of our approach, however, is that it is based on stated
attitudes, which are known to deviate from actual behavior when it comes to
privacy decisions. This deviation can limit the use of our models for other ap-
plications, such as creating default profiles. Our approach also introduces a
new risk, given the ability for developers to identify ways to “profit” from data
practices with the least resistance from their users, that is, by indirectly asking
questions such as “what secondary uses would be appropriate according to my user
base?” While we argue that this would not constitute a privacy violation if data
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practices are aligned with individual preferences, developers can still control
how such scenario-based questions are asked, which can prime users for biased
preferences. How to address this priming issue deserves further research, which
could lead to the development of standardized constructs.
Data Sets. From our survey responses, we produced two data sets: one data
set containing preferences and another containing the dollar amounts given to
the economics-related scenario. The first data set consists of 2,792 rows contain-
ing user responses to the different information flows presented in the survey.
That is, each row indicates an attribute, purpose, and device, along with the
given comfort level (1-5) for the manufacturer, third party, government, and if
identity is included, allow/deny preference, and notification frequency (1-4) in-
dicated by the respondent. Each respondent produced four of such rows and
is identified by a randomly generated code indicated in the row. Each row also
indicates which situational factors were selected for the scenario, and toward
which direction (e.g., “more” or “less” comfort), represented via a presence-
absence matrix, where each factor is a column, and “1” is indicated if the fac-
tor was selected or “0” otherwise. Because each participant responded to only
one economics-related scenario, our second data set contains 698 rows; one row
per participant. This data set indicates, in each row, the dollar amount pro-
vided by the respondent, and the condition to which the respondent was ran-
domly assigned (1-4). In order to prepare these data sets for our experiments,
we conducted the data preparation and feature engineering steps described in
appendix Section A.2.
Feature Selection. We selected our features based on features known to af-
fect privacy preferences from prior works: because users have different levels
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of privacy concerns, we considered IUIPC values; because privacy concerns are
sensitive to the entities behind the data collection, we considered the comfort
levels toward different entities (e.g., manufacturer, third party, government);
because users make privacy-for-convenience trade-offs, we considered the av-
erage notification frequency selected by participants as a proxy for “how much
they would like to be bothered.”
Models. We created three different models. The first model is a classification
model used to predict allow/deny preferences for different information flows
(binary dependent variable), given different attributes, purposes of use, and
devices involved in an information flow, as well as privacy attitudes of users
such as comfort levels towards different entities (e.g., manufacturer, govern-
ment, third party) and their attitude toward online privacy (i.e., IUIPC values).
The second model is a classification model used to predict “comfort change”
(i.e., “more” or “less” comfortable, binary dependent variable) given different
information flows and “selected” or “not selected” situational factors. Such a
model can be used to identify situational factors that can make users either more
or less comfortable with a given information flow. The value for the dependent
variable was determined automatically during the survey, where the question
posed was to select situational factors that would make participants either less
or more comfortable, depending on their original comfort level toward the man-
ufacturer (e.g., more comfortable if uncomfortable, less comfortable otherwise).
For this model, in addition to the dependent variables used for predicting al-
low/deny choices (e.g., attributes, purposes), we used each situational factor
with a value of 0 (unchecked) or 1 (checked) as features (i.e., a presence-absence
matrix). Predictions with this model can then be made by observing the model
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predictions for n choose k factors (e.g., k = 3 for the survey) that can change a
user’s original comfort levels upward or downward. That is, by using a trained
model with 13 choose 3 combinations of situational factors as independent vari-
ables, one can identify which ones can change comfort levels for a given flow.
The third model is a regression model predicting the dollar amount (nu-
merical dependent variable) that users would pay for added or fewer privacy
protections either at or after purchase time of a voice assistant, given IUIPC val-
ues, comfort levels, and notification frequency. The first and second models use
the scenario data set with 2,792 rows (four per respondent), and the third model
uses the economics data set with 698 rows.
Model Selection and Evaluation. We iteratively evaluated increasingly
complex models by adding features, one at a time, starting with only the
IUIPC values (Awareness, Collection, and Control), then adding average com-
fort toward manufacturer, third party, government, identity, and notification
frequency, one at a time. We also experimented with cluster values based on it-
eratively adding these features in the clustering process in lieu of using the raw
values. We used the Area Under the Receiving Operating Characteristics (AUC-
ROC) curve, also known as AUC, as the performance metric for classification of
(1) allow/deny decisions and (2) less or more comfort – the ROC curve shows
the performance of a classifier in regards to the True Positive Rate (TPR) and
False Positive Rate (FPR). For regression of the dollar value, we used the Root
Mean Squared Error (RMSE) as the performance metric.
We used two libraries to conduct our experiments: PySpark’s MLlib and
scikit-learn. Accordingly, we report the results of our experiments with both
libraries. While both libraries are open source, the advantage of using PySpark
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is that it demonstrates how developers could use our approach with big data
to predict preferences and their changes for potentially millions of users. The
advantage of using scikit-learn is that it is the most popular library for machine
learning, and it does not require a lot of infrastructure to replicate our experi-
ments. We used each library’s implementations of Logistic Regression, Decision
Tree, Naive Bayes (NB), Random Forest (RF), Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) with
three hidden layers with 64 units each, and Gradient Boosting Trees (GBT) for
classification. For regression, we used Linear Regression, Decision Tree regres-
sion, Random Forest regression, and Gradient Boosting Tree regression. We
randomly split our data into 60/30/10, that is, 60% used for training, 30% for
validation, and 10% for testing. In splitting the data, we ensured there was no
“cross-presence” of scenarios from the same participant in the different splits.
In other words, the splits were made by participant IDs first, then the scenarios
were selected based on participant IDs. We picked the best models based on the
performance on the validation split, but we also report results of 10-fold cross
validation for each model. We also estimate the generalization performance of
our models by evaluating them with a hold-out test split (10%). Finally, we
interpret the learned coefficients of the allow/deny model.
Minor performance differences between the two libraries are observed due
to the different default parameters (e.g., number of steps, solvers, regulariza-
tion) used in the algorithms of each library, and one would have to match the
parameters in order to obtain the exact same coefficients and performance. We
opted to use the default parameters in each library for simplicity and repro-
ducibility, so there were minor differences. In places where we do not report
both libraries’ numbers (e.g., Abstract, Conclusion), we report the lower.
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4.4 Results
We first summarize the results of our survey in order to familiarize the reader
with our data. Then, we present the results of our machine learning experi-
ments.
4.4.1 Survey
Our survey findings suggest that people may be most comfortable with infor-
mation flows for which the purpose is home automation, control, and safety –
that is, primary, intended purposes of smart home devices. On the other hand,
attributes linked to demographics and that hint at habits can cause the most dis-
comfort. Participants in which the economics scenario indicated they already
had privacy protections valued it more than those in scenarios where they did
not have them, thus confirming loss aversion. We present more details below.
Allow/Deny
As a summary, Figure 4.2 shows the percentage of “Deny” decisions by attribute
and purpose. In general, comfort levels participants provided in the survey
were in line with allow/deny preferences. Overall, participants were uncom-
fortable with most information flows, with the median comfort level toward the
manufacturer being 2: “somewhat uncomfortable.”
Attributes. Overall, participants would mostly deny information flows with
attributes involving demographics such as age and gender, as well as attributes
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of “Deny” decisions for information flows involv-
ing different attributes and purposes of use. Demographics
and activities were mostly denied as well as secondary pur-
poses.
that would enable monitoring such as communications, destinations, indoor lo-
cation, habits and lifestyle, and number of people at home. On the other hand,
participants would mostly allow attributes not directly associated with them-
selves, such as device information, weather, energy use, and outside or home
temperature.
Purposes. From the purposes of use included in the survey, participants
would mostly deny – regardless of attributes – purposes such as identity link-
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ing, legal actions, price discrimination, targeted ads, and user tracking. Partic-
ipants would mostly allow information flows for which the purpose is home
safety, customized experiences, home control, and home automation – that is,
intended purposes of smart home devices. It is very clear from these findings
that smart home users may be very uncomfortable with data being used for pur-
poses beyond the convenience which smart home devices intend to offer (e.g.,
home control, automation, safety).
Finally, the average notification frequency for each attribute and purpose
combination reflects comfort levels and preferences in participants’ responses.
For example, participants wanted to be notified more often for attributes involv-
ing demographics and habits, as well as for purposes such as identity linking,
legal actions, price discrimination, and user tracking.
Entities. In general, participants indicated being more comfortable with
the manufacturer entity involved in the information flow (Mean=2.61, SD=1.38,
Mdn=2), followed by the government (Mean=1.94, SD=1.12, Mdn=2), and third
parties (Mean=1.82, SD=1.14, Mdn=1). Participants’ given average level of
comfort when identity is involved in the information flow was 1.94 (SD=1.19,
Mdn=1). While it was expected that the level of comfort would go down when
user identity is involved, it was surprising to see that in general, participants
were more comfortable with the government than with third parties.
Situational Factors
The top situational factors to make participants more comfortable were: if con-
sent was given (48.5%), if they could control when data were shared (38.08%),
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Figure 4.3: Top: Percentage of responses for which the situation was se-
lected as making the participant less comfortable. Bottom: Per-
centage of responses for which the situation was selected that
would make the participant more comfortable.
if the data involved were not sensitive (30.51%), if they were aware of when
the information flow occurred (28.49%), and if the data were handled securely
(22.26%).
The most chosen factors that could make participants less comfortable were:
if consent was not given (45.08%), if it involved sensitive information (39.85%),
if the data were used beyond primary purposes (37.16%), if data were not han-
dled securely (24.98%), and if participants were not aware of when the informa-
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tion flows occurred (22.37%). These percentages indicate the number of scenar-
ios where the situational factor was chosen.
Figure 4.3 shows the percentages of selected situational factors making users
less (top) or more (bottom) comfortable with the information flows. By identi-
fying these situational factors in each information flow, developers could take
actionable steps to make users more comfortable with certain information flows,
while avoiding practices that would make users less comfortable. For example,
when asking about an information flow that a user would deny, the manufac-
turer could notify the user that while they expect the user to deny it, it is only
going to be used for the primary purpose of automating the home. Similarly,
user trust could be gained if users were aware of when certain information flows
occur and if they are given the ability to control them.
Economics of Privacy
The average dollar amount specified by participants as an extra amount they
would pay for added privacy protections when purchasing a $49 voice assistant
was $14.4 (Mdn=$15, SD=$12), while the average amount for a one-time fee for
added privacy protections was $13.3 (Mdn=$10, SD=$13.4).
The average amount of the discount participants would be willing to take
when purchasing the voice assistant to allow data collection and sharing was
$12 (Mdn=$0, SD=$17.9), and $11.8 (Mdn=$0, SD=$18.9) as the average amount
given by participants indicating the one-time refund they would be willing to
take to allow the manufacturer to collect and share data.
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of dollar amounts given in each economic scenario
as a percentage of $49 (price of voice assistant), with $0 re-
sponses removed. White markers indicate average.
to take any discount in exchange for their privacy, providing a $0 response. Sim-
ilarly, 46.2% of participants in the scenario where they owned a voice assistant
and were offered a refund for “decreased privacy” responded with a $0 for a
refund they would be willing to take in exchange for their privacy. Contrasting
these $0 responses with the other conditions, 17% of participants in the “pay
extra when purchasing” provided a $0 response, while 24.5% provided $0 as a
one-time fee they would be willing to pay for added privacy protections. We
have asked each participant to explain their answer and we did a thematic anal-
ysis of their explanations for $0 responses. This analysis revealed that 62% of
participants in scenarios where privacy protections were already included said
that they would not be willing to “put a price on” their privacy. In addition,
58% of participants in the scenario without privacy protections said that they
would expect privacy to be included and therefore they would not pay extra.
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Among $0 respondents, 59.6% reported not owning a smart home device.
We also looked at extreme amounts provided. From participants in the “dis-
count when purchasing” condition, 9.9% of participants entered the full price of
the voice assistant ($49) as the discount, with the same number of participants
indicating $49 for a potential refund in exchange for fewer privacy controls.
Given the many $0 responses indicating unwillingness to pay or accept,
we removed the $0 responses, and then the average amount indicated as
the discount participants would be willing to take when purchasing in ex-
change for their privacy was $31.9 (Mdn=$30, SD=$14.7), and $37.8 (Mdn=$42.5,
SD=$13) for a refund. On the other hand, participants gave an average of $19.3
(Mdn=$20, SD=$9.95) as the extra amount they would pay for privacy protec-
tions when purchasing the device, and $19.4 (Mdn=$20, SD=$12) as the one-
time fee they would be willing to pay for privacy protections.
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of dollar amounts given in each economics
scenario, excluding $0 responses. These findings suggest potential smart home
users would value privacy protections more when they already have them than
when they do not, corroborating loss aversion observed in prior works [3].
4.4.2 Machine Learning Predictions
In this section, we present the results of our machine learning experiments to
predict allow/deny choices, predict comfort changes under the presence of dif-
ferent situational factors, and predict the dollar amount associated with privacy
in the smart home in a scenario involving a $49 voice assistant. Table A.4 (ap-
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Purpose of Use Choice # Actual # Classified
Company revenue Allow 4 5
Deny 10 9
Personalization Allow 6 7
Deny 6 5
Home automation Allow 7 8
Deny 8 7
Home control Allow 13 12
Deny 4 5
Home safety/security Allow 9 8
Deny 6 7
Identity linking Allow 5 4
Deny 10 11
Legal actions Allow 5 4
Deny 12 13
Price discrimination Allow 7 5
Deny 8 10
Targeted ads Allow 4 2
Deny 10 12
User tracking Allow 5 6
Deny 17 16
Table 4.1: Allow/Deny classification of information flows involving dif-
ferent purposes in the test set.
pendix) shows detailed steps during model selection and their results, where
we iteratively added features to the models and observed the AUC and RMSE.
Predict Allow/Deny
Model Selection. For allow/deny decisions, the best performance observed
in the model selection process using PySpark was a logistic regression model
having the following features: IUIPC scores, attribute, purpose, device, and av-
erage comfort levels for each entity, namely manufacturer, third party, and gov-
ernment, with a validation AUC of .861. With scikit-learn, the best model also
104
had a validation AUC of .861 and included the same features, except the aver-
age comfort for third party and government. To evaluate sensitivity to data set
splits, we performed 10-fold cross validation with scikit-learn, which resulted in
a .859 AUC. The best-performing model was selected based on its performance
on the validation set. While we report performance with both libraries, we will
use scikit-learn models for complementary reports in this section (i.e., test set
examples, examples of use) due to the library being easier to use.
In selecting a model, inspired by the work of Bahirat et al. [19], we also ex-
perimented with clustering participants (K-means) based on the IUIPC scores,
average comfort levels, and average notification frequency. We experimented
with five to three clusters with the same combination of features described in
Table A.4 (appendix), that is, we clustered based on those features and used
the cluster as a feature, along with attributes, purposes, and devices. The best-
performing model with this clustering approach was a logistic regression with
PySpark, whose resulting validation AUC was .7593 (.7245 for the test set). Due
to the lower performance, we did not evaluate models with clusters any further
and did not include them in Table A.4. We suspect that by clustering partici-
pants, information is lost (e.g., variance in the different IUIPC constructs and
comfort levels, average over four scenarios used in our work rather than 14).
Model Evaluation. To measure the generalization performance of the se-
lected model, we used the hold-out test set of 10% of rows resulting from the
data set splits. Predictions on the test set resulted in an AUC of .868 and .871 on
the test set with PySpark and scikit-learn, respectively. Table 4.1 shows exam-
ples of predictions made with scikit-learn on the test set for different purposes.
False positives (19 out of 44 mistakes) were mostly given for device attributes
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(e.g., actions, events, brand/model), but for purposes that would be mostly de-
nied, such as user tracking and company revenue.
Model Interpretation. We interpret this model by looking at the coefficients
learned from the logistic regression from both libraries. We had to add reg-
ularization to PySpark’s model as a fine-tuning step because the resulting co-
efficients were too large (e.g., 4), so we suspected overfitting. When we added
elastic net regularization (regParam=0.02, elasticNetParam=0.2), this was resolved
at a minor cost to performance (.858 validation AUC and .861 test AUC). Scikit-
learn had regularization by default. Both libraries converged on very similar
models, with top 10 largest coefficients in each direction (deny or allow) be-
ing roughly the same (Table A.3, appendix). For PySpark, the top five coeffi-
cients contributing toward “Deny” were Legal Actions (-1.026), Communica-
tions (-.960), Identity Linking (-.952), Age of people (-.798), and Targeted Ads
(-.727). For scikit-learn, these were Communications (-1.251), Legal Actions (-
1.139), Age of People (-1.128), Identity Linking (-.828) and Targeted Ads (-.760).
For coefficients contributing toward “Allow,” PySpark’s model had Comfort
Manufacturer (1.237), Outside Temperature (.787), Weather (.737), Inside Tem-
perature (.668), and Personalization (.632). Similarly, scikit-learn had Comfort
Manufacturer (6.346), Inside Temperature (1.191), Weather (1.030), Home Safety
(.943), and Outside Temperature (.932). Table A.3 (appendix) shows the list of
top 10 largest coefficients each way, for both libraries. Different coefficients be-
tween both libraries are due to default parameters, and so are the minor perfor-
mance differences. For example, PySpark’s logistic regression uses elastic net
regularization and mini-batch stochastic gradient descent, while scikit-learn’s
uses L2 regularization by default, with LBFGS solver (version 0.22). In order
to obtain the same coefficients and models, these parameters would have to be
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matched. Nonetheless, we used the default implementations for simplicity and
reproducibility. From the coefficients, we observe that secondary purposes of
use such as legal actions and targeted ads contribute heavily toward a “Deny”
decision, as well as personal attributes hinting at demographics and habits. On
the other hand, comfort toward the manufacturer, primary purposes of use such
as home safety and control, and attributes not associated with the person, con-
tribute heavily toward an “Allow” decision.
Situational Factors
Model Selection and Evaluation. Because the goal of this model is to iden-
tify situational factors that could make users more or less comfortable with a
given information flow for which a preference was already identified, we used
the same features from the best model in the allow/deny prediction problem,
but also added the situational factors as features. The validation performance
(AUC) with this model was .895 and .912 with PySpark and scikit-learn, respec-
tively. 10-fold cross-validation for this model in scikit-learn resulted in a .907
AUC. The selected model had a test set AUC of .941 and .899 with PySpark and
scikit-learn, respectively.
Predicting Changes To demonstrate how our model can be used in a com-
binatorial way, we first took the average of the numerical features (e.g., average
comfort manufacturer, average IUIPC values) to create a hypothetical “average
user” from our data set, and predicted the comfort change from information
flows with “13 choose k” situational factors that could change this user’s com-
fort level toward different information flows. Because our survey allowed users
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ated scenarios with the Cartesian product of the numerical features (e.g., IUIPC
constructs, mean comfort toward manufacturer, etc) × attributes × purposes ×
devices × 13 choose 3 situational factors, resulting in 484,484 scenarios for this
hypothetical user. In doing so, we learned to what extent certain situational fac-
tors, when selected, “matter” to each specific scenario for this user, as well as
in general, what situational factors would matter for this user, considering all
combinations of attributes, purposes, and devices. The extent and direction to
which they “matter” is expressed by the percentage of information flows involv-
ing specified attributes, purposes, and situational factors, which would make
users more or less comfortable. In other words, the percentage of predictions in
each class will indicate whether the presence of a certain situational factor will
make a user more or less comfortable. For example, if “used for primary purposes
or not?” is checked and the percentage of predictions for “less comfortable” is
greater than the percentage of predictions for “more comfortable” then it means
that for this user, secondary uses may make them less comfortable. In another
example, if “user can control or not?” resulted in a greater number of “more com-
fortable” predictions, it means that for this situational factor, this user would be
more comfortable if they could control the information flow.
Identifying Actionable Steps. Table 4.2 contains some examples, indicating
the percentage of scenarios for which the prediction was “more comfortable”
and otherwise (i.e., “less comfortable”). By using the model in this way, a de-
veloper can learn that, for example, it would make the user more comfortable in
general if they could control the information flows (84.6%, #1). Also from the ta-
ble, one can see that if data are used beyond primary purposes, the user would
be uncomfortable (67.1%, #3). Another example, involving specific attributes,
can be extracted from comparing the difference between two situational factors:
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for information flows involving energy use for targeted ads, a higher number of
scenarios were predicted as “more comfortable” for “user can benefit,” (86.8%,
#16) than for “user is aware,” (68%, #15), so for this user to be more comfortable,
benefit seems more important than awareness.
This experiment demonstrates how not only overall comfort changes can be
predicted from using the situational factors, but also how relevant, fine-grained
changes can be identified by considering the predictions within an information
flow involving a particular attribute, purpose, or device. These predictions can
inform developers toward actionable steps in preserving the privacy of their
users and developing user trust. For instance, from Table 4.2, some actions
would be that, if the indoor location is to be used by the developer for any pur-
pose, then the manufacturer should first and foremost give user control (92.1%
more comfortable, #9), not use it for secondary purposes (63.8% less comfort-
able, #8), and get user consent (57.1% more comfortable, #10). It would also be
OK for the manufacturer to use any data for the safety of the home (69.8%, #5).
Cost of Privacy
Model Selection and Evaluation. When selecting the best model for predict-
ing the dollar amount under the four circumstances, namely pay extra when
purchasing, discount at purchase, refund after purchase, and one-time fee after
purchase, the best-performing model with both libraries was a linear regres-
sion (implemented with stochastic gradient descent in scikit-learn) using the
following features: IUIPC scores, economic scenario (one of the four), and av-
erage comfort level toward manufacturer (scikit-learn only). The RMSE for the












Cost Predictions (Test Data Set)
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Figure 4.5: Cost predictions on the test set using the best model consider-
ing a $49 device. Points are ordered by the prediction value.
10-fold cross validation with scikit-learn resulted in a RMSE of 15.101. The per-
formance of the selected model on the test set (RMSE) was 14.292 and 12.459 for
PySpark and scikit-learn, respectively. Figure 4.5 shows the predictions made
on the test set.
Predicting Privacy Value. Our model could be used by collecting the IUIPC
scores, average comfort levels, average notification frequency, and automati-
cally feeding the four circumstances and predicting the dollar amount for each
economic scenario in order to understand how much users would be willing to
pay for extra privacy protections and/or willing to take as a discount/refund
in order to allow more data collection and sharing. For example, using the hy-
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pothetical “average user” from our data set, when purchasing a voice assistant
costing $49, this user would take a discount of $38.03 in exchange for sharing
their data, but would only pay $31.24 to protect such data. Similarly, the pre-
dictions indicate that after purchasing the device, this user would take a refund
of $44.48 in exchange for fewer privacy protections, but would only be will-
ing to pay $28.01 as a fee to protect their privacy after having purchased the
device. Translating this into practical setting, a developer could estimate the
dollar value of new, optional privacy features before introducing them.
4.5 Discussion
Our findings suggest that (1) attributes associated with the person (not the
home) and that hint at habits and lifestyle cause user discomfort; (2) appropri-
ation and secondary use may not be acceptable in the smart home; (3) potential
smart home users would assign a lower monetary value to privacy when they
do not have it than when they do; (4) most users would not be willing to take
discounts/refunds to give away privacy and would expect privacy not to cost
extra money and (5) personalized privacy preferences about information flows
and their changes can be predicted with machine learning.
Secondary Uses. As seen through our work, it may not be OK for data prac-
tices from other domains such as the Web and mobile apps to transfer into the
smart home. The smart home differs largely from those domains, with a ma-
jor distinction being that in most cases, popular smart home products are paid
for, whereas the most popular websites and smartphone apps are used for free,
and the reason why they are sustainable is because of practices such as online
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behavioral advertising and the sharing of personal data with third party organi-
zations. Nonetheless, major companies such as Google and Amazon are behind
the most popular smart home devices such as voice assistants, thermostats, and
smart locks, which creates opportunities for data collected through these de-
vices to be part of the larger ecosystem composed by technologies from other
domains in which these companies do business in (e.g., targeted advertising,
online shopping). In light of our findings, this practice would be unacceptable
because users do not want their data to be collected or shared for non-primary
purposes, given that they already paid for a smart home device.
Privacy Value. If secondary uses such as targeted advertising are deemed
inappropriate, and adoption of devices sold by leaders in such practice is grow-
ing, then the privacy paradox already applies. For instance, while prior work
and our own study suggest that users highly value privacy and would be con-
cerned about privacy when considering smart home devices, adoption of such
devices has significantly increased in recent years – even in our study, nearly
half of the participants reported already having a smart home device, with 29%
(201) indicating that they own a voice assistant. This suggests that optimism
bias [4] and the privacy paradox may facilitate the establishment of practices
that users do not deem acceptable, yet consumers will either tolerate them in
exchange for convenience or will be unaware of them. What’s more concerning
about this landscape is the power imbalance and information asymmetry [89]
that may quietly arise, making the smart home an environment where privacy
is not included by default, which is aggravated by what our findings suggest, in
line with works in other domains: people would value privacy less when they
do not have it. If consumers are not willing to pay extra for privacy, then the
economic incentive for manufacturers to include these protections is somewhat
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limited. Nonetheless, our findings suggest that many will either expect privacy
protections to be included by default or would not take any money to give it
away in the case where such protections are already in place.
Contextual Integrity. Given these circumstances, then how designers, de-
velopers, and manufacturers could respect established social boundaries of the
home [128, 156] while being able to offer products and services that make their
customers’ lives easier without infringing on their privacy expectations? This is
an ethical question because what is known so far seems to suggest that develop-
ers of smart home products will be able to penetrate markets regardless of how
they use their customers’ data, practicing business models originating in other
domains such as the Web, when users prioritize convenience and underestimate
risks. However, a large number of consumers are worried about privacy, and
as our findings indicate, they would expect privacy protections to be embedded
into the devices they purchase, and furthermore, would be willing to assign
a relatively high monetary value to protect their personal data. To serve such
users, manufacturers could incorporate and market privacy by design, which
could lead to acceptable transactions where both sides benefit without posing
major risks to individuals and society at large. This is precisely where our mod-
eling work fits in, so that consumer privacy preferences are in line with business
practices of smart home developers. This creates a design space for consumer-
facing (e.g., [19, 48]) and developer-facing tools (e.g. our own).
Modeling Personalized Preferences. By replicating our work, developers
could model privacy preferences based on measurements of concern toward in-
ternet privacy such as the IUIPC, in addition to comfort levels for four randomly
generated scenarios. For instance, while our survey took a median time of 19
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minutes to complete, including explanations and demographics, a user might
be able to provide the data needed in much less time. Making this a quick activ-
ity is important, since answering such questions may not be the primary goal of
users, so they are likely to skip them if they take too long or are too complicated.
Such data could be collected when a user first installs a smart home device in
order to inform developers about what may be appropriate/inappropriate for
a given user. We also envision a scenario where such models could be used in
the process of purchasing a smart home device that would be aligned with user
privacy preferences.
Predicting Changes. Beyond modeling initial allow/deny preferences, we
also show that a model could be used to identify which situations could change
a user’s comfort upward or downward given different information flows. This
can give developers actionable steps toward making users more comfortable as
well as understanding what situations should be avoided that would cause pri-
vacy concerns and distrust. For example, manufacturers could emphasize that
certain data are being collected only for primary purposes, or collect data much
less frequently. Doing so could lead to more awareness and control, mitigation
of privacy concerns, and increased user trust toward the device/developer.
Employing Privacy Values. If developers truly need to leverage user data
for business purposes, it would be possible to know how much a user would be
willing to pay for extra privacy protections, as well as how much they would
be willing to accept in exchange for being more liberal about data collection
and sharing in the smart home. While limited to our own scenario with a voice
assistant costing $49, we show through our methodology that it is possible to
predict the “cost of privacy” in smart home scenarios. Our value prediction
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model could also be leveraged by retailers when helping users choose the right
devices, by looking at the amounts derived by the model and choosing a de-
vice that reflects their privacy concerns and valuations. We note, however, that
our approach to predict costs was not as effective as the approach to predict
preferences, which may indicate that the features that worked for modeling al-
low/deny and predicting situational factors did not work as well for modeling
privacy values. We encourage further exploration on this topic.
Limitations. We acknowledge the limitations of working with users from
AMT (also known as Turkers) for our online survey. For example, while there’s
diversity of age, gender, and income, the sample is not representative of the
US population and there could be limitations about skewed education levels
[142]. We also acknowledge that Turkers may skew toward people with non-
traditional employment or underemployment who may stay at home more of-
ten and/or have more experience with information technology and the Internet.
We note that because cultural differences are known to affect privacy pref-
erences, the generalization of our models are sensitive to the context in which
the training data was obtained, which in our case, involves people in the United
States who participate on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) tasks, who may or
may not have smart home devices. Nonetheless, we provide the demographics
of survey participants, which indicates that nearly half of them already have a
smart home device.
We also acknowledge that our survey measured subjective comfort levels
and hypothetical scenarios, which we use as a proxy for how concerned users
may be in regards to data collection practices in the smart home, as well as to
identify acceptable practices. In the field of privacy research, people’s attitudes
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and behaviors are known to differ, which reflects the privacy paradox [106].
Because of this, we interpreted our results taking this into consideration, and
hope that our findings can inform and educate manufacturers, policy makers,
and end-users regarding the future of smart homes. Nonetheless, the use of
data representing attitudes is acceptable in investigating privacy expectations
and concerns in reasonably new domains in a scalable manner [16].
In predicting changes to preferences, our approach only predicts the direc-
tion of changes and the relative contribution of a situational factor toward such
changes. It would be useful to also predict what could make people accept or
deny an information flow, in other words, what could change their mind.
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4.7 Conclusion
Public discourse and consumer concerns around the privacy of smart home de-
vices are commonplace because they challenge a long-held notion of the home
as a private and intimate place. However, it is expected that these devices will
“break into” people’s homes despite people’s privacy concerns, due to psycho-
logical biases in decision-making, economic incentives, added convenience, and
increasingly fewer non-smart device offers on the market. Therefore, identify-
ing appropriate data practices is an important step toward safeguarding the
home’s privacy and developing user trust. We present the design and evalu-
ation of machine learning models to derive privacy preferences and changes
to such preferences in the smart home, considering the many contextual fac-
tors known to influence privacy decisions. We show that through a short sur-
vey obtaining responses to four random information flows and the IUIPC scale,
our model can predict allow/deny preferences (AUC .868), along with situa-
tions that could make users more or less comfortable (AUC .899). We also de-
scribe our attempt to create a model to predict the dollar amount users would
pay/accept in exchange for privacy in the smart home (RMSE 12.459). Our
work enables smart home developers to preserve the privacy of their users and
take steps toward building user trust in the smart home. However, the algo-




IN-SITU PROFILING AWARENESS IN ONLINE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING
5.1 Introduction
A research paper which draws heavily on major parts of the work in this chapter
is under a cycle of revisions for publication in the Proceedings of the ACM on
Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies (IMWUT).
Online Behavioral Advertising (OBA) has become progressively more so-
phisticated and ubiquitous in the daily lives of Internet users. Over the years,
Internet companies – whose primary business models rely on targeting ads –
have spanned and stretched the boundaries of user tracking and profiling. To-
day, data from users’ behaviors, interests, and identities captured from personal
computers, smartphones, wearables, and devices installed at a person’s home
[132] are collected, processed, and used for targeting individuals. This has re-
sulted in a scenario of surveillance-capitalism [178], brought upon users as a
consequence of relying on free-to-use services heavily engineered for satisfac-
tion and convenience, (often unwillingly) trading privacy as a commodity [38]
for added convenience.
From the perspective of users, this development produced two undesired
features that have become a reality in OBA: information asymmetry and power
imbalances. The lack of strict regulations around transparency of tracking and
profiling afforded ad networks with the possibility of enhancing and expanding
tracking while keeping the process largely opaque to their users. On the other
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hand, advertisers are given an increasingly extensive list of ways in which they
can target their audience. As a result, users have limited visibility into their own
ad-targeting profiles. For example, ad networks such as Google and Facebook
can selectively choose what tracking-related information is disclosed, and only
after the information has been collected, processed, and used for targeting ads.
In response, ad networks have provided transparency mechanisms about
targeted ads such as dashboards of ad interests and ad explanations. Nonethe-
less, these have been shown to be generic [60], inaccurate, and all around in-
sufficient [14], which further contributes to the black-box perception of OBA.
Moreover, these mechanisms do not enable users to know how their actions in-
form the ads they see, leading them to develop folk theories about apps eaves-
dropping on their conversations [101, 118]. As a result, users have feelings of
privacy invasion, helplessness and resignation [165], lacking the knowledge and
options to act upon their concerns and preferences.
In synthesis, prior empirical user studies of OBA have uncovered four open,
user-facing problems surrounding OBA today: lack of awareness and participa-
tion (e.g., [9]), insufficient understanding (e.g., [111, 163, 176]), misrepresenta-
tion (e.g., [9, 54, 60]), and limited action (e.g., [14, 167]). These problems largely
stem from the lack of transparency in what is part of the profiles used for target-
ing users at any point in time, and how users’ behaviors inform these profiles.
However, increased transparency has been suggested to have mixed effects [53].
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5.1.1 The Realities of OBA
Ads are a secondary artifact often intertwined with and/or obstructive of users’
primary activities – it is a common occurrence to have to watch an ad before
a video of interest or to have a prominent ad pop-up while reading news on-
line. While ads help sustain free services, business models exist which rely
on getting rid of them such as paying for a premium version (e.g., YouTube,
Spotify, free-to-play mobile games). Also, people’s attitudes and acceptance of
OBA are known to be mixed [114, 163], but most importantly, the reality of ad-
targeting must be acknowledged and embraced: tracking and profiling over-
come the issue of the unmotivated user; very few people might be willing to
keep up-to-date profiles about how they want to be targeted while going about
daily matters. Profiling and ad-targeting are ever more pervasive and intrusive,
incorporating activities from users across multiple contexts.
For these reasons, stated user participation/control intentions cannot be
taken at face-value given the reality of the context in which profiling and ads are
inserted. In addition, this is why it is also important to properly situate/probe
users to experience profiling mechanisms in ways that elicit their reactions to en-
visioned algorithmic interventions. After properly situating users, they might
be in a better position to answer concrete questions, such as whether/how users
might want to deal with temporal aspects, inaccuracies/inferencing mistakes,
stable and ephemeral identities, missing pieces, and sensitive items. This reality
was an important aspect in my determining of the methodology to investigate
increased user participation in OBA profiling.
In this chapter, I present the design and deployment of a technology probe
aimed at exploring and inspiring the design of future transparency technolo-
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gies for profiling in OBA. I take a Research through Design (RtD) approach to
deploy a technology probe that explores design directions which can give users
increased awareness and direct control on the composition of their potential ad-
targeting profiles. Technology probes are a useful methodology to “find out
about the unknown” and gather meaningful data to inform and inspire the de-
sign of future technologies [85]. Currently, Internet users have no way to mon-
itor and directly manipulate the composition of their own ad-targeting profiles
as it happens. The technology probe gives users such an ability in order to un-
cover in-context information on increased OBA transparency, the feasibility of
in-situ and real time transparency of OBA profiles, and elicitation of concrete
solutions to inspire and inform future designs.
Most importantly, the probe introduces a novel affordance: making the com-
position of ad targeting profiles prominent and situated within users’ daily ac-
tivities, based on online and offline behaviors. Given the reality of ad-targeting
being inherently a secondary activity, the probe will elicit participants’ re-
sponses to having visibility and control of ad-targeting becoming more promi-
nent and intertwined with the activities that help inform ad-targeting. The
main design goals of the probe – motivated by prior empirical studies – are
Engagement, Interpretation, Representation, and Action. That is, the determination
of whether the probe was successful and to what extent it was successful will
be determined by observing these four aspects in the data analysis. I designed
the probe by simulating the machine intelligence of ad networks in order to
construct the surface of knowledge about a user that could be exploited for ad
targeting. The probe provides longitudinal, in-situ (e.g., in the moment) aware-
ness and control of the composition of the users’ potential profile – according
to targeting categories of ad networks and some speculative, forward-looking
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attributes – as users carry out the primary activities from which profiles are cre-
ated (e.g., browsing the web, visiting a physical point of interest). I conducted a
two-week field deployment of the technology probe with 25 participants based
in the United States.
I found that users wish to be invited to review, and at certain moments, to
control pieces of their ad-targeting profile. Most participants were not aware of
their inferenced identities created and provided by Google or Facebook, wish
such identities had been more prominent and integrated with their primary ac-
tivities. While more transparency is desired, users also wish to have a choice
and anticipate on whether certain aspects of their activities can be used for ad
targeting – especially for activities or topics of a sensitive nature. The results
illuminate design directions that will inform future design of transparency and
control mechanisms in OBA profiling.
Specifically, these are the contributions of this chapter:
1. A novel technology probe providing in-situ awareness and control of ad-
targeting profile composition based on both online and offline activities of
individuals
2. Insights into people’s reactions to increased and in-the-moment trans-
parency and control of profiling processes, incorporating the provenance
of profiling outcomes (i.e., sources of activity)
3. New ideas that will inform and inspire future transparency design in OBA
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5.2 Background and Related Work
5.2.1 Online Behavioral Advertising
OBA is ubiquitous in today’s web. OBA relies upon tracking users across web-
sites in order to target them with relevant and personalized ads. Over the years,
its level of sophistication has grown significantly farther from targeting users
with ads based on tracking solely from the user’s browsing or search history.
Today, “hidden” user profiles are created from not only browser and search
history, but also email and social media activity, user behavior tracked via mo-
bile phones such as app installs and location history, and even third-party, tai-
lored lists resulting from offline activity such as purchases in physical stores
[13]. Such sophisticated tracking enables Internet companies (e.g., ad networks,
social media websites) – whose revenue primarily comes from ads – to allow
advertisers to target users based on an extensive list of demographics, interests,
and behaviors. OBA has also been found to track sensitive topics such as re-
ligion, health, and sexual orientation, despite forbidding regulations in some
countries [33], and proven difficult to escape, even for advanced users [1].
Forms of tracking Tracking can occur via a variety of different techniques,
the most traditional being cookie-based tracking. Cookies are a piece of data
stored locally on the user’s computer which can be accessed at a later time
by the website in order to link that user’s actions to one another over time.
More sophisticated tracking techniques exist, and these are used to track users
across websites. For example, a measurement study of the top 1 million web-
sites [58] revealed at least five predominant forms of fingerprinting: Canvas,
Canvas Font, WebRTC, AudioContext, and Battery API. Tracking is pervasive
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with ad networks such as those controlled by Google and Facebook. These ad
networks have implemented systematic tracking via web beacons [153], which
can be incorporated into emails and embedded buttons from social networking
sites. Tracking in ad-targeting can also be highly distributed. For example, Face-
book Pixel [63] is a piece of code that developers can embed into their website
in order to track fine-grained user actions which can be later triangulated in ad
campaigns. Users can also be tracked across devices, which may even include
the exchange of ultrasonic sound waves that are imperceptible to users [18].
Such extensive tracking enables ad networks to build rich profiles about their
users originating from multiple tracking mechanisms under varied contexts.
While tracking has become more ubiquitous, user-facing transparency mech-
anisms in OBA have not caught up. For instance, an extensive list of targeting
features are visible and available to advertisers who want to target a particu-
lar group of users, but users themselves do not have easy and comprehensive
access into what composes their own ad-targeting profiles (i.e., what targeting
categories or features they belong in). As a result, much of users’ own profiles
remain concealed, which engenders a scenario of information asymmetry.
Lack of Transparency in OBA
User profiles created and maintained in OBA often contain inferences about
users’ interests, behaviors, and even demographics. Such inferences remain
largely out of the user’s control, and often, inferred identities are inaccu-
rate, making users feel embarrassed, misjudged, and unable to control them
[9, 60, 140]. On the other hand, when such hidden inferences lead to extremely
accurate ad experiences, users believe they are being eavesdropped on [118].
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Not knowing how and when inferences are being made, users develop their
own theories and understanding of how the technology works and act accord-
ingly to manipulate it without knowing how it works exactly [59]. Such theories
are also known as folk theories, and are often incorrect from the point of view
of how a system actually works. Folk theories about OBA show that it is largely
misunderstood [176]. In response, several studies have been conducted about
(the lack of) transparency in OBA and the consensus is that users demand more
transparency and control over what is happening “under the hood” [54]. While
more transparency is generally welcome, its effects can be mixed. For instance,
users may want more transparency, but they also want to keep their experiences
convenient, and explaining technical terms may get in the way of that [139].
“Full transparency” in OBA can also be undesirable. For instance, Eslami et al.’s
qualitative study [60] on OBA transparency tools such as ad explanations and
ad interest dashboards revealed users found highly specific or overwhelmingly
vague explanations creepy. Similarly, Dogruel et al.’s study [53] showed users
may prefer “medium” level details in explanations.
On the regulation scene, the European Union in 2018 placed in effect the
GDPR, in which one of the directives (Article 22) [41] requires companies to
give users ways to opt out of decisions solely based on automated processes –
including profiling and ad-targeting – “which produces legal effects concerning
him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.” Implementing con-
trol over profiling could give users opportunities to participate more directly
in inferences made about themselves, in addition to providing insight into the
potential limitations of the inferencing algorithms.
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Empirical User Studies of OBA
Numerous empirical user studies have been conducted about OBA. Some stud-
ies uncovered user impressions and acceptance. Other studies explored under-
standing and mental models, and more recent works studied the user experi-
ences of existing and novel transparency tools for OBA. These empirical inves-
tigations uncovered four open problems of OBA with regard to user experi-
ences: lack of awareness and participation (e.g., [9]), insufficient understanding
(e.g., [111, 163, 176]), misrepresentation (e.g., [54, 60, 9]), and limited action (e.g.,
[14, 167]). Such problems stem from users having limited visibility and control
of their OBA experiences. I draw upon these problems to define the goals of the
technology probe used in my research.
Lack of awareness and participation Prior studies have shown that a signif-
icant portion of users are not aware of tracking (e.g., [9, 163]), especially in its
more sophisticated forms (e.g., web beacons [110]), and that awareness is corre-
lated with increased concern over resulting data aggregation [138]. When users
are aware, perceptions and acceptance of OBA are mixed. On one hand, users
find OBA creepy and invasive in light of limited transparency. On the other,
they benefit from opportunistic moments such as when being offered a deal on
a trip they are planning on taking [114, 163]. Users also understand that track-
ing and ads may be part of an exchange for free services, but ultimately wish to
be more aware and able to participate more actively in OBA [167].
Insufficient understanding Several studies have focused on user under-
standing of OBA (e.g., [111, 163, 176]). Most importantly, an interview study
by Yao et al. [176] showed users do not understand the mechanics of OBA and
develop inaccurate mental models with regard to how they are being tracked
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across websites. Much of the misunderstanding stems from the lack of trans-
parency on the information being tracked.
Misrepresentation When involving inferences, transparency can be even
more nuanced. For example, one quantitative study [54] showed that partici-
pant’s attitudes towards inferencing in OBA can be affected by the information’s
sensitivity and users’ interest levels. Participants’ preferences and trust towards
OBA can also be positively influenced by accurate inferences that match users’
identity traits [60]: participants feel embarrassed and misrepresented when dis-
covering that their ad-targeting profiles do not match their desired identities
[9, 111].
Limited action Internet users also wish to control the ads they see for sev-
eral reasons, such as to prevent ads that may trigger an uncomfortable or em-
barrassing reaction, especially when in the presence of others [111], when users
feel the ad misrepresent them (e.g., [9, 45]), or to prevent overly repetitive ads
(e.g., products that were already purchased) [112]. A more critical motivation to
control ads involves potentially discriminatory outcomes (e.g., on job opportu-
nities) when ads are chosen based on inferred demographic traits such as gender
[133].
In unison, these studies underline the need for more transparency and con-
trol on the user information and inferences of OBA than what is provided now.
Existing Transparency Mechanisms
Dashboards Ad networks such as Facebook and Google both provide settings
on personalized ads and some visibility into how ads are personalized.
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Figure 5.1: Facebook Ad Interests Visualization
On Facebook, ad interests can be managed via the Ad Settings page [61].
This page enables users to visualize interests that have been inferred across dif-
ferent categories, as shown on Figure 5.1. When bringing the cursor over each
item, a brief and general explanation is provided as to why that interest was
added. The page also allows users to remove interests if they wish to do so.
Google provides a similar page via their Ad Personalization settings [76].
On this page, users can see a list of factors that are considered when ads are
personalized, as shown on Figure 5.2. Clicking on each factor will show more
details on why that factor was added (see Figure 5.3). The link “Manage your
activity” on Figure 5.3 redirects users to Google’s user activity dashboard where
users can see the entire list of actions tracked by Google across their products
and services. While this list gives users some idea of the extent of tracking from
Google, it is insufficient because it does not link back to the factors shown in the
previous page, which would otherwise give users more control of the profile.
Ad Explanations In addition to dashboard pages, ad networks provide ex-
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Figure 5.2: Google Ad Personalization
planations for individual ads. For example, Figure 5.4 shows an ad explanation
from Facebook and Figure 5.5 an ad explanation from Google.
Clicking the “Learn More” link on Facebook’s ad explanation brings users to
a page with general information without giving users more visibility into what
exactly are the factors or actions that may have led to the underlying targeting.
In both cases of Facebook and Google, the information about ad interests
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Figure 5.3: Google Ad Personalization - Factor Detail
Figure 5.4: Facebook Ad Explanation Example
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Figure 5.5: Google Ad Explanation Example
and ad explanations is only accessible via settings or additional clicks into why
the user is seeing a certain ad. That is, these are post-hoc visualizations with
regard to the user’s activity; they give users some visibility after all the data
are collected, processed, and in the case of ad explanations, used for targeting.
There is currently no way in which users can control tracking as it takes place.
The selection of the information provided in dashboards and explanations is
also at the discretion of Facebook or Google and often do not allow users to see
a fuller picture of what might be on their ad-targeting profiles at any given time.
Empirical User Studies of Transparency in OBA
Existing transparency mechanisms have also been studied via empirical stud-
ies, and shown to be incomplete, vague, ineffective, and often misleading. For
instance, a study by Andreou et al. [14] showed that dashboards of ad interests
do not enable users to trace pieces of their OBA profiles back to actions that
originated them, nor such tools offer temporal awareness (i.e., visibility on how
profiles change over time). In addition, there is a great discrepancy between the
level of transparency provided to users and the level of targeting tools given to
advertisers. For example, Facebook’s ad explanation in Figure 5.4 states that
“There could also be more factors not listed here.” Ad explanations also do not
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include data obtained from “data partners,” [13] which are third party orga-
nizations that help ad networks and Internet companies profile users based on
information obtained elsewhere, often offline. These limitations hinder users’
ability to understand how their actions impact how they are targeted, and what
actionable steps they can take to prevent undesirable inferences and sensitive
information making it to their ad-targeting profiles. A major aspect of existing
transparency solutions implemented in OBA is that not only they provide se-
lective and partial visibility of a user’s ad-targeting profile, but they are also
exclusively post-hoc, giving visibility and control only after the information has
been processed and incorporated into the profile, in most cases, only after an ad
was triggered.
Rader et al. [140] investigated people’s reactions to the inference dashboards
provided by Facebook and Google by conducting user interviews while expos-
ing participants to such dashboards. They found that participants’ interpreta-
tions of items on their profile were largely guided by participants being able
to recall and justify their past behavior in relation to the underlying platforms.
Most importantly, their study unearthed a promising shift in OBA transparency
mechanisms from presenting a descriptive picture of users’ past actions into
providing meaningful information about how these transparency mechanisms
can help users anticipate future targeting. Doing so may appropriately place
users in a mode of thinking that emphasizes the utility of inferences.
The state of OBA
A fitting framework for the current state of OBA is the economic framework. On
one hand, users want to enjoy freely provided services such as search engines
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and social networking websites. On the other, such websites rely on advertis-
ing revenue to maintain the infrastructure and continuation of their services.
In turn, companies invest resources into enhancing their tracking and profiling
in order to satisfy advertisers and keep a steady stream of revenue that will
enable them to compete and achieve their business goals. On the user’s side,
this exchange was mediated by the constant emphasis on added convenience
and so Internet services have been heavily engineered for user satisfaction and
engagement. This cycle has enabled Internet companies to drive and stretch
what can become part of the transaction i.e. to span the boundaries, leading to
significant information asymmetry. Such circumstance is characterized by the
fact that it is often the case that ad networks and service providers have more
information about the user than the user is even aware of, yet these comprehen-
sive, opaque user profiles enable comprehensive targeting of individuals. This
is aggravated by the inherent nature of OBA: it is a practice happening on the
sidelines of online activities, which users may be unmotivated to engage with.
It is reasonable to assume that most users would not care to keep up-to-date
profiles on how they wish to be targeted due to the effort it may take in doing
so in relation to potential gains. To compensate for this, service providers and
ad-networks ramp up the guesswork in order to construct users’ identities from
their behavioral traces.
Another consequence is that service providers now have the power to pro-
vide only a selective and limited glimpse of visibility into and control of ad-
targeting profiles. As a result, users feel that their privacy is being violated,
have chilling sensations of being spied on, develop folk theories, and have their
identities misrepresented by algorithms. Such reactions are spurring great dis-
trust in Internet companies and leading users to privacy surrender mode (i.e.,
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that ”nothing can be done”) or to switch-off measures such as using ad blockers
or deleting accounts, which challenges Internet’s long-established economics.
This scenario captures the current power imbalance in OBA.
The current state of OBA carries some important implications.
The main implication is that OBA is perceived as a black box, about which
only ”hints” are given via limited transparency tools provided by Internet com-
panies such as Ad Interests dashboards and incomplete ad explanations.
The second major implication is that it is difficult or nearly impossible for
users to trace back pieces of their ad-targeting profile to originating actions,
preventing them from (1) determining what actions have triggered a certain ad
and (2) developing accurate mental models and expectations about OBA.
The third and most important implication is that the opaque nature of OBA
hinders users’ abilities to determine actionable steps to prevent undesired at-
tributes from becoming a part of how they are targeted.
The third implication encompasses OBA’s privacy and agency problem:
users cannot manually control the disclosures that create the comprehensive
picture of ”who the Internet thinks they are,” yet their experiences are shaped
by these hidden profiles daily. In addition, advertisers are given a diverse and
rich list of ways in which they can target users, with very little awareness pro-
vided to users about where they stand with regard to targeting possibilities.
Giving Internet users more visibility into and control of the composition of
their ad-targeting profiles could:
• Enable users to have more realistic expectations about what ads they get
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and why they get them;
• Prompt users to speculate and/or identify desired controls and behaviors
that serve their best interests and
• Promote active user participation in ad-targeting profile composition, po-
tentially making OBA more accurate, less chilling, and more trustworthy
In turn, realizing these goals could result in greater trust toward Internet
companies given that users will be invited to participate more actively into what
they contribute in the aforementioned economic exchange. One could also ar-
gue that working toward these goals might be in the best interest of Internet
companies who wish to boost users’ trust while becoming more transparent
and promoting participation in how users choose to be targeted online.
The Design Space
The combination of evidence in favor of increased transparency has motivated
design and research into transparency tools for OBA. For example, Weinshel et
al.’s designed [167] a novel browser extension enabling users to visualize their
tracking interests in a longitudinal manner. Their field deployment of the tool
revealed that the increased visibility provided to users enabled them to real-
ize the extent of online tracking and cultivated user intentions to take privacy-
protecting actions.
Prior works have also suggested potential advantages in enabling users to
visualize how their actions connect with their ad-targeting. A prototype-based,
between-subject quantitative study by Jin et al. [90] with 200 participants on
Amazon Mechanical Turk showed that participants preferred workflow-based
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visualizations linking recognizable actions to the selection of ads. Their pro-
totype shows study participants a workflow visualization of a simulated ad-
bidding process in order to measure whether workflow-based explanations are
preferable over plain text. The authors posit that users may become more ac-
cepting of OBA if they can examine, control, and understand ad-targeting more
actively.
A recent qualitative study of 22 participants by Shah [150] used mock-ups to
demonstrate a “forget” feature on tracking data associated with a given ad. The
“forget” feature gave users the option to forget the underlying factors of an ad
once it was displayed. A qualitative evaluation revealed the feature increased
user comfort and acceptance toward OBA. Participants in the study affirmed
that they would use such a feature upon seeing ads perceived as creepy or in-
vasive, and that the feature gave them a sense of control over tracking.
Explorations of different designs of ad explanations [14, 54, 60] showed
that there are benefits in incorporating ad explanations more prominently into
ads themselves in order to promote “algorithm engagement,” which is when
users speculate and attempt to manipulate the algorithm. More importantly,
increased visibility of inferences can lead to “algorithm disillusionment,” [60]
which refers to when users realize the limitations of such algorithms which they
thought to be perfect.
An untapped opportunity exists to design and evaluate transparency tools
that go beyond tracking from browsing history and pages visited. This is im-
portant because browsing behavior has been shown to only account for a small
fraction of ad-targeting, with a significant portion originating from offline be-
havior and data obtained from “data partners” [28].
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These directions offer a path of increased awareness and user participation
in how their own “algorithmic selves” [60] are being composed, in addition to
bolstering trust and enabling users to have more realistic impressions of the ac-
curacy and complexity of ad-targeting profile composition. To the best of my
knowledge, no prior works have attempted to give users a longitudinal and
comprehensive view of the “knowledge surface” generated from their online
and offline actions that could be leveraged by Internet companies to target them.
Awareness of such “knowledge surface” could positively affect users’ under-
standing, expectations, and perceived trustworthiness of OBA, in addition to
anticipating users’ desired levels of engagement when given increased trans-
parency and control over the algorithmic processes of OBA.
In synthesis, these are the design directions offered by the most relevant
prior works focused on making OBA profiles more prominent:
1. Promote user participation in tracking and inferences
2. Provide visibility beyond browsing activity
3. Enable users to trace back profile pieces to their actions
4. Provide temporal awareness of profiles
5. Shift the framing of inferences from descriptive into predictive
In the present work, I explore these directions via a Research through De-
sign (RtD) approach, incorporating them in features of a technology probe and
evaluating the probe through a two-week longitudinal field study.
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5.2.2 Technology Probes
Technology probes are research artifacts used to “find out about the unknown”
and “hopefully return with meaningful data” [85]. Technology probes are de-
fined as “simple, flexible technologies with three goals: the social science goal
of collecting in-context information about the use and the users, the engineer-
ing goal of testing the technology, and the design goal of inspiring users and
researchers to envision future technologies” [85].
Technology probes are used as situated research artifacts to inform future
design directions. They have been used before in emerging domains where ten-
sions and power imbalances exist about which directions are unclear on how
to mitigate them. For example, in their study of privacy tools for smart homes,
Seymour et al. [148] showed that the longitudinal deployment of a privacy assis-
tant technology probe prompted users to “co-adapt,” “find new control mech-
anisms,” and “suggest new approaches to adddress the challenge of regaining
privacy in the connected home.” In another use of technology probes as research
artifacts, Kaur et al. [92] explored to what extent interpretability tools help data
scientists and machine learning practitioners understand the underpinnings of
machine learning models, uncovering recurring problems that arise when they
build and evaluate machine learning models. The situated study through the
probe showed that data scientists “over-trust” and misuse such tools, which
poses implications for design of future interpretability tools.
A technology probe is suitable for this research because currently there is
no way for users to directly monitor and control the composition of their own
ad-targeting profile in-situ and in real time. Therefore, it is unknown whether
increased transparency of ad-targeting profile composition will be beneficial or
139
bring unexpected results, given that user acceptance, perceptions, and desired
engagement with OBA can be mixed.
Accordingly, the deployment of my technology probe aims at capturing (1)
in-context information about in-situ and real time transparency of ad-targeting
profile composition (the social science goal), (2) the feasibility of increased ad-
targeting composition transparency (the engineering goal), and (3) the design
act of envisioning increased participation of users in profiling for ad-targeting
5.2.3 Summary
Tracking and targeting in OBA have become very sophisticated over the years,
yet user-facing transparency lags behind. A number of studies have proposed
directions to promote user participation and increased transparency on the com-
position of users’ own ad-targeting profiles, yet no comprehensive system has
been developed or study has been conducted to explore increased and situated
user transparency and control of profiling in OBA. I explore such directions via
a Research through Design (RtD) approach.
5.3 Designing the Technology Probe
5.3.1 Design Foundations
This section introduces the justification for the main design decisions and con-
siderations involved in designing the technology probe.
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Conceptual Foundations
In formulating my approach to exploring transparency and control mechanisms
for profiling in OBA, I draw upon the definition of privacy as control, boundary
regulation theory, the situated action framework, and legal frameworks that de-
mand control over solely automated inferences. These theories and frameworks
provide the foundation upon which I ground my probe’s design, which gives
users in-situ, real-time awareness and control of user profiling.
Control I draw upon the definition of Privacy as a control, best defined by
Altman as ”the selective control of access to the self” to give users the ability
to decide what becomes part of their ad-targeting profile in the first place. This
will give users autonomy while potentially minimizing privacy violations and
unexpected and/or undesirable additions to their profiles. The underlying idea
is that by having continuous awareness and control over how much access is
given to OBA, users will experiment with these affordances in order to control
what becomes a part of their profile, thus enabling users to prevent undesired
disclosures, privacy violations, and misrepresentation.
Regulation of Access to the Self I also draw upon the theories of con-
textual integrity and boundary regulation as conceptual privacy frameworks
for the technology probe. The technology probe will give users situated and
in-context information about changes to their ad-targeting profiles, thus giv-
ing them the ability to regulate information transmission and keep appropriate
sharing norms. For instance, users may not expect visits to certain websites to
become a part of how they are targeted by companies, and so they wish to know
and control if that were to occur. The longitudinal aspect of my system enables
users to engage in a boundary regulation process where they are constantly
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aware of what information has become a part of their ad-targeting profile. In
contrast with existing post-hoc transparency mechanisms, I hypothesize that the
probe will enable users to engage in a ”dynamic response to circumstance” on
the composition of their ad-targeting profiles.
Situated Cognition From a theoretical perspective, the status-quo of OBA
currently stands in contrast with a situated action and cognition approach. The
theory of situated action holds that humans can only account for their actions
when such actions fit into the framework of a plan [158]. Suchman’s case study
of the user interface of a copying machine system had the system use any user
action detectable to guess the user’s plan and predict future actions. Suchman
shows that this approach fails because user intentions can be diffuse and tacit
by nature, and the static model led to users misinterpreting the machine’s be-
havior. The construction of the plan cannot be separated from actions – situated
actions – and when accounted for, such actions can enable humans to develop
a shared meaning and understanding with the systems they use. In a situated
action approach to OBA, knowledge about the composition of ad-targeting pro-
files would be situated within to the context of users’ actions. Such alterna-
tive approach would be theoretically preferable because it could enable users to
learn through “lived experiences” of profile composition instead of relying on
memory and recall for perception and interpretation of post-hoc events that re-
sult from their actions. Therefore, my technology probe offers in-situ awareness
and control of profiling intertwined with users’ primary activities.
Increased Control over Inferences My research informs the design of future
transparency tools for OBA, which will be relevant to developers wishing to
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Figure 5.6: Grounding of Probe’s Design
within the context of profiling and online tracking.
Empirical Foundations
The technology probe was designed as a research artifact addressing empiri-
cally identified problems around state-of-the-art OBA. Namely, (1) the lack of
awareness and participation in how users are tracked, (2) the insufficient user
understanding of OBA mechanisms, (3) the misrepresentation of user identities,
and (4) the limited means of taking effective, immediate action with regard con-
trolling what is tracked. These problems arise from the information asymmetry
in OBA. Accordingly, the probe (and its field deployment) has four design goals:
1. Engagement - To afford users with opportunities to more actively par-
ticipate in the composition of their own ad-targeting profiles, such as to
monitor and engage in tracking and inferences.
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2. Interpretation - To enable users to understand how their actions trans-
late into changes to their ad-targeting profiles. The probe should help
users build a rich, in-depth understanding of the composition of their ad-
targeting profiles over time, in addition to enabling them to grasp the ex-
tent of tracking that could be taking place behind the scenes.
3. Representation - To enable users to achieve selective, desired, and accu-
rate representation on their ad-targeting profiles.
4. Action - To motivate users to take in-situ, immediate direct control and
other, indirect meaningful actions (e.g., using private browsing, revoking
location permissions) aimed at reducing unwanted tracking and exposure.
Figure 5.6 shows a schematic of the design foundations and motivations for
the probe’s design.
5.3.2 Probe Features
This subsection introduces the features of the technology probe in detail, as ex-
perienced by users. The more technical details about the probe’s implementa-
tion are presented in the System Implementation subsection.
According to Hutchinson et al.’s definition of technology probes [85], probes
can be distinguished from prototypes in five aspects: functionality (probes are
simple and have only at most a couple of features), flexibility (probes enable
users to make use of them in unexpected ways), usability (probes do not have an
emphasis on usability), logging (probes’ logging capabilities focus on the gen-
eration of ideas for new technologies), and design phase (probes are exclusively
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used “early in the design process as a tool for challenging preexisting ideas and
influencing future design”). My implementation of a technology probe follows
these principles in order to make suitable use of this methodology.
The probe’s main features are grounded in prominent theoretical founda-
tions of privacy presented earlier and on Figure 5.6. The two major features of
the probe are: (1) notifying users about which additions are being made to their
potential ad-targeting profiles as they carry out their primary activities, and (2)
enabling users to review their profiles at any point in time. While these are the
major features, the probe’s design also incorporated some other, minor features,
which are described below.
In-the-moment notifications Notifications are sent to users once new addi-
tions to their profile are made. For example, if the user visits cvs.com, a noti-
fication is sent to the user saying that they may see ads about “Pharmacy” in
the future. If they walk into a Starbucks coffee shop with their phone on them,
a notification is sent telling them that they may see ads about “Coffee & Tea”
in the future. When more than one profile item is added from an activity, they
are grouped into a single notification. For example, a visit to Target may have
“department stores” and “grocery stores” added to a profile, but only a single
notification is sent to the user listing those items.
Profile visualization At any point in time, users can see all the items added
to their profile. Upon visiting their profile, a user can filter items based on their
originating device, and sensitive/non-sensitive items. For items added from
browsing activity, a hierarchical structure of at most two levels is imposed on the
visualization, following the top-level and lower-level categorization of Google
AdWords. Profile items are grouped into three main sections: “You may see
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ads about,” “You may be ad-targeted as,” and “Hints about your intents today.”
The difference between them is that the first section shows potential topics and
interests of the user, the second shows items that are relatively more stable, such
as the brand and model of the device the user is using, the city, state, and ZIP
code they are located in, their phone’s operating system, among other items.
The third section contained items that are more speculative in nature, but that
may hint at a person’s immediate needs, such as “looking for bakeries” after
they search for “panera” on Google Maps, or “had little sleep” after having
the probe detect under 8 hours of device charging in the evening. Items under
the “Hints about your intents today” section expired at the end of each day,
meaning that they automatically fall off from the profile, with new items added
the next day. On the profile visualization, users can also use a slider to go back
in time and visualize new profile additions each day.
Item details Upon clicking (or tapping) a profile item, users can see a de-
scription of the related actions that led to the addition of the profile item. For
example, they will see that “Health > Pharmacy” was added because they vis-
ited a page on cvs.com, where the title of the page they visited is also visible,
in addition to the date in which the item was added to the profile. If the item
came from a location visit, users will see the name of the point of interest, along
with its physical address. On the details pop-up, users will also see ad examples
related to the item they are seeing, which are explained in more detail below.
Ad examples The ad examples were a feature suggested in the pilot stage of
the probe. Pilot testers thought that besides showing the items on their profile,
it would be nice to see a visual representation of their profiles in the form of ads
that the profile may help inform. Accordingly, this feature was implemented
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based on a manually labeled open data set of ads [84]. For each item, ad ex-
amples were gathered based on the semantic similarity of the item’s title with a
category of an ad, and also based on some heuristics for speculative items. For
example, in detecting that the user may have had little sleep the night before,
the item “had little sleep” is added under the section “hints about your intents
today,” for which ad examples showing coffee and energy drinks are shown.
Similarly, if the probe detects hot weather at the user’s location, the ad exam-
ples showed cold drinks and ice cream for ad examples.
Ad tags Because the probe’s profile is at most a local substitution model,
that is, it does not reflect users’ actual ad-targeting profiles, ad tags were imple-
mented to attempt to show the relationship between items on a user’s profile
and actual ads users saw online when visiting different websites. For each ad
detected, the probe gathered and showed the most closely related item on the
user’s profile with the ad, based on a semantic similarity calculation consider-
ing the profile items’ titles and the text recognized on the ad. This was both a
way for users to have the probe some integration with the profiling outcome –
the ads– and for gauging the similarity of items on the profile with the actual
ads seen by users, as a loose proxy for profile accuracy. Ads were detected via
a combination of using open-source pre-trained models from the Ad-Versarial
[70] project and models created in [84].
Profile controls Users can remove any item from their profile, which means
the item gets deleted, but could be added again if any future activity leads to the
same item being inferred. Users can also mark any item they want as sensitive,
which means that the user will start getting notifications about when the item
gets inferred again in the future. Some items are marked as sensitive by default,
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based on a crowdsourced list of people’s comfort with Google AdWords cate-
gories provided in [167], and users can mark them not sensitive if they wish to.
Users can also mark not-sensitive any previously marked-sensitive items.
5.3.3 System Implementation
The technology probe was implemented via a browser extension and a mobile
app which conduct background processing to determine the additions to users’
ad-targeting profiles while giving users continuous and real time visibility of
such additions. Such processing is a simulation of actual ad-targeting compo-
sition mechanisms involving inferencing and categorization of user attributes
into potential interests, demographics, and behaviors that can be used to target
personalized ads to users of Facebook and Google services. I highlight potential
because I do not have access to actual user profiles and composition mecha-
nisms of ad networks – which are trade secrets – but instead the probe attempts
to reconstruct such profiles using state-of-the-art open-source inferencing and
machine intelligence technologies. For example, in order to draw connections
between ad interests from Google’s AdWords, I use Google’s open source Uni-
versal Sentence Encoding [34] algorithm. In some ways, the probe detects and
reveals the possibilities of profiling that could be used to target users with ads.
The probe artifact was named whoami, which was also the name given to the
browser extension and mobile app.
Browser extension In the probe’s implementation, the whoami browser ex-
tension serves two purposes: making inferences from browsing activities and
providing a comprehensive visualization of the user’s profile. For example, in-
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Figure 5.7: Screenshot of the whoami browser extension
terests are inferred based on the content of the pages visited by participants
when using the browser extension, and as inferences are made, users are no-
tified about new additions to their profile if such inferences lead to a new po-
tentially sensitive profile item being added to their profile (the determination of
sensitive is presented in the Inferences subsection). The visualization provided
by the browser extension is more comprehensive, containing filters for items,
and showing all items on the user’s profile, both originating from the computer
browser and phone sensors, while the visualization on the phone does not in-
clude filters nor items originating from the computer browser. This was a design
choice not to overwhelm users on the phone’s small screen with a long list of
items and buttons. A sync feature was added so that new items from the phone
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could be visualized on the computer browser by simply opening both the app
and the browser extension at the same time, after having initially paired them.
Ad tags are only shown on the computer browser, since the mobile app does
not have permission to access the content of web pages visited on the phone’s
browser.
The browser extension’s code was written on top of the React front-end
framework and the WebExtensions API, and published as unlisted in the
Chrome Web Store and signed for distribution by the Mozilla Developer Hub to
be used on Firefox.
As instrumentation for the study, the browser extension also has two addi-
tional features: the ability to send the locally stored profile data to the research
server, only done at the end of the study, and the ability to submit diary notes
for the study.
Figure 5.7 shows the user interface of the browser extension.
Mobile app The whoami app is used to capture “offline” behaviors from
participants, making inferences from physical locations visited, apps used,
physical movement (e.g., driving, cycling, running), messages exchanged, and
device charging activity. Notifications are also sent to users when new items
are added to their profiles. On the phone app, just as on the computer, users
can also see their profiles, details of profile items, and ad examples, but only for
items originating from the phone. Filters are also not available on the phone.
The mobile app was developed on top of the React Native and AWARE [64]
frameworks, and published to both Apple’s App Store and Google’s Android
Play Store, using their respective beta testing channels (TestFlight on iOS and
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Figure 5.8: Screenshot of the whoami mobile app
Internal Testing on Android) for the field study. The AWARE Framework is an
open-source mobile context instrumentation framework available for both An-
droid and iOS. Through AWARE, pre-processed sensor data can be obtained in
order to create rich data about user’s context as they use their mobile phone. For
example, it can provide data on apps used, locations visited, communications
exchanged (e.g., chat), activity recognition, ambient noise, and device usage in-
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Figure 5.10: Probe Implementation System Schematic
formation.
Figure 5.8 shows the user interface of the mobile app and
Due to restrictions of the iOS operating system with regards to what apps can
or cannot capture, some speculative profile attributes such as user’s mood from
keystrokes in instant messaging apps, apps used on the phone, and searches
performed on Google Maps are only captureable on Android.
Figure 5.9 shows the implementations of the different features on the
browser extension and the mobile app.
Figure 5.10 shows each component of the system, which I describe in detail
below.
The probe was designed and developed by me in about four months, from
June to October of 2020.
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Tracking and Inferencing
Activities tracked On the computer browser, web pages visited by users are
tracked in order to make inferences about interests users may have. Specifically,
each page’s title and a summary of their content are used for inferences. Upon
first using the probe, the IP address is also used to determine the user’s ZIP
code, state, and city, in addition to the browser and operating system used on
the computer.
The following are the activities tracked on the mobile app:
• Location – obtaining the latitude and longitude values every 2 minutes
and 30 seconds, when it is determined that the user has made significant
movement (e.g., more than about 100 meters or about 328 feet)
• Device usage – obtained from the duration of user sessions, between
timestamps of when the screen is turned on and off.
• Physical motion – obtained from native APIs that detect human activity
such as stationary, in a vehicle, walking, cycling, or running. Physical
activity detection is tracked every two minutes.
• Device information – information on the brand of the device’s manufac-
turer and the phone’s operating system
• Local weather information – obtained from OpenWeather using the
phone’s location coordinates, information includes minimum and maxi-
mum temperatures, and weather conditions such as cloudy, clear, rainy,
snowy, etc.
• Device charging – obtained as measurements of time for the duration of
device charging sessions in the evening.
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• Apps used (Android-only) – information about other apps used by users,
such as their name and distribution package or ID.
• Keystrokes (Android-only) – keystrokes are captured from instant mes-
saging apps (Messages, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and WeChat) in
order to locally infer the user’s mood. Keystrokes typed into Google Maps
are also used to infer possible user destinations.
Inferences made Most inferences that can be added to a participant’s ad-
targeting profile originate from website visits on the computer and phone sen-
sors. Interests added from browsing activity on the computer each map to an
exact interest in the Google AdWords categorization, and are representative of
“online” behavior. Interests drawn upon location sensing are mapped from
Google Maps, Yelp, and Overpass APIs via reverse-geocoding and radius search
of points of interest. A smaller number of profile items are mapped based on
heuristics, such as hours of device charging in the evening hinting at number
of hours of sleep, sentiment of words entered into messaging apps hinting at a
person’s mood, and searches made on Google Maps hinting at a person’s im-
mediate intentions. Profile items traced from phone activity are representative
of “offline” behavior. Some of the profile items are speculative, in that they are
(likely) not considered in ad-targeting today, but they are technically feasible to
infer, and could be a part of targeting in the future. These were mainly used to
elicit participants’ responses on unexpected and potentially sensitive activities
informing their ad-targeting. For example, the probe attempts to infer user’s
mood from sentiment analysis on recent chat messages, as well as lifestyle from
physical movement such as whether a person is physically active or their mode
of commute (e.g., cycling, vehicle). Studying these inferences also enabled the
unearthing of a kind of “playbook” in the ever-expanding boundaries of profil-
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Source Inferences about Mechanism Speculative?
PC browsing
Interests Google AdWords
Browser and OS used Native APIs
ZIP code IPStack API
Phone location
Interests Google, Yelp, Overpass
City, state, county Overpass API
Income Yelp price levels
Travel activity Heuristic
Local weather OpenWeather API D
Phone screen Device usage Native APIs
Phone motion
Physical activities Native APIs D
Commute mode Native APIs
Interests Heuristics
State of mind Heuristics D
Phone Device info Native APIs
Phone charging Sleep patterns Heuristic D
Phone apps* Products and services Native APIsInterests Play Store app category
Phone keystrokes*
Mood Sentiment analysis D
Languages spoken Language detection
Multicultural affinity Heuristic
Destination Maps Autocomplete D
Table 5.1: Summary of sources of inferences and mechanisms used in the
probe. Inferences are considered speculative if neither Google
or Facebook provides a way for advertisers to target users based
on them. * Android-only. Open-source algorithms were used for
semantic similarity with Google AdWords, sentiment analysis,
and language detection. Details on heuristics can be found in
appendix B.1
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ing, that is, these capture the idea and potential user reactions on unexpected
activities being tracked and profiled. Table 5.1 shows a summary of inferences
and whether they are speculative or not.
From the activities tracked by the browser extension and mobile app, infer-
ences are made and mapped to three different sections of the profile: “You may
see ads about,” (containing potential user interests) “You may be ad-targeted
as,” (containing potential user demographics and behavior) and “Hints about
your intents today” (containing speculative targeting attributes). The wording
for these sections was framed in a way that alludes to the utility of profiling
rather than labeling them in a descriptive manner, as suggested by prior works
on how people perceive OBA inferences [140]. The mapping to different pro-
file items was inspired by the different attributes Facebook and Google pro-
vide to advertisers when targeting users. For example, inferences were made
about pages visited on the user’s computer and measured for similarity against
Google’s AdWords list of interest categories. From the list of custom target-
ing based on demographics and behaviors on Facebook, inferences were made
about the user’s location, device used and usage, and apps used on the phone.
Some profile items are marked sensitive by default. For example, if the com-
fort value of the selected AdWords category is negative, the item is marked as
sensitive by default upon insertion. If either the top-level category or any of
the lower-level items have a negative value for comfort, a notification is shown
to the user on the browser about the item being added to their profile. Only
notifications involving potentially sensitive items are shown on the browser in
order not to overwhelm users with notifications at every page visited. These
AdWords interests are added under the “You may see ads about” section. A
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list of items originating from location could also marked as sensitive by default.
This was done by comparing the tags from Yelp Fusion and Google Places APIs
via semantic similarity with sensitive AdWords categories, and manually in-
specting potential matches. From manual inspection, a threshold was picked to
decide whether the item should or should not be marked as sensitive. For ex-
ample, “Doctors” in Google AdWords and “Doctors” on Yelp is a perfect match,
but “Pharmacies” and “Drug Stores” are not a perfect match, but a strong re-
lationship. Perfect matches were automatically tagged as sensitive, while the
highest scores were ordered and manually inspected until the relationships be-
came weaker, and a threshold was chosen, 0.7. If the Cosine Similarity between
the closest sensitive AdWords interest and the tag was greater than 0.7, the tag
was marked as sensitive.
The ultimate goal of these inferencing processes is to identify ad-targeting
possibilities and show users what these might be. In some ways, the probe pro-
vides the individual user’s subset of items in targeting lists provided by Google
or Facebook to advertisers (e.g., [77], [62]). Importantly, these inferences are at
best a local substitution model for the ground truth, with efforts made to mimic
the underlying process as best as possible, while keeping room for exploration,
such as in case of the speculative attributes.




An informal pilot was conducted with friends and acquaintances who agreed to
use earlier versions of the whoami browser extension and mobile app. For this
pilot, ten users used the prototypes and received regular updates for iterations
of the probe during several weeks, providing feedback about technical problems
and bugs they encountered, in addition to recommendations on wording used
and placement/layout of user interface items. Among the most meaningful
(and accepted) suggestions from the pilot were the ability to see ad examples as
a way to gaining visual feedback into how profile changes can change resulting
ads, prioritizing notifications on the computer browser only for the critical or
sensitive items, being able to see potential connections between profile items
and actual, rendered ads, and the ability to remove or mark sensitive entire
groups of items. These findings helped further inform the design of the probe
in preparation for the field deployment.
5.4 Method
To investigate design directions for increased transparency and control of profil-
ing in OBA, I conducted a longitudinal technology probe study. In this section,

























Figure 5.11: Field Deployment’s Proposed Research Design
5.4.1 Probe Field Deployment
The field deployment involved asking users to install both the whoami browser
extension and the mobile app on their smartphone, and use them for a period
of two weeks. Users were divided into two groups: the awareness and direct
control group. The experience of both groups in the study was the same, with
one exception: participants in the awareness group could not make any changes
to their profiles during the first week, such as removing items or marking them
sensitive. This was done in order to elicit the feeling of having no ability to
control during the first half of the study, and in doing so, to understand whether
seeing their profiles being composed without being able to directly modify them
would lead participants in this group to change their profiles more than those
in the other group, who could make changes from the beginning. The field
deployment was conducted with US-based participants and took place between
the period from October 21 to November 21, 2020.
Figure 5.11 shows the research design for the field deployment.
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The field deployment started with a semi-structured entry interview of par-
ticipants in order gather their initial perspectives on concepts of privacy, expe-
riences with OBA, and extent to which they feel in control of OBA, and then to
assist them in installing the technology probe onto their computer browsers and
mobile phones.
At the middle and at the end of the study, namely after the first and second
weeks, participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire focused on the
four design goals of the probe: Engagement, Interpretation, Representation, and
Action. These questionnaires gave participants an opportunity to share their
impressions with regards to the four design goals once they used the probe for
a week (midterm) and two weeks (exit). More details on these questionnaires
are provided in their respective sections below.
The study also included a diary component where participants were asked
to log their thoughts and feelings as they experienced the technology probe,
such as things they found surprising or interesting about the probe, or when
particular OBA-related events occurred, such as seeing privacy-invasive, sur-
prising, or inconsistent tracking and ads or carrying out actions they wish were
not tracked. Participants were able to submit diary entries from the user inter-
face of the whoami browser extension. Participants were not required to submit
notes, but an incentive of $1 (USD) per note submitted was offered, up to $15
per participant. These notes served as a loose way of experience sampling in
the research methodology.
During the two weeks, the probe was used by participants with logging ca-
pabilities to capture events related to the composition of participants’ profiles,
along with their interactions with the probe. Logging was implemented in a
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privacy-preserving way. For instance, when new additions to participants’ pro-
files were made, the logs did not indicate which items were added, but just the
number of items added. At the end of the study, participants were required
to submit their profile data which remained stored on the participants’ devices
for the duration of the study, and at that time they could exclude any items they
were not comfortable submitting. More details of what was logged can be found
in the respective section below.
Finally, participants completed an exit interview aimed at gathering insights
from their situated experience with the probe, potential changes in behavior or
attitudes that the probe may have motivated, and further explaining any be-
havior or diary note captured during the study. Most importantly, the exit in-
terview’s main focus was to derive concrete design directions for future trans-
parency and control interventions in OBA once participants had gone through
the two-week probe and were situated enough to provide meaningful accounts
and suggestions.
The field deployment of the technology probe was reviewed and approved
by the University of Illinois’s IRB. The remaining of this section presents the
details of each component of the field deployment.
Recruitment
Participants were recruited via several channels, including Craigslist, Prolific,
and Amazon Mechanical Turk. Purposive sampling was conducted in order to
ensure the diversity of participant demographics, technology experience and
expertise, and privacy concerns and considerations.
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# Gender Age Education Phone Browser Probe Profile Views
P1 Male 25-34 Bachelor’s Android Chrome 68
P2 Male 45-54 Associate’s Android Chrome 50
P3 Female 18-24 Bachelor’s Apple Firefox 69
P4 Female 45-54 Master’s Apple Chrome 103
P5 Male 25-34 Bachelor’s Android Chrome 174
P6 Male 25-34 Master’s Android Chrome 113
P7 Male 25-34 Bachelor’s Android Chrome 109
P8 Male 25-34 Doctoral Apple Chrome 115
P9 Male 35-44 High school Android Chrome 20
P10 Male 25-34 Master’s Apple Chrome 166
P11 Male 18-24 Some college Android Firefox 101
P12 Female 35-44 Master’s Apple Firefox 151
P13 Female 25-34 Bachelor’s Apple Chrome 76
P14 Male 35-44 Associate’s Android Firefox 94
P15 Male 18-24 Some college Android Chrome 62
P16 Female 25-34 Some college Android Chrome 67
P17 Female 25-34 Bachelor’s Android Firefox 113
P18 Female 35-44 Master’s Apple Chrome 94
P19 Female 55-64 Associate’s Apple Chrome 53
P20 Female 25-34 Bachelor’s Android Chrome 103
P21 Female 45-54 Bachelor’s Android Chrome 101
P22 Female 25-34 Some college Android Edge 43
P23 Female 35-44 Bachelor’s Apple Chrome 72
P24 Female 18-24 Bachelor’s Apple Chrome 50
P25 Female 25-34 High school Apple Chrome 66
Table 5.2: General participant demographics and the number of profile
views throughout the two weeks of study.
Specifically, 20 prospective participants responded to the screening question-
naire on Prolific and AMT (10 from each platform), from which five participants
completed the study (two from Prolific, three from AMT). A Craigslist post was
created containing the recruitment flyer and link to the screening questionnaire
and posted to the Champaign–Urbana and Chicago areas. From these posts,
eight responses were received from the Champaign–Urbana area and 89 re-
sponses from the Chicago area. Six participants from the Champaign-Urbana
area completed the study, and 11 from the Chicago area did so. A few of my
lab mates and acquaintances were asked to spread the word about the study
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on social media, and 8 people completed the screening questionnaire from that
channel, from which three completed the study. In summary, 17 participants
who completed the study were recruited from Craigslist, five from crowdsourc-
ing platforms, and three from social media.
Participant Demographics
A total of 27 participants were recruited for the study, and 25 completed the
study. Out of the two dropouts, one could not install the mobile app at the
entry interview and was set to install it later, but never did, and the other was
inactive and unresponsive for a few days, and later reached out saying that they
had gotten a new phone in the middle of the study. In both cases, I decided to
compensate the two participants for the activities completed and discontinue
their participation, given the period of inactivity and non-compliance with the
study requirements.
Table 5.2 shows participant demographics, along with the number of times
they visited their probe profiles during the two-week study. The 25 participants
came from diverse backgrounds with regards to age, education, gender, occu-
pation, internet weekly use, operating system used on their phones, and atti-
tudes toward online privacy. In the screening survey, participants reported us-
ing the Internet an average of 40.69 hours per week (Mdn=30, SD=28.67 Min=2,
Max=135). Occupations were very diverse, with some examples being health-
care administrator, package handler, substitute teacher, librarian, and yoga
teacher. Seven participants reported using ad blockers. Participants’ IUIPC
scores [107] were also distributed. When adding up all the questions to cre-
ate a composite score, the minimum value was 37, Q1=50, Q2=55, Q3=63, and
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the maximum was 68, with the average being 55.72 (SD=8.38). Interestingly,
the statement with the most variance in the responses was “I’m concerned that
online companies are collecting too much personal information about me” and
“Companies seeking information online should disclose the way the data are
collected, processed, and used” being the statement with the least variance.
Compensation
Participants were compensated with up to $95 (USD) for their participation.
Participants who completed the whole study received $80, in addition to $1 for
each diary note submitted, up to $15. Compensation was made via electronic
Amazon gift cards sent to participants’ preferred email addresses upon study
completion.
Participation was voluntary and participants could withdraw from the study
at any point, and in such a case they received pro-rated compensation: $10 for
the entry interview, $20 for each week, $20 for the exit interview, $10 bonus for
completing the entire study, and $1 for each diary note submitted.
Participant Screening
A link to the participant screening survey was added to the recruitment flyer,
which was distributed on the crowdsourcing platforms, Cragislist, and social
media. Participants were required to be 18 years old or older in order to par-
ticipate in the study. Participants were also required to own a smartphone with
either iOS or Android operating system. The screening questionnaire collected
prospective participants’ gender identity, age bracket, education background,
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occupation, hours of weekly Internet use, smartphone operating system, com-
puter operating system, browser used on computer, and use of ad blockers. Par-
ticipants were required to answer the entry questionnaire described later in this
section, in addition to questions about Awareness, Control, and Collection from
the IUIPC scale at the end of the questionnaire. Prospective participants were
required to provide their name and email address for contact in case they were
eligible to participate. Consent to participate in the study was obtained in elec-
tronic form, prior to starting the screening questionnaire.
Entry questionnaire
The entry questionnaire was a part of the screening questionnaire, presented af-
ter the demographic questions. The entry questionnaire contained 9 questions
used to gauge people’s original attitudes and experiences with regard to the
probe’s design goals. Likert-scale questions about OBA engagement, interpre-
tation, representation, and action were asked, such as “I believe I have the ability to
monitor my potential profile used in OBA.” and “I believe that I have the ability to take
action in order to reduce unwanted tracking and exposure in OBA.” Participants were
required to respond using the choices “Not at All,” “Very Little,” ”Somewhat,”
or “To a Great Extent.” Participants were presented with a brief introduction
of OBA before answering these questions. For all the OBA questionnaires pre-
sented, questions were rendered at a random order, and explanations were re-
quired for each answer provided.
Figure 5.12 shows the results of the entry questionnaire. Most notably, par-
ticipants were mixed about their ability to monitor their own ad-targeting pro-
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 immediate and meaningful actions about OBA
Action
I believe that I have the ability to take action
 in order to reduce unwanted tracking and exposure in OBA
Action
I believe that I want to/have the motivation
 to control my experience in OBA
Interpretation
I believe that I know the extent of tracking
 taking place in OBA
Representation
I believe that my OBA profile
 captures an accurate representation of who I am
Representation
I believe that my OBA profile
 is consistent with the ads I have seen in the past week
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 to actively participate in OBA
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Entry OBA Questionnaire Results
Figure 5.12: OBA Entry Questionnaire Results
accurate representation of who they are.
Entry Interview
For each participant, the study started with the entry interview. This was a
semi-structured interview whose focus was to capture participants’ original at-
titudes and concepts about privacy and OBA, and assist in and verifying the
installation the browser extension and mobile app. The original attitudes and
concepts captured in the entry interview were read aloud to participants during
the exit interview in order to elicit qualitative comparisons and discussions on
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website visited on computer expanded item group on computer
items added to profile entered item group on phone
items updated in profile opened item
notification shown on computer changed ad example
clicked notification on computer opened item actions
notification sent to phone removed item
notification opened on phone marked item sensitive
entered profile marked item not sensitive
left profile ad detected on computer
dragged time slider ad tag shown
filtered out browser items hovered ad tag
filtered out phone items clicked ad tag
filtered out non-sensitive items sent profile for sync
swiped ad example card on phone sync successful
hovered ad example strip item on computer
Table 5.3: User events logged by the probe
what the effect of using the technology probe was. Five questions were asked,
including what privacy meant to participants, what their experience with OBA
had been, to what extent they felt in control of OBA, what data they believe
to be considered to inform the ads they see online, and whether they used any
tools, methods, or settings to control or block tracking or targeted ads. Sessions
were conducted via Zoom and recorded for future audio transcription.
Once participants responded to these questions, I shared links and verbal in-
structions with them so they could install both the mobile app and the browser
extension. I also assisted them in pairing the browser extension with the app
so that profile items are synced, and gave them a brief introduction of some of
the probe’s features, such as opening item details, performing item actions, and
submitting diary notes for the study. The entry interview took 30 minutes.
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Log Data
Logging of user activities started upon successfully installing the browser ex-
tension and the mobile app. The logs were later used to complement the data
analysis with quantitative data representing each users’ behavior. The purpose
of collecting log data was to contextualize participants’ qualitative responses
and capture a more comprehensive picture of each user’s participation in the
study by triangulating their qualitative accounts with the quantitative signals
obtained by the probe. Table 5.3 shows all events logged in real time.
Logs served as a rich grounding mechanism for each participant, providing
evidence of participants’ behaviors during the study.
It is known that accuracy is a primed characteristic of ad-targeting profiles
[54]. For example, users may discredit the algorithm if they find inconsistencies
in the connections between their identities or behavior and their profiles [60].
For this reason, whenever possible, a proxy value for confidence or accuracy of
profile items was captured in order to determine the consistency of the profiles
created by the system with the ads users will see during the field deployment.
For example, when new profile items were added from the similarities of page
content with AdWords categories, the Cosine Similarity was stored. The Co-
sine Similarity value was also stored for ads and ad tags shown. These values
help in gauging the accuracy of profiles and how distant the profiles created by
the probe might be from actual, ground-truth profiles, as determined by their
semantic similarity with the text in actual ads, respectively.
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Midterm Questionnaire
The midterm questionnaire served as an opportunity for participants to share
their impressions and feelings with regard to changes in their impressions, atti-
tudes, and perceived levels of control upon completing one week of probe use.
Participants answered six questions, again regarding the probe’s four goals of
engagement, intepretation, representation, and action. The difference is that this
time most questions were framed to inquire about changes with regard to such
goals. For instance, “In your opinion, how has the system affected your ability to
monitor your potential profile used in OBA?” or “In your opinion, how has the system
affected your understanding of your own OBA profile?” At this midpoint, partic-
ipants were also asked to answer how accurate they believed their profiles to
be, which was also asked at the end: “In your opinion, do you find the profile cre-
ated by the system to be an accurate representation of yourself?” All questions were
again required to be answered using the same four-point Likert scale as before,
in addition to being required to explain their answer for every question. The
questionnaire was shared via email with participants exactly one week after en-
tering the study. In the same email, participants were reminded of available
probe features, and those in the awareness group were told that they could now
remove and mark items sensitive moving forward.
Diary
A participant-driven diary/logging component was included in the field study
in order to obtain rich complementary context on participants’ general OBA ex-
periences while using the probe. These entries were voluntary, but encouraged
by offering participants $1 per note submitted, up to $15. The main purpose of
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such notes was to capture situated accounts of participants’ experiences during
the study. Participants were asked to take not of and share their thoughts, ex-
periences, and feelings when finding anything worth sharing about the probe,
such as surprises, positive or negative experiences, experiences with their pro-
files, such as something privacy-invasive or inconsistent with their identities,
when they the connection between an ad and their profile items was (un)clear,
activities during which they wanted no tracking, and when they wish to know
and control how an activity performed by them might inform ad-targeting.
Exit Questionnaire and Profile Submission
Upon finishing the two weeks of study, and prior to their exit interview, partic-
ipants were asked to answer a four-question questionnaire about the represen-
tation, engagement, and action design goals of the probe, again the questions
were framed with change in mind, such as “In your opinion, how has the system
affected your ability to reduce unwanted tracking and exposure in Online Behavioral
Advertising?” and “In your opinion, how has the system created opportunities for you,
as a user, to actively participate in Online Behavioral Advertising?” A final measure
of perceived accuracy was collected from participants in order to gauge whether
they believed their profiles became more accurate between the end of the first
and second weeks.
Participants were also asked to take time to review and submit their final
profiles prior to the exit interview, which could be done from the browser ex-
tension. Before submitting their profiles, participants had the opportunity to
exclude any items from the submission.
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Exit Interview
Participants were required to participate in a semi-structured exit interview. For
each participant, the exit interview was conducted exactly two weeks after en-
tering the study. Each exit interview session lasted approximately 45 minutes
and was conducted via Zoom. Sessions were recorded and had their audio tran-
scribed for the data analysis.
The exit interview started with questions about participants’ experiences
with the probe, such as their general impressions, features they liked or dis-
liked the most, and follow-up questions about behavioral logs and diary notes,
such a “why or why not did you remove items?” or “why did you or did you not visit
your profile frequently?”
Next, participants were asked if they noticed any change in their behavior
due to their experiences with the probe over the two weeks. For example, partic-
ipants were asked if they found themselves doing something either to prevent
or ensure whoami noticed. Participants were also reminded of the main points
they made during the entry interview with regards to their attitudes toward pri-
vacy and OBA, and asked whether their experience with the probe had changed
any of those.
An open-ended question about what transparency and control features they
desired in OBA was asked.
Next, a comparison exercise with existing OBA transparency and control
mechanisms was conducted. Specifically, participants were asked to open
Google’s or Facebook’s dashboards of ad interests and a couple of ad expla-
nations. The decision for which service provider to use was counterbalanced by
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asking odd-numbered participants to look at Google’s and even-numbered par-
ticipants to look at Facebook’s, with the exception of when they did not have a
Facebook account or it would be inconvenient to log in. Participants were given
time to explore the existing solutions and verbally confirm when they thought
they were ready to proceed. They were then asked whether they were aware of
these existing solutions, and asked how the information on there compares with
the information on their whoami profiles in general. To wrap up the compar-
ison exercise, participants were asked about the pros and cons of the existing
solutions and whoami, and to say whether there were any features they wish
could be borrowed from whoami to be in the existing solutions, or vice-versa.
Following the comparison, a co-design exercise aimed at understanding
how users would like to handle ephemeral, short-lived inferences, inaccura-
cies/mistakes, stable versus short-lived identities, missing pieces, and poten-
tially sensitive inferences. For instance, one of the questions was “You have prob-
ably noticed that there are mistakes on your profile. For example, inaccuracies and/or
conflated identities, such as when doing something for work or sharing a device with
others. Would you be interested in correcting those? Why or why not? If so, how might
you want to do it?” These were asked to probe participants for concrete and
realistic ways in which they wish/did not wish to engage with OBA profiling.
Finally, an open-ended question was asked: “I will ask for a moment that you
imagine a designer from Google or Facebook being in this call with us. How would
you tell them about your preferences to see and control your ad-targeting profile?” If
participants’ answers hinted at some form of desired participation, they were
asked “With what frequency would you like to do so? Every day? At the time they are
inferred? Every week or month?” Participants were paid at the end.
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5.4.2 Data Analysis
I approached my data analysis using a mixed-method strategy. The anchor and
emphasis of my analysis was on the qualitative data from the exit interview.
Then, my quantitative analysis provides contextual grounding for the qualita-
tive evidence, such as showing participants’ engagements with the probe, and
a comparison of responses to the entry, midterm, and exit questionnaires via
the descriptive statistics of responses. The diary notes are taken as situated
accounts of participants’ experiences on the probe’s transparency and controls.
Whenever possible, I triangulate the main qualitative findings with quantitative
data in order to highlight when participants’ attitudes were aligned with their
behaviors as indicated by the logs.
Although I myself conducted all the 52 interviews of the study, the entry
and exit interview sessions were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed for recur-
ring themes. During each interview, I took notes that captured the main point
from participants’ responses, in addition to attempting to capture what they
said word-for-word. I conducted a thematic analysis by first reviewing all the
interview notes, then identifying recurring themes, grouping them, and order-
ing them by their recurrence. In the Results section, present the main themes
that had over four participants providing responses that fall into them. Once
the transcription was completed, I looked for representative quotes for each
theme, and presented them in the Results section when appropriate.
A thematic analysis was also conducted for the 187 diary notes submitted
by the study participants. I first read all the notes to get situated with their
content, then mapped recurring themes and identified how many times they
were reinforced, presenting the most reinforced themes.
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5.5 Results
5.5.1 Entry Interview Takeaways
This subsection summarizes the main takeaways from the entry interview,
mainly for context in interpreting participants’ accounts.
Conceptions of privacy When asked about privacy conceptions, most par-
ticipants (11) defined privacy as ability to control, nine alluded to the idea of
contextual integrity, and five conflated aspects of security with privacy. Four
also defined privacy as the right to be left alone.
Ads follow me, my phone eavesdrops The most common experiences with
OBA participants reported were about ads “following”them around after con-
ducting certain activities online. Nine participants out of the 25 gave concrete
examples of situations in which they believed their phone was eavesdropping
on their conversations with others, after seeing eerily accurate and specific ads
for topics they only remembered talking about and not leaving online traces for.
Little control of OBA Participants felt that they have little to no control
when it comes to OBA, with feelings of resignation, giving up, or helpless-
ness being common. Participants often mentioned that they are forced to either
accept the practices or not use products at all, and that the only control they
thought they had was on the originating activities, such as searching for some-
thing in order to see ads about it. When asked what controls they currently use,
such as tools or settings, six participants commented that they do not engage
in any control because they believe it takes a lot of effort to do so, and three
reported that they do not try to control anything because websites may stop
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working as intended since many websites rely on tracking and targeted ads for
revenue.
Narrow view of tracking When asked about what data or data types they
believe to be considered to determine what ads they will see, 11 participants
did not go beyond browsing and searching data, which suggests participants
may have a narrow view of the device and activity sources of profiling. Nine
participants provided concrete, diverse examples of things they thought were
considered, including likes, views, and comments on social media, and apps
used on their phone. Four participants used a blanket “everything” statement
to convey that everything they do online which can be captured is being used
to target them with ads.
Mixed attitudes Perhaps the most important finding from the entry inter-
view for grounding the research findings is that participants showed mixed
sentiment and acceptance towards ad-targeting. For some, profiling and ads
are a nuisance that they attempt to escape by using ad blockers and never really
bothering to look further into them. For others, ads are something to be ac-
cepted as an exchange for using free services, despite being bothered by them at
times or “never really thinking much about them.” However, some participants
mentioned benefiting from ads and wanting them to be more relevant. This is



































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Visited profile Engaged with profile visualization Modified profile
Could not change profile in Week #1Could change profile in Week #1
Figure 5.13: Participant engagement by day of study. Modifications to pro-
file include both item removals or markings of sensitive/not
sensitive. I reached out to participants on Day 7 asking them
to complete the midterm questionnaire, reminding them of
some probe features, and communicating to participants in
the awareness group that they could make changes to their
profile moving forward. Day 13 had another touchpoint ask-
ing participants to answer the exit questionnaire and submit
their profiles, and reminding them of the interview which
happened on Day 14.
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5.5.2 The Impact of the Probe
Probe Engagement from Log Data
Engagement A total of 92,675 system log entries were created. Collectively, the
25 participants visited their profiles 2,233 times. A total of 4,526 items were
added to participant profiles, and 1,587 “open item” events were logged. A
total of 184 items were removed, 17 marked sensitive, and 28 marked not sen-
sitive by participants. When only considering profile visits lasting under 10
minutes (96% of profile visits are under 10 minutes), the average length of pro-
file visits was 44.27 seconds, and participants spent a collective total of about 35
hours engaging with their profiles. When looking at the cumulative time spent
each day per participant and averaging the cumulative daily time spent over
the 14 days, the average number of minutes spent daily by participant was 8.43
(Mdn=7.74, SD=3.77, Min=2.55, Max=20.38). Participants visited a total of 2,703
distinct websites on their computer browsers throughout the study. The top 10
most visited websites were Google, MTurk, Gmail, Facebook, Reddit, Twitter,
ConnectNetwork, YouTube, Amazon, and Google Docs.
The average number of profile visits per participant was 89.32 (Mdn=94,
SD=37.75, Min=20, Max=154). Each participant opened an average of 63.92 pro-
file items (Mdn=51, SD=59.17, Min=5, Max=214). The average number of items
removed from profiles per participant was 7.36 (Mdn=2, Min=0, Max=46). Over
the two weeks, the average total time spent visiting profiles was 83.91 minutes
per participant (Mdn=77.33, SD=31.07, Min=33.15, Max=159.7).
To better gauge participants’ use of the probe, it is preferable to look at daily
engagement. Figure 5.13 shows participant engagement for each day of study.
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Engaging with profile visualization is marked if one of the following events was
captured for each day: opened item, dragged time slider, expanded group, en-
tered group, changed ad example, hovered ad example strip item on computer,
opened item actions, filtered out browser items, filtered out non-sensitive items,
filtered out phone items, or swiped ad card example on phone. Profile modifica-
tions include both item removals and marking sensitive/not sensitive. The logs
indicate that most participants were very engaged with the probe, visiting and
engaging with their profiles almost every day. Overall, the logs also indicate
that most participants did not change their profile very much. In addition, the
logs also suggest the number of profile modifications was comparable between
the participants who could and could not modify profiles during the first week.
These figures suggest that the probe’s deployment was successful in receiv-
ing use from participants, especially considering the fact that they were not re-
quired to visit or engage with their profiles as criteria for the study. The low
number of profile modifications also suggest that the utility of the probe was
perhaps more on the side of transparency than on the side of control.
Submitted profiles All 25 participants submitted their profiles at the end of
the study. When analyzing these profiles, the average profile size was 257.08
items (Mdn=249, SD=123.67, Min=27, Max=504). Out of the 25 participants,
eight participants excluded items from the final profile transfer, with the aver-
age number of items excluded from the transfer being 11.5 (Mdn=8, SD=10.74,
Min=1, Max=31). As promised in the study’s consent form, for privacy reasons,
the actual profile items excluded from transfer are not known, but only that
items were excluded prior to transferring the profile data. The average num-
ber of profile items originated from participants’ phones was 51.84 (Mdn=44,
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Figure 5.14: Tree map plot of items removed by participants during the
study, from their final profile submission
SD=29.8, Min=15, Max=116), with the percentage of items from the phone being
25% on average (Mdn=22%, SD=16%, Min=4%, Max=68%). The average num-
ber of profile items from participants’ phone location alone was 10.52 (Mdn=0,
SD=10.06, Min=0, Max=32). Final profiles had an average of 49.76 sensitive
items (Mdn=50, SD=30.03, Min=0, Max=132), and average of 9.96 speculative
items (Mdn=9, SD=5.11, Min=2, Max=27). The average percentage of spec-
ulative items in the submitted profiles was 5% (Mdn=4%, SD=3%, Min=2%,
Max=11%). The number of speculative items suggest that most items on peo-
ple’s profiles align with actual targeting possibilities.
Figure 5.14 shows a tree map plot of all items removed by participants
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Figure 5.15: Word cloud of all items marked sensitive present in partici-
pants’ submitted profiles at the end of study. The left image
contains both system-defaults and user-marked items. The
right contains only user-marked items.
throughout the study. When removed items had been added due to a visit to
a website, the top websites for removed items were google.com, craigslist.com,
hp.com, ebay.com, and yahoo.com. Figure 5.15 shows a word cloud of the sen-
sitive items found on participants’ profiles at the end of the study. These are
presented in order to provide some contextual background about potentially
sensitive items on participants’ profiles.
How accurate were profiles? The log data also contained information about
the strength of relationship of profile items added from the computer browser
with participants’ activities. Specifically, the Cosine Similarity value was logged
as part of the profile item records. For each user, the average value for this
relationship across all profile items for each participant was 0.56 (Mdn=0.57,
SD=0.01, Min=0.55, Max=0.59). Another proxy for profile accuracy was the re-
lationship between the ads shown to users and probe profile items. The average
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Cosine Similarity between the most closely related profile item with the ad’s
extracted text was 0.48 (Mdn=.47, SD=0.08, Min=0.2, Max=0.9).
A measure of perceived accuracy was also collected via the midterm and
exit questionnaires. Specifically, participants were asked whether their probe
profiles were an accurate representation of their perceived identities. At the
midterm questionnaire, 16 participants responded with “Somewhat” and three
responded with “To a Great Extent.” At the exit questionnaire, four participants
responded with “Very little,” 11 responded with “Somewhat,” and nine partic-
ipants responded with “To a Great Extent.” Combined, these figures suggest
the profiles created by the probe were reasonably accurate, and that perhaps
perceived accuracy increased the longer the probe was used for.
Behavior explanations When asked to explain their engagement with the
probe, such as the reason for removing/not removing items or visiting their
profiles frequently, some explanations were very elucidating. For example, 12
participants mentioned that they did not find any item on their profile to be sen-
sitive or concerning, so they did not feel like they wanted to remove any items,
and two participants reported not removing any items because they thought
they were general enough to keep them. Another aspect related to item re-
movals was inaccuracies: five participants said the reason they removed items
is because they thought it did not reflect their identities or activities. However,
three participants said they did not remove inaccurate items because they were
not bothered by potential “mistargets.” Finally, when asked to explain why par-
ticipants visited their profiles frequently and engaged with features such as the
time slider, filtering, and opening item details, the main reasons participants re-
ported were to monitor the growth rate of their profile (five participants) and to
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determine whether something potentially sensitive had been added (two par-
ticipants).
Reactions to Probe from Diary Notes
A total of 185 diary notes were submitted by 23 participants. The notes contain
rich accounts of people’s reactions to increased transparency about inferences
made from their activities. The average number of notes submitted per par-
ticipant was 7.4 (Mdn=6, SD=6.1, Min=0, Max=22). Among the most common
participant reactions to the increased transparency were instances of: identity
reflection (19 notes), for example, disputing inaccuracies and seeing merged
identities and algorithmic disillusionment (17 notes), with participants react-
ing to learning the limitations of algorithms they originally thought to be per-
fect. These are reactions to be expected once transparency of a once opaque
system is introduced to users (see [59, 60, 167, 140]). For this reason, I present
only the novel findings in this subsection, namely participants seeking specific
explanations about unexpected profiling, engaging in identity performance, be-
ing able to detect and wanting to set personal boundaries, and elucidation of
OBA profiling processes.
Surprises about tracking A common topic written in the participant-driven
diary notes was unexpected tracking, mentioned in 17 notes such as when par-
ticipants did not know that their location, physical movements, and apps used
on their phone could be used to make inferences and target ads to them. For
example, P14 wrote
“I did not know that when using the GPS program such as Waze or Google Maps
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they can send targeted ads based on where you stop. I stopped nearby the In and Out
burger and it said I may see ads based on Burgers.”
Most of these reactions originated from activity performed away from the
computer, such as when driving or going to a physical location. For instance,
P1 wrote
“I am surprised to know that the profile knows when my phone is moving so it can
tell perhaps when I’m driving or moving vigorously. I also didn’t expect it to be able to
tell the specific text of each page. I took a survey earlier that each page had questions
about different things and each page of the survey the profile would tell me a different
kind of ad I could be shown. It also knew either what Wi-Fi I was connected to earlier
when I was at the hospital or perhaps my location data? I am a little surprised by some
of these things.”
However, for participants whose mental models of profiling centered
around browsing activity, they were surprised to see that inferences could be
made about them for activities beyond online shopping, such as when visiting
education-related websites. For example, P24 wrote
“I was super shocked about how ads track you even when you are not shopping.
There has been so many job pop-ups found on this app as well as education. I was even
shocked that Facebook searching and groups are targets for ads.”
When items were surprising, participants also wondered how an advertiser
might use the information involved in it. For instance, P13 wrote
“My phone identified that I am a heavy smart phone user because I use my phone
more than the average user (3 hours) on a single day. I’m curious if this is just for
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users using whoami or of all smart phone users. Curious how that would be used for ad
targeting.”
Most importantly, among the notes of unexpected profiling were partici-
pants’ need for specific explanations. Often these were items that did not align
with participants’ mental models of how they are being tracked and profiled.
For example, P13 noted
“I’m curious to know how it has determined I’m physically active. It says I went
for a walk with my phone but doesn’t mention any of the many workouts that I’ve also
track on my phone. I’d like to know if this actually impacts my ad-targeting”
And P7 writing
“I’m in interested in the results I received when I used my navigation app. I would
like to know why I got auto insurance results. Was it just because I was driving? Was
it because I was driving at a certain speed.”
These notes suggest that users may want very specific explanations upon
seeing an outcome of profiling that they did not expect or does not align with
their view of what is considered when creating such profiles.
Identity performance The main topic of 14 of participants’ notes was about
either their desire to see certain pieces of their identity reflected on their ad-
targeting profile or surprise that such identities were not seen on their profiles.
Often these identities were related to a gender identity, pieces of a person’s iden-
tity that make a big part of their lives, such as being a stay-at-home parent, or
a strong interest in a particular topic or activity. For instance, P5 wrote on his
attempt to see his interests reflected on profiles, saying “I’ve actively been trying
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to go to websites for my personal hobbies like Magic the Gathering, World of Warcraft,
and Wrestling, and few of those things are being picked up.” In another example, P17
wrote a note about the library cafe being detected but not her interest in books,
writing “My phone thinks one of my interests is cafes because I’ve visited [cafe name].
However, I work at a library that has a cafe. I’m curious why I’m not being logged as
someone who has an interest in books/libraries instead.”
Often such notes about identity performance were reflective of attitudes re-
lated to algorithmic authority and omniscience, where participants expected the
algorithm to pick up on more nuanced aspects of their lives or have a height-
ened sensory perception. For instance, P4 wrote “Another thing I noted today and
yesterday was that I spent a chunk of time each day in my kitchen, and the app does
not notice that, that I am cooking and baking.” Participants’ thoughts of algorithms
being omniscient were the subject of nine notes.
“This is too personal” In 12 of the notes submitted, participants expressed
concern with some inferences made from either activities they thought were
personal and wished didn’t inform ads, or topics they deemed sensitive such as
their sleep patterns or locations visited. For instance, P20 wrote
“This morning, I was chatting to a friend in Facebook messenger on another friend
case whom I had a fall out with. While writing in conversation how I expressed the
negative situation on the fight. I received a profile attribute ”bad mood” onto the profile.
I think this was another instance of spying on people’s conversation. I was surprised to
receive the attribute like it was analyzing my text conversation.”
Most interestingly, participants were motivated to remove certain items
when they were both inaccurate and sensitive, and wondered about and ques-
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tioned the mechanics of the algorithm when an inference was both accurate and
perceived as sensitive. For instance, P13 wrote
“Curious to know how it identified me as an auto traveler. How did the technology
determine I was in a car vs a bike or other moving transportation?”
Elucidation For 12 notes, the main point was how participants found the
experience with the probe elucidating, both in seeing how a certain item came
to be on their profile, and when they saw a certain ad about a topic or having
gotten a notification from the probe that they might get it. For example, P10
wrote “Visited Office Depot to get a tape. Now I see office equipment tag and ad on my
Facebook page.”
Similarly, 11 of the notes submitted described moments in which partici-
pants were unsure of why certain items were on their profile at a first glance,
even when seeing the originating actions. This led them to recall their actions
and try to justify items on their profiles which could have been simply inaccu-
racies. For instance, P12 noted
“Today’s interesting misunderstanding of my identities was that I’m now, it seems,
a cyclist, because I held my phone while cycling. I don’t own a bike, and haven’t ridden
one in four? maybe 5? years, and strongly prefer walking. I’m not sure what could
confuse it–walking speed? the fact that my brother and I talked about bike commuters
in cities? that I walked on a forest trail today marked for walkers and cyclists? I’d be
really curious to know what goes into make these determinations.”
People’s tendency to justify algorithmic inaccuracies is a known reaction to
increased transparency of opaque systems [60].
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Reported Changes in Attitudes and Behaviors
When asked about any changes in their attitudes after having participated in
the study, when reporting any changes, it was common for participants to re-
port being more aware (nine participants) and more motivated to control (ten
participants) their OBA experiences, which were already reported before in the
literature [167]. The more interesting and novel findings about such changes
involve participants reporting being more mindful of the connection between
their activities and future ad-targeting (six participants), becoming more em-
powered to take action (six participants), and having the probe either reaffirm
(four participants) or challenge their views on OBA (eight participants).
More mindful of activity–ad connections When asked whether participants
noticed any change in their behavior due to using the probe, most participants
noted they did not. However, six participants claimed to be more mindful of the
connection between their actions and potential items on their profile and ads
they might see in the future. These participants either mentioned speculating
about how a specific action might lead to an ad, or being curious about what
items in particular might be added as a result of a given activity. For example,
P1 explained
“I don’t think I changed my behavior a lot, but I was 100% more mindful about
it. Anytime I would connect to a Wi-Fi in a public area, or I’m writing a message to
someone on a messaging platform, I’m way more thoughtful of, ”Well, if I write this,
it’s going to think this,” and I wouldn’t change my behavior, but I just was curious to
think about how that would work.”
At the exit interview, I reminded participants about the main points they
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made during entry interview regarding privacy and OBA, and asked whether
anything had changed after being in the study. Nine participants said that their
views had not changed much, but a number of participants gave specific exam-
ples of where their attitudes had changed, which are covered below.
More empowered Six participants reported feeling more empowered to con-
trol their profiling when using the probe. For example, P1 noted about what
changed, saying
“I would say it’s pretty close to the same. I can appreciate more now my ability to
control and because I feel like I have a little more control, I guess I am just slightly less
inclined to agree with that it’s the price you pay for using online because some of the
information I think is a little harrowing the mood specifically. Using words that I’ve
written to guess my mood is a little harrowing. It’s a little scary. So it kind of makes me
think what else will come in the future.”
Mood prediction from instant messaging was one of the speculative infer-
ences of the probe – it does not necessarily mean advertisers are making such
inferences, but it was a way to probe participants for potentially sensitive activ-
ities and topics that may make it into their ad-targeting profiles.
(Mis)matched expectations Participants also often mentioned that the study
had changed some original views they had towards OBA. For instance, five
participants commented that they had underestimated the extent of profiling
that can be done based on their activities, with P4 noting “Well, I will say I learned
that they do a lot more tracking than I thought. Because of that, especially with the
GPS.” P4 further commented that many items on his probe profile came from
his short visits to restaurants when delivering for Uber Eats and DoorDash. He
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also noted how difficult it could be for him not to be tracked when he needs
location on for his job, saying
“Well, I didn’t really have my location on it a lot before I started delivery, but now I
have it on lot of time. I just keep forgetting to turn it off afterwards. So as I explained,
before I started doing delivery I used to turn it off a lot. Sometimes it’s hard to keep it
off when I go to delivery, I keep forgetting to turn it off.”
Four participants had a somehow opposite reaction, stating that they ini-
tially thought profiling was highly accurate and eerily specific, and that know-
ing that they can be inaccurate and more general made them less concerned.
For example, P5 noted
“I don’t know. I guess the experience with whoami has taught me I’m more comfort-
able with the way things seem to be than I expected. Yes, things aren’t that transparent.
But what I’m getting so far isn’t necessarily uncomfortable. I don’t like people watch-
ing my stuff, but knowing that them watching it is not giving them good data, or in
the cases that it is, is a lot more voluntary, actively using a website and a place going,
”Hey, do you use these parts? Maybe you’ll like these things.” [...] It’s not that there’s
nothing to be concerned about, there’s just less to be concerned about.”
Such comments were more common for participants whose original atti-
tudes hinted at impressions of algorithmic authority and omniscience, and their
experience with the probe showed them that algorithms have limitations.
In contrast, for four of the participants, the experience had reaffirmed their
original views, with with P2 noting
“I think it reaffirmed my original suspicion and anything that can be tracked will
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be, and it’s going to be used to build some profile, and bombard you with more and more
attention catching ads tailored to your interests.”
Other times such impression came from having some technical knowledge,
with P11 noting that it had confirmed his original stance, saying
“I think it’s just confirmed what I already thought a lot of the time, which is pretty
much that anything you – and again, I have the luxury of being well-educated about
this. I’m a computer science student, so I have a lot of technical knowledge that others
may not have, but it confirmed the fact that any information I am giving somebody, they
will take. And any information I’m exposing through my web behavior, they will take.
And the mitigations to that are, at least in the current form of the Internet, are kind of
onerous, because it involves blocking cookies and things like that, which are necessary
for the web to work. So it puts people in kind of a, if advertisers are not playing fair
by actually allowing you to disable personalized ads, it can be onerous to actually stop
tracking.”
Revisiting probe goals: Increased engagement and interpretation The re-
sults from the midterm questionnaire (Figure 5.16) suggest that the probe had
an impact on participants’ ability to monitor their profile, understanding of their
own profile and the extent of tracking taking place in OBA. The sentiment given
by participants about their answers suggest that the reported change in the abil-
ity to monitor profiles is neutral to positive (1 negative, 12 neutral, 12 positive),
the change in understanding of their own profiles is positive (10 neutral, 15 pos-
itive), and the change in the extent of tracking is somewhat mixed in sentiment
(5 negative, 11 neutral, 9 positive). Looking at response explanations, the neg-
ative sentiment about the change in the extent of tracking stems from learning

























In your opinion, do you find the profile created by the system
 to be an accurate representation of yourself?
Representation
In your opinion, do you find the profile created by the system
 to be consistent with actual ads you have seen in the past week?
Action
In your opinion, how has the system affected your
 willingness and motivation to control your experience in OBA?
Engagement
In your opinion, how has the system
 affected your ability to monitor your potential profile used in OBA?
Interpretation
In your opinion, how has the system
 affected your understanding of your own OBA profile?
Interpretation
In your opinion, how has the system affected
 your impressions on the extent of tracking taking place in OBA?
Not at All Very Little Somewhat To a Great Extent Not at All Very Little Somewhat To a Great Extent Not at All Very Little Somewhat To a Great Extent

























Midterm OBA Questionnaire Results
Figure 5.16: OBA Midterm Questionnaire Results
and that inferences can be made even from minor or seemingly “insignificant”
activities participants engaged in. For participants who were neutral, their ex-
planations carried aspects of not being surprised by such ubiquitous tracking
or the things that were tracked, or feeling that profiling is an “inevitable part
of the digital world” (P4). The positive sentiment about changes in impressions
on the extent of tracking revolved around being more aware of what is being
considered in profiling processes.
Participants were mixed about whether using the probe during the first week
had motivated them to control their OBA experiences. For participants who


















In your opinion, how has the system affected
 your ability to reduce unwanted tracking and exposure in OBA?
Action
In your opinion, how has the system affected
 your ability to take immediate and meaningful actions about OBA?
Engagement
In your opinion, how has the system created
 opportunities for you, as a user, to actively participate in OBA?
Representation
In your opinion, do you find the profile created by the system
 to be an accurate representation of yourself?
Not at All Very Little Somewhat To a Great Extent Not at All Very Little Somewhat To a Great Extent













Exit OBA Questionnaire Results
Figure 5.17: OBA Exit Questionnaire Results
sponses revolved around being open to ad-targeting, feeling that nothing can
be done, and not seeing anything sensitive being profiled. For participants who
responded with “Somewhat” and “To a Great Extent,” responses hinted at in-
tentions to investigate their profiles and control profiling processes, with P17
saying “I’m willing to take more privacy measures in the future, especially in regards
to my location.”
After the first week, participants also generally thought their profiles to be
somewhat accurate and consistent with the ads they remembered seeing during
the first week.
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Analyzing the responses from the exit questionnaire (Figure 5.17), partici-
pants reported that they thought their profiles to be accurate, with an increase
in the number of participants who chose “To a Great Extent” compared to the
midterm questionnaire (from 3 to 9), which suggests that people’s profiles be-
came more accurate and/or complete during the second week. Most impor-
tantly, by the end of the two weeks, participants felt that the probe had given
them opportunities to actively participate in OBA, which was one of the in-
tended effects of the probe’s design. The sentiment for the opportunities to
participate was mostly positive (14 positive, 11 neutral). For participants who
were neutral about their opportunities to participate, they mentioned that their
participation mostly is about seeing their profiles. Interestingly, participants
claimed that the probe had not affected their ability to take immediate and
meaningful action about OBA, nor to take action to reduce unwanted track-
ing and exposure, mainly due to the fact that participants understood that their
probe profile changes would not have a real effect on their actual ad-targeting
experiences. For example, on the responses about meaningful and immediate
action, participants who answered with “Not at All“ and “Very Little” noted
that they would not know what to do to stop the profiling, with some mention-
ing that they cannot use the services if they choose to block tracking, or that they
are dependent on the services therefore they assume they will be tracked. For
participants who responded with “Somewhat” and “To a Great Extent,” they re-
ferred to the features of the probe which allowed them to remove certain items,
or that they now can speculate about what to do in order to limit undesirable
profiling, with P16 commenting “I have a much better idea of when and how infor-
mation is being collected on me. Because of this, I have enough knowledge to limit what
data is collected on me. It is still difficult, but knowing where to start is a huge step.”
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In tandem, results from the questionnaires indicate that participants thought
the probe impacted their engagement and interpretation of OBA profiling in
positive ways. Also, according to participants, their profiles captured an accu-
rate representation of themselves. However, the probe did not seem to have
affected participants’ motivation to and ability to take action. This was partly
because participants understood that the probe did not have control over their
actual profiles, and that the probe did not provide information on what actions
they could take to prevent profiling in actuality. Often, participants mentioned
not knowing how to control, or were doubtful of how they can do so when they
depend on services and accept profiling as a reality of using free services, but
for those who reported changes in their ability to reduce unwanted tracking and
take immediate and meaningful actions, they hinted at concrete actions such as
using private browsing or turning GPS off, in addition to a general feeling of
awareness of what they can do to stop profiling if they wish to do so, with P12
saying “It pointed out ways that I was being tracked, and knowing about it and I can
now act on it, if I choose to. That’s great.”
5.5.3 Most Liked Probe Features
Behavior traceback Participants appreciated the specificity at which the probe
gave them information of why each item on their profile was added, being high-
lighted by 13 participants. Participants found being able to trace back their pro-
file items to actions elucidating and a form of accountability. For instance, P1
noted
“When you click on each one, it will give you the exact related actions and when it
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was added, because the notifications in the moment are good to be mindful as you go
throughout, but to go back and see how it’s all aggregated is also really useful.”
Accordingly, the log data shows that each participant opened an average of
63.92 profile items, where the originating actions are shown.
In-situ notifications While many notifications were sent to each participant
throughout the two weeks, 10 participants mentioned them as a liked feature
in particular. Notifications helped participants anticipate and speculate on how
their current action might lead to certain profile items and ads in the near future.
It was also a way for them to visualize what was being profiled at any point in
time. For example, P16 noted about one of her favorite features
“The notifications, for sure. Even if they don’t pop up all the time, just being able
to see more clearly when that was added to your profile. Because I think that was the
biggest thing that made me feel more trusting. I could, instead of thinking like, ”Oh my
God, they know me.” I could just be like, ”Oh, I just walked past a weed store. Okay.
Whatever.””
Notifications also served as an opportunistic tool for participants to be able
to see inaccuracies and potentially sensitive items added to their profiles.
Interestingly, the average number of notifications sent to users on both
the computer browser and the phone throughout the entire study was 468.72
(Mdn=303, SD=552.99, Min=35, Max=2,413) – a relatively high number – yet
most participants found them to be useful. Only a couple of participants men-
tioned that they wish there were fewer of these on the computer, since every
page of a website they visited could trigger one notification when the inference
was determined sensitive by the probe. In addition, “conversion rate” for no-
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tifications was low, with a mean of 3.2 clicks/taps per user (Mdn=2, SD=3.48,
Min=0, Max=14). In considering participants’ comments alongside the log data,
it seems as though participants found the notifications useful as a monitoring
mechanism about profiling in OBA.
Profile structure Seven participants mentioned liking the structure of their
profile in particular, which indicated the prominence of items on their profile,
and what are the main items on their profile at a first glance, allowing them to
see more specific information if needed. For instance, P1 said
“I like the way that it’s a word map kind of. So it’s obvious what categories are bigger
for me because their text is bigger. So the more often I visit something, the more often I
am put into that category, the words will get bigger and they’ll get higher up. And so
that’s useful. It’s very visual.”
Ability to remove The ability to remove items from their profile was praised
by six participants. Mainly because it made them feel in control of their profiles
and gave them the ability to remove any item they did not want “turned into
ads.” For example, when asked what probe features she liked the most, P4
noted that besides being able to see which actions lead to each item, she liked
having the ability to remove certain items, saying “The other thing is that I can
modify stuff. So, say, I didn’t actually go in that store and I went across the street. I can
just take that off. That’s good.”
Timeline The time slider offered by the probe was highlighted by six par-
ticipants as a liked feature. These participants mentioned that being able to
see their profile changes over time allowed them to gauge the amount of and
growth rate of their profile, as illustrated by P5, who said “to see how my profile
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grew [...] I was just interested to see how it grew and changed over time.”
Log data from the time slider component show that participants engaged
with the time slider an average of 11.96 times (Mdn=11, SD=9.51, Min=0,
Max=31). A single engagement was logged when the participant slid the time-
line to a different day, either backward or forward.
Other features Mentioned by at most four participants, the following are
the other features which participants reported liking the most about the probe’s
design: marking an item sensitive, filtering profile items by originating device,
and having some items marked as potentially sensitive automatically. Most in-
terestingly, participants who mentioned wanting to see a distinction of where
each profile came from with regards to devices wanted to see such a distinction
due to the way they use different devices. For example, P13 said that she liked
being able to see the originating actions of profile items, but that she also liked
filtering based on different devices, saying
“I also like that you can see the difference from your browser to your phone sensors.
I think that’s cool to see because there are different things at play for tracking you on
each of those different devices.”
While having some items marked sensitive by default was seen as a posi-
tive aspect, some participants mentioned in the diary notes and exit interview
that often they did not agree with what was marked as sensitive, reflecting the
subjectivity of what may be sensitive for different users.
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5.5.4 Comparison with Existing Solutions
Reactions to dashboards of ad interests and ad explanations
When exposed to the existing transparency mechanisms provided by Face-
book and Google, participants noted a general lack of specificity and vague-
ness in the information provided (ten participants), which was also reported in
literature before (e.g., [14, 54]). Also already reported elsewhere is the lack of
temporal aspects in such visualizations (e.g., [13]). Below, I introduce the most
common and novel reactions beyond the two mentioned above.
Efficacy of control Mentioned by ten participants is their desire for existing
solutions to give them the choice to mark something as sensitive or off-limits.
For instance, P11 commented
“For example, if somebody expressed an interest in something that was private, but
they still wanted to see recommendations related to that topic in their feed, like in terms
of posts and things, I feel like marketing as sensitive would prevent advertisers from
being able to see that information, or target you with that information, but would allow
you to still get recommendations in your feed related to that.”
However, some participants wondered what effect doing so might actually
have since Google does not give the option to completely remove something
from the profile, but instead to “turn off” items. This was particularly noted
by P21, who said she might want to get reminders to review her ad-targeting
profile once a week, but the amount of energy she might spend will depend on
whether she can determine whether her controls worked, noting
“If it’s the effect of and I can take something off and not see it again, that would be
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great because then I can put all the time and energy into a couple of sittings, remove
whatever I need to remove. Don’t show me this again and so on and of course I’ll be
watching out for the following days to see if it’s actually true, possible that it does get
deleted and never shows up and so on.”
Relatedly, P4 noted that the existing controls provided by Goggle are insuffi-
cient, commenting on the ability to turn off certain items from her ad-targeting
profile, saying
“So, if I say turn off, advertisers, you turn off let’s say for at least 90 days. That’s
kind of weird too. You can’t permanently turn it off. That’s kind of annoying. I’m not
going to go back every 90 days and change things all the time. It gives you an illusion
that you can control this profile, but you really can’t, because you can’t take this stuff
off permanently.”
These comments highlight the importance in not only providing trans-
parency and controls, but also visibility into the efficacy of the controls exercised
by users.
Not integrated with primary activities Eight participants highlighted that
they wish Google or Facebook included notifications from time to time inviting
them to review their profile or giving them a “heads-up” about when new items
were added to their profile. The most preferred way to receive such notifications
was at the time they are carrying out an activity such as a search. For instance,
P4 noted her preference by saying
“I guess if you do a Google search, maybe they could have a little blip there, a little
thing that says, ”If you’d like to modify your ad settings, go here.” I’ve never had them
invite me to do that when I do a Google search or something.”
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No structure Upon seeing their inferred profiles from Google or Facebook,
five participants noted that they wish to see more structure in how the items
are categorized, allowing them to group more relevant and prominent items
and drill down into more details, if needed. This is a contrast to the current
layout of the profiles which offer only a long list of items without information
on prominence/recurrence. P25 noted this comparison, saying
“It seems like [Facebook]’s been watching me for longer. But also it’s not broken
down in a way that makes sense. So, it’s tons and tons and tons of single disjointed
words. There was so much stuff and it didn’t seem to be reflective based on... It wasn’t
like the stuff at the top I have more interest in than the stuff at the bottom or anything. It
was just a big mess. At least like the whoami it’s broken down into categories and stuff
too. Or there won’t be some bigger ones at the top that... So like health has parentheses
nine and I understand health is much more general than Sushi Bars, but yeah.”
In unison, these reactions led participants to believe that Facebook and
Google are being purposefully vague, and only giving illusory transparency
and control by not being specific and complete, providing no insight into
changes of profiles, casting doubt on the efficacy of controls, hiding them in
settings several clicks away, and providing a structure that is not user-friendly.
For instance, P16 noted
“It has to be accessible because I had no idea this ad personalization page existed on
Google. I’ve never seen this. I’ve never heard of this. I’ve never known anyone who’s
heard of this. Well, that’s obviously not true, but I’ve never talked about it with my
friends and even that tiny little arrow in the corner with the Google ads being like, why
this ad, that’s not something I’ve ever used, even after having noticed it. And so it’s not
transparent. It doesn’t feel like they want you to use it. And even when I’m looking at
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the dashboard here, it’s very general. Very general. And it’s just not that illuminating.”
Accordingly, P3 explained why she thinks it is not in the best interest of
Facebook to promote visibility of people’s ad-targeting profiles:
“Why? Well, if I would think the more specific information you give to your con-
sumer about what data they’re essentially mining from you and taking from you, I
would think that that would lead people, if they could find the information, because I
didn’t even know this was here. If they can find that information, they would probably
remove it too especially if there was a remove all button, which there’s not even a re-
move all. It’s just remove individual things. And there’s a lot of stuff. So, I feel like oh
my gosh, there’s a lot of information. So, I would think it would, if they made it eas-
ier for consumers to control that, consumers would be less likely to participate I guess
voluntarily because I think everyone knows that they do this kind of stuff.”
Perhaps the approach to profiling transparency may take into account how
to implement progressive disclosure [157] in order to not overwhelm users and
give them the (justified) impression of being too much to parse and engage with.
What must change, according to users
Once participants compared the probe with existing solutions, they were asked
specifically what they wish could be “borrowed” from whoami, and the items
below are the most commonly mentioned by participants as desired features
upon having gone through the comparison.
Profile visibility Thirteen participants desired that their ad-targeting pro-
files be more prominent when they are using Internet products. The fact that
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only one of the study participants was previously aware of the ad interest dash-
board and only a few were aware of ad explanations further suggests that these
are not sufficiently visible for people to engage with them in meaningful ways.
For instance, P21 noted about ad explanations “Nobody, I guess me in particular
would not have ever thought to go and see based on the ad that there were three dots that
I can go further and do more look on it.”
Relatedly, a recurring comment from participants was a strong negative re-
action to an ad, which prevented them from investigating ad explanations, as
noted by P22, who said
”Whenever I clicked that little X on top of the ads, I was usually only clicking it
because I was so offended that I just wanted to be done with the ad, whatever it was that
was showing. So, I didn’t even take the time to explore what else was being offered from
AdChoices. I didn’t even know that that was being offered because, I guess, like I say, I
was so offended as some of the ads, I just wanted to get them off of my page, and not see
them anymore, and not have my kids accidentally come upon them, and stuff like that.”
This adds further evidence in favor of explanations becoming more promi-
nent with ads, perhaps side-by-side, as expressed by participants in prior user
studies of explanations [60]. Specifically, that for potentially triggering ads, it
may pay off to brings explanations to the forefront and give users control with-
out expecting that they might do so after a few clicks.
Participants also wanted to be invited from time to time to review their pro-
file or be kept in the loop about what is new on their profile. Such visibility,
they believe, could be made at opportunistic moments with notifications about
potentially sensitive activities, unexpected tracking, or unusual activities per-
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formed by them. For example, when looking something up that is not a part of
their usual searches, they would like to be told whether that is going to lead to
ad-targeting and have a say in whether it may or may not be. For instance, P8
noted
“Another suggestion, something I would say these are anomalies. Which I don’t
go usually but show you something that, hey you did it. So you want to review that
information. Something like that would be useful.”
For participants who accept, empathize or enjoy ad-targeting, they thought
increasing the visibility of profiles might lead them to want to correct inaccura-
cies, prevent undesired experiences, or even optimize their profiles for optimal
benefit. P19 mentioned wanting to do so is because of serendipitous opportuni-
ties, noting
“I’m doing like some restyling and stuff furniture. All of a sudden I’ll get a pop-up
about something that maybe I’m not aware of, but then I do become aware of it because
of the pop-up. That kind of thing, yeah, I think would be helpful or cool.”
P19’s comment is reinforced by her behavior with the probe – she was one
of the most active in modifying her profile, removing 40 items and explaining
that she did so because she wanted her profile to be accurate.
For those users who may be on the fence about their willingness to correct
inaccurracies, what may motivate them is the prominence and intrusiveness of
ads, as expressed by P7, who noted
“I’m of two minds there. The cynic in me is like, ”Keep them wrong, so they don’t
actually know and they can’t track you too well,” but not utilitarian. The pragmatic me
204
is like, ”They should be correct. If I’m forced to sit through these, they should at least be
useful. Otherwise, they’re just wasting.” I’m of two minds there.”
The participant further explained that he would have an interest in fixing
inaccuracies for ads he is “forced to interact with” such as those on YouTube.
Participants also wish to have anticipatory visibility into their profile at the
moment they are engaged with the primary activities. For instance, P24 noted
that having visibility and control of her ad-targeting profile items in advance
could prevent undesired shoulder surfing experiences, saying
“Even like shopping because it’s getting to be around Christmas season. If I’m look-
ing up stuff for my parents, I don’t want them looking over my shoulder and seeing,
hey, I got them a certain thing.”
Action traceback Eight participants wanted explanations for ads and profile
items to be specific in how the data was collected, such as what specific website
was visited or action that they took which helped inform the profile item or
ad-targeting. For instance, P20 commented about Google’s explanation, saying
“Okay. Basically is stated at pretty broad. It says based on ”Google’s estimation of
your interests.” And then there was a link of what the setting was and I only knew it
was nothing much to add to why.”
In-the-moment controls When asked a general question about what trans-
parency and control features they desire at the exit interview, ten participants
mentioned some variation of a control to be exercised at the time or briefly af-
ter they carry out an activity which may lead to ads. For instance, participants
wanted a “do not track this“ toggle, a “this is not for me,” a “transaction mode,
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” a “work mode,” and “blocklisting” certain topics or websites when carrying
out activities that might lead into ad-targeting. For example, P23 suggested
“I think an invitation to review your profile, or when it happened, either would work
really well. I wouldn’t want it to wait until I physically looked at the profile. Because
a lot of the times, you forget about having an actual profile like this. Having those
notifications, I think, would be very helpful. To be like, ”Hey, we noticed this behavior
that’s irregular,” or, ”Hey, we noticed that you may want to review this activity. Do
you want to include this in your profile, or would you like us to remove it?””
Such in-the-moment controls might be particularly helpful for activities par-
ticipants may think carry a sensitive nature. For instance, when asked how
might she want to have transparency or control of such items, if at all, P25 ex-
claimed “Gosh, I guess maybe Facebook sent me some kind of notification asking for me
to pre-approve certain content for being turned into ads.”
Profile specificity controls Six participants expressed the desire to set the
level of specificity of their profile items. This is motivated by participants’ ac-
ceptance of more general items on their profile such as “Movies” instead of a
very specific genre or title they might like. This is best illustrated by P16’s com-
ment, saying
“If I was able to control it to be more general, it’d be like, okay, you’re furniture
shopping, cool, whatever, versus you’re looking for these things specifically. That is the
thing I would change for sure.”
Along the same lines, P17 commented “Sure. I wish that there were more ways
to just turn targeted ads off. I know that companies need to make money somehow, but
maybe there could be a more generic ad than like these hyper targeted ones.”
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Invitation to contribute Five participants mentioned that they wish profil-
ing could use more of the user’s input and feedback as opposed to relying solely
on tracking and guessing. For example, P23 mentioned
“No, I’m generally a pretty transparent person, and I feel like tracking for advertise-
ment is somewhat harmless. I actually enjoy advertisement. So I rather like engaging
with them, actually. While I do worry about security, I’ve never felt like I was at risk of
losing personal data, or being compromised. But having the reason that I would be in-
terested in more control over the profile you mentioned, would just to have more tailored
ads specific to things I like, instead of guessing; then they’d know for sure.”
In doing so, Internet service providers may benefit not only from more ac-
curate ad-targeting, but also from a boost in trust from users. For example, at
the end of the exit interview, when asked what they might say to a designer at
Google or Facebook about their preferences on how they want to see and control
their ad-targeting profiles, P16 explained
“You need to present it in a way that you’re actually trying to help the consumer
and be less creepy. So you need to make it transparent. You need to make it accessible.
And you need to be clear about your intentions, that you actually want people to have
control over their profiles and not just, yes, having that dashboard is great. You need to
tell people how to access it and you need to do that with the context that you actually
want them to use it. And you’re not just secretly spying to steal everybody’s information
for profit, which I think you are.”
207
5.5.5 Participant-Driven Design Suggestions
Throughout the study, some participants provided concrete design suggestions
on how they wish to have more transparency and control in OBA profiling.
Ad blurring When asked about how he might want to deal with sensitive
inferences, P9 suggested a feature when an ad is rendered based on a potentially
sensitive inference, saying
“Maybe they’d give you a warning or they have the picture blocked and then you
can get rid of the picture, some kind of warning, this may be sensitive information. And
then they’ll give you an option where you can go ahead and see it or not.”
Show me this instead Upon seeing undesired ads, P6 suggested the idea of
providing an alternative, saying
“Maybe if somebody sees the ads they’ll choose an action, like you don’t want to see
this ad again or they should have something like, give an alternative. So without to
giving an alternative, you just let them know instead of showing me about this, show
me this.”
Upon seeing ads, P6 also wanted to have the ability to remove the item that
caused the ad to be targeted, not only close/hide the ad. This was the subject of
the “forget” feature exploration in [150].
Interest questionnaires In order to have more accurate OBA profiles, P4
suggested some sort of questionnaire for interests
“I mean, if you really wanted to give the app information about yourself, you could
just create a questionnaire that gave like, ”Okay, please choose from the following
208
menu,” and have 100 different interests and just have people check them, like a dat-
ing site almost, the way dating apps, I guess. You can choose from that list. Like, I’m a
hiker, I’m a walker, I’m a boater, I’m a this.”
These concrete suggestions provide further evidence that participants wish
to have more feedback mechanisms to control their ad experiences.
5.5.6 Expected User Engagement
While the previous sections presented findings mostly in objective ways, this
section presents the main findings as interpreted in light of the reality of OBA
profiling introducted earlier in this chapter – mainly around it being an activ-
ity happening on the sidelines of people’s primary online activities. The en-
gagement of this reality into the interpretation of the study findings enables the
mitigation of bounded rationality and potential social desirability bias in par-
ticipants’ stated preferences about the probe and how they wish to have more
transparency and control in OBA profiling. Accordingly, when asked to answer
to concrete questions about profiling, a common comment from participants
was that they expect the algorithms “to figure things out” without much inter-
vention, and that the way they wish to have transparency and control is often
intertwined with the primary, originating activities or only when seeing ads,
but mostly at opportunistic moments.
Engagement might vary As was expected, participants’ desired level of en-
gagement with their profiles can be predicted by their original attitudes toward
and experiences with ad-targeting. For example, participants who dislike and
block ads are not as interested in engaging with their profiles as much as partic-
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ipants who accept them or even claim to like them. For example, P2’s reported
experiences with OBA in the entry interview was mostly negative:
“I do not particularly like when my device activity is being used to build a profile.
I do not like the idea that I search for an item, and then I get targeted ads, which are
completely irrelevant to what I’m looking at. For example, I’m trying to read the news,
and I may have searched for a tool in Home Depot. And then later, I’m being bombarded
with ads for similar tools from similar vendors.”
Later, when asked about whether and how he might want to deal with inac-
curacies, he noted
“No, I would not. Because information is getting spewed out there [...] if you can’t
block it, then perhaps another good way of going about is just to overwhelm the system
with irrelevant information.”
He also noted why he would not manually add missing pieces to his profile,
saying he was not interested in doing so
“Yeah. I’m not. I understand why ads are there, but I’m not necessarily friends with
them, so. Yeah. If I need something or want something, I’ll drill into it myself.”
However, across the board, there are moments in which participants would
like to participate in order to prevent or mitigate undesired experiences. One
of such undesired experiences is being “bombarded” with ads about something
they did not buy for themselves, or seeing an ad that they either can only trace
back to a potentially private activity such as a conversation with a friend, or
seeing an ad for which the profiling process does not align with their mental
models of what activities are being tracked. In addition, participants in the
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spectrum of “despising ads to liking them“ might engage at different moments
and with varying levels of effort. For instance, some would only engage with
their profile after seeing an undesired ad, while others would appreciate being
able to anticipate what ads they might get and even be willing to go out of their
way to “fill in the gaps” in order get more relevant ads.
“Just figure it out” A common thought, expressed by 14 participants was
that it is up to the algorithm to determine whether something is timely and rel-
evant for them. For instance, when asked about how they might want their pro-
files to distinguish between long-term, short-term interests, and one-off inter-
ests, participants generally expected that the algorithm should be smart enough
to pick up on such nuances. For example, participants expected that short-term
or one-off natured items such as a small purchase or an unusual search should
not be considered for ads by default, as presented earlier by P8’s comment on
anomalies. Participants also expect profiling mechanisms to determine when
something is no longer relevant for them, such as if they stopped searching for
a product after a while, the underlying interest should fall off from their pro-
file. Another common expectation was that profiling should be aware of world
events and ephemeral life circumstances. For instance, for some participants,
one of the participation weeks was election week in the United States, and par-
ticipants thought their profile was disproportionately affected by interests in
politics. For example, P11 noted
“Okay, a great example is, in the US, we just had the election, and I searched things
related to the election. But that doesn’t necessarily mean I have ... Well I’m interested in
politics, but that’s ... My point is that someone who isn’t actually interested in politics
may make those searches just because an event that’s happening then, and it’s relevant,
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but that’s not actually represented as a long-term interest. ”
The same thought was given by a participant about their profile capturing
aspects of her life which were temporary and imposed by the COVID-19 pan-
demic restrictions – she had a strong reaction to a profile item that said “inex-
pensive establishments visitor” which she said is a temporary aspect of her life
due to the pandemic, meaning that she is not able to shop at places she might
normally do, and that she tries to stay closer to home and shop from local, small
businesses. All in all, participants hoped that profiling would take these nu-
ances into account in order to mitigate undesired experiences such as when no-
longer relevant ads follow them around, or world events or life circumstances
disproportionately inform the ads they see. At the same time, some partici-
pants highlighted a discoverability trade-off: from time to time, ads about more
ephemeral and immediate needs can lead to serendipitous discoveries about
items they were not aware of or helpful discounts.
The expectation for algorithms to account for these contextual factors largely
came from users being unmotivated to or uninterested in regulating the rele-
vance process when engaging with their primary activities, with a few excep-
tions. For example, six participants mentioned they would like to receive a no-
tification when the algorithm detects an unusual search, which can give them
choice about whether they would want such inferences to inform future ad-
targeting, as noted by P11, who said
“I think I guess on the phone, when a notification pops up about something, maybe
being able to click on that and say ... For example, if it pops up with, ”You’re interested
in politics because you searched for this,” clicking on it and saying that it was a one-off
search or something like that. Or saying that it’s confirming or denying I guess.”
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Algorithmic feedback Participants highlighted that there are moments in
which they would be willing to participate more actively, such as fixing inaccu-
racies to get more relevant ads or specifying that they want “more of this type of
ad” upon seeing a relevant ad. When asked about whether and how they wish
to fix mistakes and inaccuracies on their profile, participants reported mixed
intentions. For example, while 13 participants claimed they would fix inaccura-
cies in order to more accurately reflect their identities and/or to get more value
out of ads, eight participants said they might to do only if a particular type of
ad starts bothering them. For instance, P17 noted about when she might engage
in fixing inaccuracies, saying
“I guess it depends, so if I hand my phone to my husband and he Googles something,
that seems fine. If it was something weird though and then I was getting things that are
I am totally not interested in, I might correct that. It just depends I guess.”
Interestingly, five participants found inaccuracies on their profile to be an
obfuscation mechanism, with P17 expressed concern over having an accurate
profile, and noted that she might want to keep inaccuracies as a way of control
saying
“I like to think that I’m pretty savvy about trying to obfuscate and protect my digital
privacy. So I don’t know what other things I can do besides just googling things I’m not
interested in, like cycling.”
The main reasons behind participants wanting to correct their profiles were
mainly for identity performance, financial gain (e.g., seeing deals they would
not know about), more relevant ads, anticipating potential embarrassment (in
case of shoulder surfing), and when something potentially sensitive but inaccu-
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rate was inferred. For example, P3 explained why she deleted an item, saying
“I guess the thing that it did pick up, I was uncomfortable being labeled as viewing
something like that because I don’t even remember searching something from that topic.
I think it was addiction. I don’t know why that came up. So, I removed it, because I was
like that’s not me.”
The desire to correct potentially sensitive inaccuracies was also observed in
many diary notes and explanations of behaviors during the exit interview, and
this aligns with prior works that suggest users may be uncomfortable with both
inaccuracies and sensitive topics [54]. Most importantly, participants attitudes
about inaccuracies and their motivation to engage with them can be predicted
by their attitudes toward and utility of OBA.
Opportunistic interventions When asked about whether and how they
would have wanted the probe to pick up pieces of their identities that “flew
under the radar,” six participants mentioned that they wish their profiles had
included key aspects of their identity, such as their gender identity or a strong
interest in an activity or topic. For example, P1 noted
“I attempted to sort of influence some of the information on my whoami to pick up
certain aspects that it wasn’t picking up on, like specifically the fact that I’m gay. It
would not acknowledge that in any way.”
Participants expressed interest in adding such items manually to their pro-
file in order to inform their ad targeting or ensure their profiles reflected their
identities accurately. In other instances, expressed by five participants, partic-
ipants wanted to manually add items to their profile in order to optimize the
outcome of ads. For instance, P10 noted
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“Yeah. I would rather have direct communication with more of the ads I want to see,
rather than it wanting to track my browsing history and showing me ads. These days, I
want to see the Black Friday sale deals, which I don’t see them in ad. I need to manually
go to websites and see what are the deals.”
and P25 explained
“If I was going to continue using something like this, I would want it to have the
most accurate information possible. Right? So sometimes my Apple watch doesn’t know
I’m doing a workout unless I tell it. Or sometimes my calorie counting app doesn’t know
that I burned 200 calories running, so I have to tell it, so that I can continue to get the
best functionality out of the technology.”
The way in which participants wanted to do so varies, with some wanting to
be able to manually enter new items into their profile, while others wanting to
do so directly via the ads, as expressed earlier by P16 and P4 in the “Participant-
driven Design Suggestions” section, where they wanted to “provide an alterna-
tive” for an irrelevant ad, or answer to a questionnaire of interests, respectively.
Two participants mentioned moments in which they would like to be able to
input profile items, such as when gaining a new interest or going through a
particular life change. For example, P9 noted
“If you’re able to manually put it in, maybe you gained a new interest that day, or a
week later after you started it, you could manually add a new interest.”
At the same time, four participants, who were mostly negative or neutral
about ad-targeting, said that they would see no incentive to do so. For example,
P17 pondered
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“No, I wouldn’t have an interest in doing it unless there was ... I mean, if there
was some incentive to do it. Just intrinsically, I have no desire to be like, ”This is me,
everyone, look.””
While participants differ in how they might want to engage with profiling
in OBA, an overlapping theme is that managing their profiles should be more
intertwined with both the activities that originate them and the resulting ads.
These comments also express how participants wish to have more participation
than being solely tracked and profiled.
When users want to be in the loop Although there is the expectation for the
algorithm to independent in figuring out context and relevance, some aspects
of users’ activities may inform how involved they want to be with the compo-
sition of their ad-targeting profile, as expressed by 19 participants. Mainly, par-
ticipants wanted to be able to do so when engaging in activities that may not
speak strongly to their identities, such as a one-off search, looking up or buy-
ing something for a friend, or topics and activities they deem sensitive, such
as health-related and finance-related topics, private conversations, or activities
they do not expect to become part of how they are targeted online. For instance,
P16 noted
“Being able to turn off the GPS tracking. I mean, I guess I know at this point that
they’re not going to judge me for going to the weed store and the strip club too much,
but I don’t want that on my profile. I don’t want to be labeled as a deviant.”
For such activities, participants would want to see a notification with a
choice of whether they would like to be targeted about them once an inference is
made. For example, P7 mentioned that they wish to be given a choice whether
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the present activity might be turned into ads, saying
“I think in an ideal world, that would be the way I would go about it, because I don’t
think I can completely get away from ads. I guess if there’s something sensitive that’s
going on my profile, that can alert, because those would be the things that I’d be most
likely to be like, ”Don’t, don’t, don’t track this.” I think that would be the only time I’d
want an active alert, like, ”Boom, this just happened, this is what the results are.””
Keeping users in the loop based on the nature and context of their activities
and inferences might require profiling algorithms to become effective in detect-
ing such moments, such as anomalies in user activity, and activities and topics
which might be considered sensitive for a large number of users. In general,
as seen in this study and elsewhere, mental models of tracking involve mostly
online browsing and shopping activities, and when inferences are made beyond
such activities, users might want to be kept in the loop and exercise choice. The
main reasons participants said to be wanting to be in the loop and exercise con-
trol is to be able to prevent undesired tracking and ads. This further contributes
to the idea that users want to control OBA experiences based on the informa-
tion involved [176]. One challenge that might arise is in having algorithms be
aware of the “must have” moments where users wish to anticipate and control
profiling, given that this may vary based on user’s attitudes, perceived utility,
and engagement with ads.
5.6 Discussion
As evidenced by the quantitative data and the richness in people’s accounts and
reflections of the probe, it can be said that the probe deployment was success-
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ful in unearthing design directions for increased transparency in the underlying
profiling possibilities of OBA. Through using the probe for two weeks, partic-
ipants were able to share situated perspectives on how they wish to see and
control their ad-targeting profiles, and which moments or circumstances are the
most important for them to do so. Most importantly, the probe seems to have
created an accurate representation of participants’ identities, and impacted their
engagement and interpretation with regards to OBA profiling. However, the
impact on the ability to take action was limited, as reported by participants,
mainly due to not knowing how to control, being doubtful of the efficacy of
their actions to control, or understanding that the probe did not change their
actual ad experiences. In addition, the fact that participants did not engage
in modifying their profiles as much as they did engage with the visualizations
and information provided by the probe suggests that future designs of OBA
profiling transparency may be successful in prioritizing transparency instead of
expecting users to engage in controlling their profiles, with a few exceptions.
The main takeaway from this study is that users wish to be invited to review,
and at certain moments, to control pieces of their ad-targeting profile. It was evi-
dent that most participants were not aware of their inferenced identities created
and provided by Google or Facebook, and that they wish such identities had
been more prominent from time to time. Determining opportunistic moments
for interventions and exposure of ad-targeting identities is a promising direc-
tion. As seen in this study, such moments can be informed by the nature of the
activity which is the source of inferences (e.g., instant messaging, online search,
location visits) or the nature of the inference that is being made (e.g., health-
related, finance-related, hobby-related). Most importantly, when it comes to
managing their OBA experiences, the collective evidence from this study (e.g.,
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logs, questionnaires, interviews) suggest that transparency is desired more so than
control, but that control is expected to be exercised by users at opportunistic moments,
which algorithms themselves may need to determine.
The opportunity to engage users in profiling That being said, not all users
are expected to accept the invitations to engage with their profile or participate
in their composition. However, a few factors might motivate participation. The
first one is in the case of being given the opportunity to set boundaries on what
can or cannot be turned into ads in the first place. The second is on the ability to
remove – not only turn off – certain elements of ad-targeting profiles users wish
to remove. For the most engaged users, they might even want to correct inac-
curacies or determine whether an unusual inference for their behavior pattern
should make it to their ad-targeting profile. These are circumstances in which
users might benefit from anticipating and preventing undesired experiences as
well as making sure ads are relevant. Participants who reported serendipitous
discoveries via ads also reported being willing to add items to their profile via
manual input, or via interest-choosing questionnaires. Seizing such moments
may lead to more trust in ad-targeting processes and increase ad engagement
for those users who do or do not pay attention to ads alike.
Intrusiveness as a motivator With ads becoming progressively intrusive and
pervasive, users’ interests in understanding them and having them be accu-
rate might increase. For example, YouTube is known to play ads that cannot
be skipped and interrupt longer videos to show ads. In such a case, one of
the study participants mentioned that she would love to know precisely what
triggered YouTube to show her “ads of Spanish-speaking mothers feeding their
child yogurt.” Ads are also increasingly blended into feeds consumed by users
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on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and other social networking apps. Free-to-
play games rely on showing video ads during intervals between games. This
means ads are becoming harder to escape, which also pushes users to opt into
paying for a premium version of services, such as the freemium model on Spo-
tify and YouTube. Evidence from this study suggests that even users who want
to escape ads or block ads whenever possible would prefer them to be accurate
if they have to “sit through” ads when using online services. Essentially, this
means that if ads are to become ever more prominent in user interactions, it
may make sense both for service providers and users to implement feedback,
transparency, and control mechanisms that make the experience more worth-
while and engaging.
From the sidelines to the forefront Several findings in this study suggest an
interesting shift from ”heavy guesswork“ onto more dialogue with regards to
how people wish to be tracked and targeted online. This means that affordances
for this potential dialogue, such as ad explanations and ad-targeting profiles
should come to the forefront of user interactions and control mechanisms must
be more integrated with both the primary activities of users and the ads they see.
For instance, some participants wished they could not only hide a certain ad – a
feature currently offered by ad networks – but also prevent future ads from the
same topic from being shown to them in the future. Therefore, more integration
is necessary between people’s identities, originating actions, and resulting ads.
As a contrast, on the Google Personalized Ads dashboard, users cannot see the
specific originating activity when looking up different items on their profile,
and when choosing to investigate further, they are taken to a page that includes
all of their activities on Google services, without any connection to the profile
items whatsoever. However, as seen through this probe study, such increased
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visibility may need awareness of when users would prefer to be interrupted,
and what they expect to be automated and independent. Further, because users’
desired levels of engagement with ad-targeting may vary, interventions may
need to be prioritized according to the most likely successful moments for each
user. For instance, some would only care to engage and change their profile if
they get “bothered enough” by a specific ad, while others would want to take
preventive measures when doing an online search or visiting a physical location
in order to define their own boundaries and prevent undesired outcomes such
as embarrassment, unintended disclosures about their past behavior in case of
shoulder surfing or shared devices, and irrelevant ads as a potential result of
conflated identities. Implementing the preventive strategy translates into giving
users choice via in-the-moment toggles or “modes,” such as a “do not track this
activity,” “transaction mode,” “work mode,” or “not doing for myself mode.”
For those who are not motivated to engage with such anticipatory mechanisms,
they might want to be invited biweekly or monthly into reviewing new items on
their profile, or be given sufficient, prominent explanations and controls upon
seeing an ad that triggers them to investigate and take action.
The subjectivity of sensitivity In this study’s probe, users often mentioned
that some items marked as potentially sensitive by default did not align with
what they might consider sensitive. This had to do with both the subjectivity
of sensitivity and the objectivity of profiles. For instance, while some users may
be concerned about being profiled on finance-related activities, others may not.
Users may be comfortable with an objective representation of their activities on
their profile, but might be concerned with potentially manipulative aspects of a
profile, such as being aware of a person’s mood, intentions, or thoughts. This
perhaps is what might motivate some users to prefer their profiles to be general.
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Another challenge is that users have different mental models and expectations,
as seen in this study. For instance, one of the participants reported deleting any
profile item originating from finance app use because he thought it might enable
nefarious targeting activities, whether that is true or not.
Communicate the utility of new inferences In implementing anticipatory
interventions, designers must be clear on how the inference might be used by
advertisers. For example, during the study, a few participants reported in their
diary notes not being able to imagine how an advertiser might use sleep data or
location weather data to target them, but one of the participants captured – via
the ad examples – that an advertiser might show her ads about coffee and hot
drinks on a cold day, and she even mentioned appreciating that utility, which
is something that she might be looking to do. In such a case, even though the
profile item might lead to manipulative, immediate targeting, the participant
appreciated its utility because it might lead to relevant targeting. It can be dif-
ficult to determine such preferences algorithmically, and doing so also carries
potential risks in itself, such as by under or overestimating users’ perceived
value or expectation of utility from an inference.
Inaccurate and sensitive The most expressive reactions participants had –
which triggered them to act – was when they considered an inference being
both sensitive and inaccurate. For example, when having their mood be in-
ferred from messages exchanged on their phone, participants got triggered be-
cause it was an activity considered private, and because the mood prediction
was a gross generalization and therefore incorrect, such as one participant re-
porting that they typed “I’m so sorry to hear that,” empathizing with a friend’s
relative who had been diagnosed with COVID-19. While objectively capturing
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a potentially negative context, the participant noted that the inference was not
representative of her mood, but that she was showing empathy to her friend,
and that she thought that inference was invasive. Other times participants re-
ported removing items on their profile because they were inaccurate and car-
ried a sensitive connotation, such as addiction, smoking, or sleep patterns. For
the most part, participants’ emphasis and reactions to inaccurate profile items
revolved around sensitive activities. When an inference was potentially sensi-
tive but accurate, participants’ reactions were often wanting to investigate more
about the inference such as how it came to be made and what data are involved.
Either way, it seems that potentially sensitive inferences motivate engagement,
since users would like to either remove them, if they are inaccurate, or investi-
gate them when they are accurate.
Transparency theater In comparing the probe’s design with ad interest dash-
boards and ad explanations offered by Google and Facebook, it was clear par-
ticipants were dissatisfied with the vagueness and generality of the information
presented to them. This is aligned with prior works which identified that a
vague and incomplete explanation is a non-explanation. It may be argued that
with the state of tracking and profiling, it is in the best economic interest for
companies to keep it that way, but mounting evidence suggests that the current
approach is not helping users build trust towards and feel comfortable with
ad-targeting. Participants in this study thought that while they exist, the tools
provided give the illusion of control and make it seem like service providers
do not really want users to engage with them. This might reinforce the state of
distrust many users currently stand in with regard to Internet companies.
Specific and prominent explanations for the unexpected Specific explana-
223
tions may be more desired when users cannot recall what may have triggered
a certain ad, or when the originating action may not be a part of how users ex-
pect to be tracked and profiled. This further expands the knowledge of users’
preferences with regard to the level of detail in explanations. For instance, a
prior user study revealed users prefer “medium-level,” explanations [54], yet
the findings of my study suggest that the answer might actually depend on
the context. It could be that users would want very specific explanations for
unexpected outcomes of profiling and ad-targeting. Moreover, the fact that ex-
planations are often a couple of clicks or taps away triggers unintended reac-
tions from users when they see a highly accurate ad about which they think
may have been triggered from a potentially private activity, such as a conver-
sation with a friend. In such cases, participants are likely to use heuristics and
recall to explain the ad instead of clicking through it to see the offered expla-
nation. Ideally, all explanations should be sufficient and satisfactory, however
this may not be attainable at all times. The direction seems to be to detect when
more prominent, specific, and satisfactory explanations are needed, and such in-
stances seem to rely heavily upon users’ mental models and expectations about
what activities and devices/sensors are tracking them. In some of the diary
notes, participants also wondered whether the explanation was hiding some-
thing, or whether their profile purposefully chose to hide certain items from
them. This might be a common reaction in real circumstances as well, which
can make satisfactory explanations unattainable, more so if users come from a
place of distrust and resignation in services that run ads. As noted in a recent
user study of explanations for decisions made by machine learning models, the
opportunity to provide feedback to explanations may be equally (or even more)
important than providing the explanation in itself [155].
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The feasibility of specific explanations If ad networks are to show specific
and complete explanations, it may mean that they have to store such data for
accountability purposes. A question that emerges is one of feasibility: given
the highly distributed place tracking is currently found in, is it even possible
for companies to determine which specific actions have triggered a certain tar-
geted ad? One paradox that might exist is that for the most accurate predictions
of user intentions, machine learning models which came to decisions that in-
formed the underlying targeting may not be interpretable at all, yet these might
be the moments in which users demand satisfactory and complete explana-
tions. Although such contextual and specific information could be collected
for accountability purposes, its possession also carries risks of breaching and
secondary use. For example, Facebook has been caught using phone numbers
collected for two-factor authentication to target users with ads. Just as litigation
proceeded in that case, this might be an area where policy might need to inter-
vene to enforce processes that prevent secondary use of information collected
for accountability of automated processes.
Shared responsibility The path forward suggests a need for shared re-
sponsibility in balancing the utility and potential oppressiveness of profiling.
While users want more transparency, control, and accuracy in profiling for ad-
targeting, these may also require some effort from them. For example, algo-
rithms may fail at determining boundaries for each user, and if users are not mo-
tivated to set them, then such boundaries are likely to continue being violated.
When given the opportunity, some users might even use non-participation as a
protective strategy, such as participants who mentioned seeing inaccuracies as
an obfuscation mechanism. Users may also be in a place of resignation and be
unsure on whether their efforts might actually have any effect, so there is a need
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to promote the visibility of efficacy of control. For instance, a common challenge
in privacy and security interaction design is that it is difficult to translate and/or
present when users’ privacy and security are being protected. Modern browsers
such as Firefox and Safari now present visibility and general statistics of when
trackers are blocked, which is a great first step. Still along the lines of shared
responsibilities, policy intervention may have to ensure algorithmic processes
used in ad-targeting are interpretable, and to prevent secondary use for data
collected for accountability (e.g., for specific and complete ad explanations).
5.6.1 Design Implications
Below, I present design implications grouped into three themes: desirable prop-
erties of profiling algorithms, transparency mechanisms, and user control mech-
anisms.
Desirable properties of profiling algorithms
Have the algorithm “figure it out” Given that ad-targeting is a process hap-
pening on the sidelines of users’ primary Internet activities, users have expec-
tations about the amount of effort they would like to place in controlling their
ad-targeting experiences, and such amount may vary based on users’ views of
online privacy. However, in general, users have expectations that the algorithm
should be able to figure out when a certain interest is no longer relevant (e.g.,
a purchase), or when a certain inference might be incompatible with their per-
ceived pattern of activities (e.g., buying a gift for a friend). For this reason,
developers should not expect users to actively “fill in the gaps” of aspects in
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which participants believe it is the profiling algorithm’s responsibility to “fig-
ure it out.” This expectation may originate from the idea that users believe
signals are captured which indirectly provide feedback to the algorithm. For
instance, if they do or do not click an ad about a certain topic or if they start
or stop searching about a subject. This expectation could also be the reason
participants reported during the entry interview that the only control they can
exercise is in carrying out the primary activities in ways that can be picked up
by profiling algorithms. Such expectation is a reflection of the opaque nature of
profiling in OBA, leading users to speculate and explore the algorithm in indi-
rect ways. Given this expectation, more effort should be placed on developing
profiling algorithms that can pick up on the nuances of behaviors, especially as
it relates to ephemeral aspects, such as when buying products or going through
life events such as moving. Existing profile visualizations do not offer any dis-
tinction about long-term and short-term interests and identities. According to
participants’ accounts of experiences with OBA, these aspects are not currently
being considered well enough to meet expectations, yet users are not motivated
to do anything about resulting ads, unless it bothers them to the extent where
they will seek ways to stop them, such as when seeing repeated ads about an
item they already purchased, a topic they deem irrelevant or misaligned with
their identities, or being forced to sit through an ad on YouTube.
Detect and seize opportunistic engagement moments For some, ads are a
nuisance and something they wish to escape, and so they have minimal mo-
tivation to engage with the profiling that will inform ad-targeting. Even for
these users, however, ad-targeting may be inevitable, and could lead to unde-
sired experiences stemming from inaccurate, repetitive, irrelevant, and poten-
tially embarrassing ads [9]. In such cases, identity performance may be their
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primary goal rather than optimizing the outcomes of ad-targeting for financial
or serendipitous opportunities. For others, ad-targeting is seen as beneficial at
certain moments, and they even wish ads became “blended into” their feed of
interests and media consumed via apps and Internet services. The latter group
may be more motivated to engage with their ad-targeting profiles by monitor-
ing, correcting, and even adding items in opportunistic moments. However,
even the most motivated users might expect the algorithm to be able to figure
out by itself when something is worth an intervention, while for the least mo-
tivated users, having the algorithm be aware and intervene at certain moments
seems to be a desired trait. For example, users might want to provide feedback
when a particular inference might be potentially inaccurate, no longer relevant,
potentially sensitive, or unusual with regard to their historic behavior online.
This is to say that profiling algorithms need to be able to detect when users
might want to control their experiences, and my study provides insight into
what those moments might be. For example, users might want to be kept in the
loop when inferences are made based on an activity seen as private or sensitive,
unusual for their behavior patterns, or potentially something they might be un-
aware can be used for ad-targeting, such as a sensor on their phone. Across
the board, my findings suggest that users would want to be kept in the loop
and have the option to “provide permission” as to when a potentially sensitive
or unusual activity may be turned into ads. This choice seems to be desired in
order to prevent irrelevant or undesired ads. In addition, for those users who
like and benefit the most from ad-targeting, they might even be willing to tell
the algorithm whether a certain inference is accurate or not, even when it may
not involve a sensitive aspect. Essentially, these expectations mean that perhaps
profiling processes need to be able to detect and seize opportunistic moments in
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which users would like to participate for the sake of exercising privacy controls,
anticipating and elucidating their ad-targeting experiences, and optimizing the
outcome of ad-targeting profiling. For those users who block tracking, profil-
ing, and ads, engaging these processes may require a “cold-start,” which can be
challenging without much historical behavioral data.
Provide more prominent and specific explanations when needed As seen
in prior works, participants in this study also reported wanting ad explanations
to be more prominent or even be shown alongside the ad itself. Moreover, most
participants were unaware of ad explanations and reported never using them,
even when they were “offended” by an ad. From this thought, besides being
vague, incomplete, and misleading, the utility of ad explanations is perhaps also
not being realized because users get triggered to the point where they just want
to remove the ad or move on. It was also the case in my study that users appreci-
ated the specific explanation as to why certain items were added to their profile,
and when comparing with the existing ad explanations provided by Google or
Facebook, participants noted that those were vague and insufficient. It was also
common for participants in the entry interview to give an example of a very
specific and intrusive ad which made them think their phone was eavesdrop-
ping on them. Prior works also show that users can recognize the connection
between their actions and ads when they first see them if the ad aligns with the
perception of their own behaviors, such as seeing a distance learning program
ad after having searched for it [140]. That being said, it seems that users might
prefer explanations to accompany less obvious ads when they are shown, and
that the explanation leaves no “stone unturned” with regards to how the ad
came to be shown. As a result, ad-targeting processes might have to determine
such moments in order to satisfy users. Not all ads may be targeted or per-
229
sonalized, so in certain instances such explanations may not be satisfactory or
convincing. One way to determine the need for a more prominent and specific
explanation is to consider whether the originating profile item may have come
from a sensitive activity or is about a sensitive topic. A recurring user concern
is about manipulation, in that whether the ad-targeting process is an objective
reflection of a user’s activities or whether it is reading a person’s thoughts. The
latter aspect is what might trigger people to build distrust toward ad-targeting
processes and so making explanations more prominent and specific might prove
beneficial, as illustrated by P5’s comment “The more explicit that that kind of profile
is, the better. The less I need to infer, the happier I am.”
Transparency mechanisms
Make ad-targeting profiles more visible It was evident in the study that most
users may not be aware that they can access and directly control their ad-
targeting identities, and that users wish to be told about how to do so. Mak-
ing such profiles more prominent can help users become more educated and
mindful of the connection between certain activities and ads they might see,
anticipating potential ad-targeting experiences that they otherwise might think
are invasive or creepy. For example, if users are made aware that they might
see ads from Home Depot after visiting the physical store, they might anticipate
such an ad and not become negatively surprised when seeing an ad on their
feed if they initially thought physical movement was not something considered
for ads. Without the anticipation, users might build distrust toward the service
provider not knowing exactly what triggered such an ad. However, my findings
suggest that there are moments in which promoting visibility of profiles may be
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more effective, and these should be carefully considered not to overwhelm users
with an activity expected to be secondary by nature. Last, but not least, invit-
ing users to manage their ad-targeting identities over time could fundamentally
change how profiling in ad-targeting is conducted. For instance, a shift could
gradually be made from widespread guessing and inconspicuous tracking into
a metaphorical “conversation” where people have a say in their future expe-
riences with ads. Such a shift could be conducted by inviting users to review
their profiles from time to time and giving them opportunities to control them
at certain moments, such as when new items are added.
Make users feel empowered It is expected that not every user will seize
opportunities to control their ad-targeting experiences. However, being given
the option to do so is fundamentally important, and might be a key strategy
in shifting the ad-targeting impressions of users from a state of resignation and
opaqueness into a state of participation and dialogue. This idea is best illus-
trated by a quote from P1, who said
“I would say the more that you can make me feel like I can control my information
and the more information you give me about how you collect my information, the better
I will feel, the more comfortable I will feel, and the more secure I will feel. So at any part
of that, whether it be notifications, whether it be being able to manipulate each piece
of my profile. I don’t think it’s possible to go too far in the control department. So it
wouldn’t be overwhelming. There’s no way that people will be say that there’s too much
control. So I would say the more you make me aware the better it is for me and honestly
better, it is for the advertisers in some ways.”
While one might not want to take this suggestion at face-value given how
users differ in their attitudes toward online privacy, detecting and seizing the
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opportunistic controls mentioned earlier in this section may lead users to feel
more empowered with regards to what they can do. However, one important
aspect of control is in its perceived efficacy, especially given the current state of
resignation and powerlessness users are coming from with regards to Internet
tracking, and the impression of transparency theater in the existing tools offered
by companies. This means users will want to actually see their choices being
exercised, say if they do a search about side effects from a specific drug and
choose not to be targeted based on that topic in the future, they might want to
see that they do not really get ads for such a topic. One challenge in doing so
is that ads in themselves are call-to-action artifacts, so it is difficult to envision
that a space reserved for ads would show users that an ad for a topic they chose
not to be converted into an ad was prevented from being displayed there, so
opportunities for future work in this area abound. Perhaps this might pose an
opportunity for end-user tools, similar to ad blockers, but instead of blocking
ads completely, they enforce users’ preferences about what they might or might
not want to see in ads.
User control mechanisms
(In)accuracies as a control The utility of inaccuracies varies based on a user’s
attitude towards OBA. For some, inaccuracies can be a way to obfuscate their
true identities, and for others, they can be an opportunity to engage in order to
get more relevant ads. Profiling processes might benefit from learning which
of these two groups a user might belong in by gauging their ad interaction and
feedback. For the latter group – the potentially engaged group – more relevant,
and as a result, more successful ads may be targeted if they are given regular
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opportunities to confirm or correct inferences. For example, P13 suggested a
concrete way to correct inaccuracies in the moment inferences are made, saying
“Do you classify this [as] ”business and industrial,” or whatever the subcategory is. I
would have the option to say yes or no, that would be a much easier way to do it.” Once
again, the level of engagement with such prompts might vary based on a per-
son’s attitudes and expectations of online privacy and targeted ads. However,
an interesting point was made by participants in this study who are not particu-
larly fond of ads, which is the fact that ads are becoming increasingly intrusive,
such as ads on YouTube, Instagram stories, and in mobile games, and that in
such instances, if they are forced to sit through ads, they would prefer ads to be
relevant and so they might be willing to correct inaccuracies in those cases. This
poses an opportunity to service providers in seizing feedback moments from
users by building empathy. For example, YouTube could show a prompt as an
ad is played saying that this ad is based on the inference that you like this topic,
is this correct? Your response will help tailor future ads you see on YouTube
to be more relevant and engaging to you. One of the participants even wished
whoami could help explain video ads, saying
“I don’t know if this is something like your, one of your extensions or something
would be capable of doing, but being able to explain how you get YouTube ads, video-
based ads would be really interesting to me. Because then like maybe I could more fully
explain how they came up with, I seem to be a Spanish-speaking mother who feeds her
children yogurt or something.”
Ultimately, seeing traces of their identities presented by an algorithm, peo-
ple’s reactions involve identity reflection and performance for the sake of rep-
resentation. This might be an added benefit of promoting the visibility of such
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profiles, which will give users who want to engage in identity reflection and
performance an opportunity to do so not necessarily because they want more
accurate ads, but because they want to perform their identities. As a result, ads
may become more relevant and successful.
Give choice on profile specificity A common reaction to the probe’s built
profiles were that many items on them were general enough that people did not
feel triggered or concerned about the profiling taking place. This was reinforced
by some participants even mentioning that they were not as concerned with pro-
filing after having experienced the study because they thought information on
their profile could be more specific. Yet, when looking at their actual profiles
as provided by Google or Facebook, participants noted that items on those pro-
files were more specific. For example, while an interest in the probe was given as
“Politics,” on Facebook the name of a politician was displayed on the person’s
dashboard of ad interests. The experience of participants in the study led them
to want to control the level of specificity in which they wish to be profiled. This
provides an opportunity which may be a compromise between people turning
off profiling and ads completely or more liberally allowing everything. It might
be beneficial for ad networks to provide such an option, which may stand as a
middle ground for those who wish to block tracking and ads completely. For
example, upon detecting both a general and specific interest from a user, options
could be given to say which level of specificity they might prefer, and learn from
those choices or give users the option to always apply the same preference.
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5.6.2 Limitations
The probe’s inferencing mechanism is at most a local substitution model that
aims to simulate to some extent what inferences can be made from user behav-
ior. For this reason, users’ actual ad-targeting profiles might differ from the ones
built by the probe. However, during the exit interview, when asked to compare
the information on actual profiles with the one in the probe, users did not ex-
press that they found the information to be widely different, except that their
actual profiles had more items, which according to them was expected given
decades of Internet use, and that items could be more specific.
Given that the probe is only a substitution model, participants level of con-
trol (e.g., removing items) might differ if the study were conducted with their
actual profiles, given the difference in the organization behind the profiles. For
example, some participants reported in the exit interview that they did not re-
move any items from their profile because they wanted the researchers to have
an accurate picture of what the probe had captured. This is a limitation of the
methodology, yet it was mitigated in the exit interview via probing participants
to situate themselves within the context of their actual ad-targeting profile.
5.6.3 Future Work
In this section, I briefly introduce future avenues of exploration that can be gen-
erated from my research findings and discussion.
Detecting opportunistic moments In increasing the visibility of ad-targeting
profiles, not every user is expected to engage with them, and their motivation to
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engage may depend on the activities they find themselves in. For instance, users
may be more invested in controlling inferences from potentially sensitive or pri-
vate activities. Future works could look more specifically into user-centered
ways to detect such opportunistic moments and seizing them successfully. This
means developing algorithms that are aware of when individual users might
want visibility and control and when they are OK with them being in the back-
ground. The probe deployment findings suggest that users’ priority may be on
setting boundaries for future targeting and preventing irrelevant targeting that
could be informed by one-off activities or merged identities. The decision on
whether to make an explanation more prominent or more specific may also be
subject of future explorations. For example, there could be moments in which
ads can be informed by unexpected profiling which does not align well with
users’ mental models, and for such moments it may prove beneficial to provide
not only more specific explanations that help elucidate and educate users, but
also more prominent explanations that help users build trust and not become
triggered by a seemingly invasive algorithmic process.
Feasibility of explanations Future works could also explore the feasibility
of specific explanations. OBA tracking and profiling processes are highly dis-
tributed, and they may rely on algorithmic processes that are difficult or im-
possible to interpret. A gap may exist between what users will find satisfactory
and what is even possible to provide. Future research could investigate to what
extent this is true, and if so, how to bridge such a gap. Perhaps if such a gap
truly exists, the solution might be to only make inferences that can be precisely
explained.
Recognizing targeted ads Not all ads are targeted. A future avenue of explo-
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ration is conducting user studies and developing algorithms that are capable of
determining whether an ad was targeted or not, such as the work in [21]. This
is important because even if specific explanations are feasible, they may not
be sufficient if users assume that all ads are targeted and informed by profiling.
However, doing so may be more complicated since targeted ads now encompass
a wide range of activities from multiple devices. Nonetheless, communicating
this distinction might be beneficial to engage with profiling processes, specifi-
cally helping them build more accurate mental models about ad targeting.
Recognizing need for more prominent explanations The findings from this
study suggest that an opportunistic moment for engagement with ad-targeting
profiles is when users experience a seemingly intrusive or creepy ad. This find-
ing may need further validation via field studies in order to determine, for in-
stance, whether it is true that users might actually engage with their profiles
more when they are faced with an unexpected artifact of online tracking and
profiling. The undesired characteristics may be based on inaccuracies, mis-
aligned or incomplete expectations of tracking, and ads that seem to be in-
formed by private and sensitive activities. Further investigating this finding
will enable ad networks to properly place efforts on the most necessary mo-
ments, since evidence seems to suggest users may not need further explanations
of ads they expect and can explain themselves by recalling their actions [140].
Instead of creating individual models for users, solutions such as chatbots may
be promising in providing different users opportunities to attain the level of
explanation needed in different circumstances.
Investigate control effects on the ad economy A common thought ex-
pressed by users in the study is that it may not be in the best interest of com-
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panies to be more transparent about their profiling efforts. Some participants
also raised a concern that if more users are exposed to the reality of how they
are being tracked and profiled, it may trigger them to be more protective about
it altogether. This perhaps might be a misguided expectation, since it is also
possible that in recognizing the limitations and specificity levels of profiles – for
instance, identities that represent groups instead of individuals – users may feel
more comfortable than before, when they assumed every inference was accurate
and specific. It could also be the case that users want transparency primarily,
but most would be satisfied with seeing the ability to control, but not actually
engage with it due to not being bothered by targeting. That being said, measure-
ment or lab studies (e.g., [69]) could be conducted to test whether the increased
visibility and feedback on profile composition leads to more restrictive control
on the part of users, and how that might affect ad campaign outcomes.
Find ways to show efficacy of control in OBA Misconceptions and doubts
about the efficacy of controls are very common in OBA. For instance, in the
entry interview, several participants wondered whether when they use private
or Incognito browsing, doing so prevents any profiling at all. Other participants
also mentioned that once spending time and effort to control their ad-targeting
profiles, their actions would actually have any effect. Often times doubts about
efficacy of control was even introduced by the very own control affordances
provided by Facebook and Google. For example, Facebook says on top of their
interests page
“Removing yourself from an interest category prevents advertisers from reaching
you by indicating that their ads should be shown to people in that specific interest cat-
egory. It doesn’t affect the number of ads you see overall. We may still show you ads
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related to these categories if we think these ads may be relevant to you.”
And when attempting to turn off certain interests on Google’s dashboard, a
message is shown, saying “Advertisers you turn off will stay off for at least 90 days.”
These cast further doubt into the efficacy of controls users already are un-
certain about. Coming from a position of distrust and resignation, users want
to make sure their control efforts pay off, and the examples above add more
friction and tension to these circumstances.
Therefore, future research should look into how to implement visibility of
efficacy of control in OBA. One anticipated challenge is that ad targeting is sec-
ondary artifact happening on the sidelines of people’s primary activities, and
it is unclear what might be the most effective ways of showing users that their
choices are being respected. For example, would ad networks, instead of show-
ing an ad, show that they have prevented an ad from showing which users
might not want to see? An interesting strategy suggested by one participant
was to show the ad anyways, but initially “blur” an ad and show a warning
that recognizes their prior choice, and gives users the ability to still see the ad
if they want to. However, what are the benefits in doing so? Would users feel
respected? Would this lead to increasing trust? How would this impact un-
derlying ad-biding processes and ad campaigns? For example, it would not be
ideal for advertisers to pay for an ad spot that could be blurred by default. Per-
haps enforcing user preferences needs to considered a prominent consideration
in choosing which ads to show users in the first place.
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Methodological reflections on the technology probe
Below, I present a reflection on some of the aspects of my probe design and
deployment that I believe were essential to its success, while highlighting the
challenges I faced. The intent is to help researchers who wish to use a technol-
ogy probe in the future to be aware of these aspects in their work.
Successful decisions The three most important decisions that contributed to
the probe’s success were (1) a firm grasp on the reality of ad-targeting, (2) the
introduction of speculative attributes, and (3) triangulation of evidence.
Specifically, the firm grasp of reality involved a thorough literature review
to inspire design features of the probe, while also paying close attention to ac-
tual targeting attributes used by ad networks, and using state-of-the-art, open-
source technologies whenever possible. This enabled the probe to elicit partici-
pant responses to phenomena that align well with the context of study.
While a firm grasp of reality was important, so was leaving some space for
speculation. In the probe’s deployment, the speculative profile items yielded
many opportunities for participant elicitation and engagement with important
aspects of the domain of OBA. However, speculation might still benefit from
some grounding on feasibility. For instance, all of the speculative items included
can be justified as reasonably feasible to be inferred by developers if they wish
to do so. The main benefit of speculation in this case was to obtain a glimpse
into users’ reactions of ever expanding possibilities of inferencing.
The third most successful decision in my opinion was to embed enough re-
search artifacts to triangulate the data in order to capture meaningful signals.
These included system logs, diary notes, interviews, and quantitative ques-
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tionnaires. This mixed-method approach enabled insightful conversations with
users and provided opportunities for elucidation of behaviors that otherwise
might have gone unnoticed or unpacked. While generating more data and re-
quiring more effort for analysis, I believe this was a fortunate strategy.
Challenges faced I faced several challenges during the design and deploy-
ment of the probe. Mainly, challenges were around (1) promoting efficacy of
user actions and integration with the actual mechanisms of the domain, (2) con-
flating, prior user knowledge, opinions, and experiences with the underlying
domain, (3) technical limitations, and (4) potential reactions to inferencing sys-
tems in general that can misplace user expectations.
Promoting efficacy of control proved to be very difficult. A major design and
development effort was placed in giving participants some connection between
“the world of the probe and the real world,” via showing showing ad tags near
actual ads on the browser relating back to items on the probe’s profile. Yet,
these often went unnoticed due to the fact that many users may have learned
to ignore ads on the browser, and so they may have not noticed them at all.
While it is likely that ads on social media apps and video platforms are the ones
that people are paying the most attention to or being forced to interact with,
incorporating these into the probe implementation would require significantly
more effort. Other times a major challenge was to make sure the connection
was meaningful. This was a significant challenge because the similarity was
established by comparing the text detected in the ad with profile items, and
many ads do not show text at all. I mitigated this by detecting logos in an
attempt to capture the most semantic information possible without having to
develop a highly sophisticated ad parsing mechanism, yet the result was far
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from ideal. Connecting the world of the probe with the actual world may be an
important aspect in studying privacy and other subjects in which not all users
may be motivated to engage with the affordances provided by the probe, given
the inherent lack of ability for the probe to change actual systems and processes,
since they are exploratory in nature.
Similarly, based on participants’ responses about the probe goal’s, it would
have been beneficial to include in the probe design hints about what actions
users could take – beyond the actions they could take in the probe – to prevent
undesirable profiling. This would have helped bridge the gap between the real
world practices and the probe’s simulated environment, and perhaps further
motivated users to engage with the probe and feel more in control.
While the probe introduced novel aspects about profiling transparency and
control, the domain of OBA is very well established. Many have already formed
an opinion about it and developed theories about its underpinnings and mech-
anisms. While beneficial for having more elaborate, and often philosophical
discussions, this can also pose some challenges. For example, some participants
initially thought that the probe would show them actual ads from advertisers
who were targeting them based on their profiles, when they were merely ex-
amples. Other times participants thought that the websites they visited were
“leaking” information and the probe was capturing such leaks. Some users
also had technical knowledge about the domain of OBA, and engaged with the
probe as a self-contained system ought to be judged on whether it was accurate
or not, which is not the main purpose of probe deployments. I attempted to
mitigate such confusions by explaining to participants at the beginning of the
study that the system is not connected to their actual ad-targeting profiles, but it
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shows users what could be considered by advertisers in targeting them. These
mismatches in expectations may stem from the inaccurate mental models users
have about OBA [176], but they may also apply in other domains. Still related
to the point of established domains, it may be possible that some participants
did not remove items that they might have removed from their actual profiles
just because of the context of research – they may not trust Facebook as much
as they trust the University of Illinois. This possibility was mitigated by prob-
ing participants at the exit interview in ways that led them to think about the
actual context, considering Google or Facebook, but it may be inevitable that
these biases come to occur.
Simulating the profiling processes of OBA is a major technical challenge in
itself. The main reason it is challenging is because an independent system is
trying to capture broader signals of behavior about the user through the use of
a single app or browser extension, whereas companies can benefit from captur-
ing such signals through the use of multiple services, apps, and tracking mech-
anisms used by third-party developers. One way in which I mitigated this for
my study was to ask users to be more liberal in the permissions they provided,
such as enabling background location use, and using Accessibility Services on
Android to obtain broader signals beyond the app itself. The drawback of such
solutions is that the user is more aware that they have given permission for such
broader signals to be captured, which could bias the intervention.
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5.8 Conclusion
Profiling processes in OBA are increasingly distributed and sophisticated.
While such processes have become pervasive in people’s online experiences,
they are also still very opaque. Increased transparency can offer benefits to
users, but the reality of OBA is that user acceptance and utility can be mixed. It
can also be said that many users are unmotivated to control their ad-targeting
experiences due to it being a secondary, often intrusive process in people’s on-
line activities. With these in mind, I designed and deployed a technology probe
with 25 Internet users based in the US, which gave them in-the-moment visibil-
ity into inferences that could be a part of their ad-targeting profile as they car-
ried on with their daily lives for two weeks. The probe also provided desired
details and controls identified in prior works. I found that users wish to be in-
vited to review, and at certain moments, to control pieces of their ad-targeting
profile. Most participants were not aware of their inferencing identities created
and provided by Google or Facebook, and they wish such identities had been
more prominent and integrated with their primary activities. While more trans-
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parency is desired, users also wish to have a choice and anticipate on whether
certain aspects of their activities can be used for ad targeting – especially for
sensitive-nature activities or topics. The results illuminate design directions that




DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Benefits and Challenges of Algorithmic Realism
The three case studies presented in this dissertation provide empirical evidence
that foreshadows some of the benefits and challenges afforded by algorithmic
interventions that account for and embrace the realities of the social worlds in
such interventions are deployed to.
In the first case study, the evaluation of the a reality-embracing human-
centric crowdsourcing recruiting framework showed that it is possible to antici-
pate and mitigate potential data biases and dehumanization effects that arise in
such platforms. The central benefit of implementing such a framework is in ex-
posing and accounting for the underlying realities of crowdsourcing processes
so that (1) requesters can be made aware of potential problems and come up
with actionable plans to mitigate them and (2) the platform can exercise their
power to enforce ethical practices, such as making sure people get paid fairly
and that the work is engaging for contributors. Most importantly and perhaps
most surprisingly, the evaluation of the framework suggests minimal impact
on the objective measures of data quality such as accuracy when the recruit-
ing process shifts from being process-centric into a more human-centric. The
framework, however, introduces some new risks such as the possibility for dis-
criminatory practices, slower data labeling throughput which may oppose the
economic forces of platforms aiming to generate revenue at a rapid pace, and in-
herently unavoidable realities, such as the difficulty in acquiring a diverse pool
of contributors in the first place. Last, but not least, the materialization of more
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human-centric algorithmic interventions may lead to more personal data being
involved, such as collecting contributors’ gender identities and age.
The second algorithmic intervention showed that, within the reality of po-
tentially inevitable widespread adoption despite privacy concerns, and the pos-
sibilities of secondary use, it is possible to predict fine-grained, personalized
user preferences about acceptable information flows within the smart home in
ways that preserve people’s privacy preferences on data use in smart homes.
Most importantly, the evaluation also showed that it is possible to predict how
certain changes in context or transmission principles might affect original users’
decisions, which is an important aspect considering the fluidity and necessities
of businesses that often pivot in their strategies in an attempt to find a sus-
tainable growth. Perhaps to a more controversial purpose, the evaluation also
showed how developers of smart home products and services can predict and
leverage users’ privacy valuations in the process of making a purchase. To-
gether, while these algorithms illuminate a path for developers to exercise eth-
ical data practices, they also reveal vulnerabilities. For instance, the very same
algorithms aimed at mitigating power imbalances in how people’s data ought
to be used, could also be re-purposed to find the “upper bound” of data ex-
ploitation, which technically might still be respecting users’ privacy. In addi-
tion, given the common consideration of convenience alongside privacy risks in
purchasing smart home devices [25], the study of people’s privacy valuations
within the smart home revealed loss aversion: consumers may not value pri-
vacy as much if their current stance does not indicate they have such privacy in
the first place. This tendency could be exploited by developers by offering dis-
proportionate economic incentive to counter consumer resistance, putting them
at a position of “privacy-not-included” which can later be difficult to change if
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consumers are expected to pay extra for privacy protections.
In the third case study, considering the reality of (1) ubiquitous and per-
vasive profiling processes and (2) the fact that ad-targeting is a secondary ac-
tivity that many users may not be motivated to engage with, the technology
probe study unveiled actionable, practical directions for increased transparency
in OBA profiling. These directions include promoting visibility of ad-targeting
profiles at opportunistic moments, engaging users with more prominent and
specific explanations when they are needed, and incorporating visibility of
the composition of such profiles into users’ primary activities in order to al-
low them to anticipate and mitigate undesired outcomes in OBA. Materializing
these mechanisms, however, poses questions of feasibility and doubts about
how users might perceive them, when being in a stance of resignation, helpless-
ness, and distrust towards current practices, deeming transparency and control
mechanisms as theater and unsure about the efficacy of their actions to prevent
undesired outcomes. Most importantly, the directions uncovered by the study
provide a sort of profiling transparency “playbook” in the ever-expanding land-
scape of user profiling. For example, the speculative profile attributes involved
in the probe study provide a glimpse of knowledge into how users may react to
transparency in unexpected profiling processes, such as using their sleep data,
their mood, daily needs to target them with ads.
Taken together, the findings from the presented case studies foreshadow
what lies ahead for algorithmic processes that attempt to account for and em-
brace the realities of the data economy, unearthing future research directions
needed to illuminate the path forward.
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6.2 Research Opportunities
Below I discuss five research directions to be considered when researching and
implementing algorithmic processes that account for and embrace the realities
of the data economy. These directions center around feasibility, algorithmic au-
thority, prevailing economic forces, mismatched expectations, and shared ac-
countability. I structure the presentation of each direction in form of needs, ex-
pected challenges, and research opportunities. Whenever suitable, I also high-
light opportunities for design and policy.
6.2.1 Explore the feasibility of acting in good faith
The need From an ethical (and empirical) standpoint, it is desirable to give
users more transparency and control. However, this may be difficult to attain
in highly distributed and accurate algorithmic processes. In some instances,
feasibility might be inherently limited.
Expected challenges The reality is that crowdsourcing platforms might still
generate data sets worked on by a disproportionate amount of people from a
single country or demographic background, since platforms cannot simply ac-
quire users elsewhere to counterbalance their samples without significant mar-
keting effort. In the case of smart home devices, a prevailing reality is the long
tail of device manufacturers, with frequent discontinuation of products and ser-
vices [83], and so it might be extremely difficult to detect information flows and
enforce policies. This aspect of the smart home also suggests a highly decen-
tralized and distributed environment, more so as app marketplaces evolve for
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smart hubs and voice assistants, such as Alexa Skills or Google Assistant In-
tents. Beyond economic forces and distributed environments, algorithmic pro-
cesses themselves which increasingly rely on machine intelligence are affected
by trade-offs between accuracy and interpretability. For example, the more ac-
curate a trained model is in making predictions, the less interpretable it is ex-
pected to be. When combined with the distributed nature of tracking and pro-
filing, it may be difficult or impossible for developers to arrive at satisfactory
levels of explanation.
Research opportunities Objective, measurement studies could be conducted
about the feasibility of anticipatory and mitigation mechanisms that rely on
transparency of algorithmic processes. For example, it is unclear to what extent
ad explanations can be specific and satisfactory given the highly decentralized
and potentially uninterpretable algorithmic processes that inform ad-targeting.
Qualitative studies could further unpack the feasibility of certain anticipatory
algorithmic interventions as they relate to user expectations and what they
might be accustomed to. For instance, perhaps as a way of anticipating harm
in ad-targeting, users might be invited to overcome limitations of algorithms,
but ultimately be unmotivated or unwilling to do so. Perhaps a fundamental
aspect of implementing algorithmic transparency is to only engage algorithmic
processes that can be held accountable for what they do by means of providing
specific and satisfactory explanations, at the cost of potentially more generic or
inaccurate outcomes as a result of diminished performance. Ultimately, an im-
portant question to ask is whether limitations on feasibility should be accepted
in principle. Given that they reflect the status-quo of the power imbalances tak-
ing place in the different domains, accepting such limitations can be seen as a
conceding decision which can further reinforce such power imbalances.
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Policy opportunities An often expressed reaction to any “do good” design
implication is motivated by unclear incentives and costs for companies to ma-
terialize them. Rightfully so, detecting desired demographic distribution for
contributors to complete a given labeling task, detecting information flows and
enforcing user preferences in the smart home, and recognizing an opportunis-
tic moment of control for users in OBA will require significant infrastructure
and engineering effort and coordination. These measures can prove to be ex-
tremely costly, which may lead businesses to steer clear of dispensing effort be-
yond compliance or only do so as reactionary measures to public relation crises,
or financial loss accrued from losing users, their trust, or their engagement. To
make matters worse, Internet companies in high-growth, high-pressure envi-
ronments may be incentivized by their investors to dispense all their efforts into
growing a successful and profitable business, often with disregard towards the
consideration of ethical implications that the growth of such companies might
introduce. Perhaps this is another aspect where policy could play a role: requir-
ing that companies separate resources for infrastructure and engineering aimed
at anticipating and mitigating algorithmic harm that may be a result of their
business activities.
6.2.2 Break down algorithmic authority
The need It seems beneficial to create user interventions that break down algo-
rithmic authority and expose the realities of algorithmic processes to users. In
the crowdsourcing platform’s case, such authority may be naturally enforced by
the formalist nature of the data labeling activity, which may prevent requesters
from recognizing hidden contingencies of the social world which may have im-
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pacts on such a process. In profiling for OBA, it might be beneficial for users
to learn that not everything that is tracked is highly nuanced, specific, and ac-
curate, instead of staying in the dark and having to guess or think they are
being spied and eavesdropped on. The path forward seems to suggest that in-
creased transparency and feedback mechanisms in traditionally opaque algo-
rithmic processes can be beneficial in breaking down algorithmic authority and
promoting user trust and participation in such processes [60, 155].
Expected challenges A challenge of algorithmic interventions is meeting
users where they stand with regards to the technologies that they have come
to rely on. For those who have resigned or stand in a position of distrust, al-
gorithmic disillusionment may help alleviate tensions and build empathy and
trust. However, unnecessary friction may be introduced for those whom the in-
tervention may not align well with their expectations and prior understanding.
For instance, when installing a smart home device that gathers privacy prefer-
ences in order to respect them, the already skeptical and educated users may
appreciate that, while the less aware may become skeptical and suspicious.
Research opportunities Exposing the realities of the underlying social world
of the data economy will inevitably introduce friction. Nonetheless, if inter-
ventions are also implemented as educational and emphatic opportunities, they
may be more successful. On a more philosophical note, using OBA as the use
case, perhaps it may not be possible to untangle the effects of interventions
aimed at disillusioning from eliciting potentially unwelcome revelations about
the underlying mechanics of the algorithms. One piece of evidence for this is
that users in the probe study were triggered by inaccuracies that carried a sensi-
tive aspect. In such cases, while the purpose of the intervention was to primar-
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ily give users transparency, they learned that algorithms can make all sorts of
wrong inferences that they may not be comfortable with, such as being misla-
beled for having a certain medical condition or leading a “deviant” life. Future
research could further unpack this entanglement and expand the knowledge
of when disillusionment can introduce unnecessary friction. Perhaps “blissful
ignorance” may be desirable from a convenience standpoint in certain cases.
6.2.3 Acknowledge and counter prevailing economic forces
The need While the mode of thinking proposed in algorithmic realism provides
opportunities for economic forces to be recognized and embraced, the undesired
and unintended effects of such forces may be inevitable. For instance, in the
case of lower throughput for labeling task completion, it can be argued without
much effort that it may not be in the best interest of a for-profit crowdsourcing
platform to purposefully reduce the speed at which they generate revenue, es-
pecially in the case of high-growth startups. Similarly, the driving economics of
smart home devices may be fundamentally bounded by the intent of secondary
use, such as Google using device interactions to profile and target consumers
or Amazon creating hardware to boost online sales, by offering increasingly af-
fordable consumer products in counterpart. In the case of profiling in OBA, one
could also argue companies have the best interest in keeping things opaque to
users while leading already profitable businesses from their data, which begs
the question of whether efforts to counter the undesired consequences from
these economic forces may prove futile [5].
Research opportunities More research effort must be placed into measuring
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economic impacts of implementing a desired intervention aimed at countering
undesired effects from prevailing economic forces. For example, could poten-
tially more accurate profiles as a result of increased user participation lead to
more accurate and successful ad campaigns in OBA? By how much? While these
questions are arguably trivial to ask, answering them can be a major challenge in
itself when the algorithmic processes of the data economy are kept purposefully
concealed as they are seen as competitive advantages and trade secrets. While
this makes it difficult for researchers to conduct such measurement studies (al-
beit possible e.g. [69]), industry researchers may have an untapped opportunity
to bridge the gap between compliance, user needs, and countering the strongest
economic forces by unearthing evidence of economic gain (or loss) as a result
of more ethical practices. In doing so, researchers must also pay attention to
different user expectations, since these may be previously affected by existing
power imbalances.
Future research threads in user privacy should consider algorithmic inter-
ventions that protect and enhance the privacy of individuals with the assump-
tions of prevailing economic motives that heavily influence a particular domain.
For example, often, design implications from generative research tend to carry
juxtapositions about how the state of the world should be different, such as how
developers might need to consider user preferences instead of ignoring them.
Such implications often lead to (rightfully justified) questions of “so, what is the
motivation for developers to do so?” I argue that privacy research and design needs
to embrace the possibility (and reality) that developers are not going to willingly
consider users’ desires for the sake of “doing good,” unless challenged by as-
pects that may have an economic connection, such as financial loss or gain, or
brand trust and reputation. Further, this aspect perhaps needs to be embraced
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in the processes of dissemination of knowledge through academic publications
and peer-review efforts, rewarding and prioritizing works which are cognizant
of such aspect. In adopting this rationale, researchers and designers are more
likely to make pragmatic recommendations that are not so far out of touch with
the realities of the economic values developers wish to defend, akin to consid-
erations of “deployability” presented in a framework introduced by Bonneau et
al. when considering replacements for passwords [31]. This “reality-embracing”
research approach to privacy may also unearth practical directions for policy-
makers in ways that recognize the tensions and influences of the prevailing eco-
nomic forces, but that attempt to anticipate and mitigate issues in spite of them.
In doing so, researchers should also look into ways of pointing out broader,
societal implications that the underlying reality helped create, beyond merely
protecting the rights of individual consumers in a capitalist environment. For
example, how might loose or nonexistent legislation to safeguard the privacy of
people’s homes lead to a generally acceptable notion that the home is no longer
a place where the utility of the devices are separated from threats to the privacy
of people in their own homes? Accordingly, a thread of research could embrace
this constraint of policy non-intervention. For instance, often, conclusions from
generative research focus on motivating new policies, but what if this was not
an alternative? What could be done without policy intervention? This might be
a reasonable to make given the history of lack of policy intervention in the US.
One research direction that might prove successful is to mitigate the pre-
vailing forces that are contributing to power imbalances by means of trust and
its connection to economic gain. Trust is a fundamental concept to business
and can also be assigned important economic leverage. Trust alone, or the lack
thereof, may be a driver of change for companies. Drawing from effects of prod-
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uct harms in consumer products (e.g., a harmful consumer product being sold),
the ensuing effects of harm in brand trust can lead to loss of sales, reduced
effectiveness of marketing efforts, increased sensitivity to rivals, and even re-
duced sales in other, unaffected products and brands that may be associated
with the harmful product [164]. The parallel is that with growing distrust to-
wards Internet technologies that sustain and drive the data economy, resulting
economic loss, while slow to be realized, may be inevitable. Accordingly, more
efforts could be placed into quantifying such impacts and understanding when
it makes economic sense to promote user trust. Equally important and also a
part of the underlying reality is that behavior distortions caused by cognitive
biases, addiction, the need for self-expression and validation, dependence, and
arguably irreplaceable technologies, can lead users to continue using products
and services even when they cause harm [81, 5, 165]. These have implications
with regard to what extent power imbalances can be mitigated.
Design opportunities In the case of the smart home, perhaps a group of
users will willingly accept a discount in the purchase of a smart home device
that meets a specific need while explicitly permitting secondary use of their per-
sonal data. Therefore, it could be beneficial for developers to be upfront about
how they intend to monetize on the user beyond their product purchase. In do-
ing so, developers might allow users to find the right device for them in terms
of the actual costs of purchasing one device over another. Such a possibility
could be introduced in the design of products and services. One benefit in do-
ing this is that being upfront about the “rules of engagement” companies may
find that some users are OK having a willing and purposeful transaction of their
personal data in exchange for a cheap or free device that adds convenience to
their life. As of now, however, this cannot be argued as a reality, since it is more
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likely that users are being incentivized economically to make decisions prone to
biases that make the real costs hidden or difficult to estimate [2].
In exposing and embracing the realities of the data economy, careful consid-
eration must be made about the possibility that well-intentioned algorithmic in-
terventions may help further reinforce existing power imbalances. In the three
case studies presented, accounting for and embracing their underlying reali-
ties can mean to have more human-centric, contextual, and potentially personal
data collected. Recruiting crowdsourcing contributors based on their demo-
graphics requires collecting such data in the first place. Gathering privacy pref-
erences upon installing a smart home device introduces new data into the trans-
action, namely people’s privacy preferences. Providing specific explanations on
ads may require ad networks to collect and retain more detailed information
about users’ activities. It seems as though to make algorithmic processes more
human-centric, more contextual data needs to be collected, which also might
introduce new risks. For example, the embodiment of more contextual, human-
centric data may introduce undesired possibilities, or issues that may further
aggravate the issues such data was collected to mitigate in the first place. For
example, if the purpose of collecting people’s privacy preferences about smart
home information flows is to protect the home’s privacy as a societal goal, it
may accelerate a process of a sort of malicious compliance: developers could
technically respect users’ privacy by discovering and exploiting the numerous
acceptable ways to monetize on personal data. Without safeguarding mech-
anisms to prevent such uses, algorithmic interventions could further reinforce
and perpetuate existing power imbalances. Therefore, designers must be careful
in how they can further reinforce power imbalances. For example, the proposed
crowdsourcing framework in Chapter 3 could be used to discriminate against
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certain groups of users or intentionally pay contributors unfairly. The models of
privacy valuations in Chapter 4 reveal vulnerabilities of users, such as loss aver-
sion in smart home privacy, which could lead developers to seek a state where
privacy is not included, making privacy less valuable for users by default, since
even privacy-oriented consumers may be influenced by the price of a device if
the price suddenly becomes a motivator [25]. Increased transparency in OBA
could be used to collect more data for explanations which can be appropriated
for other purposes. The materialization of these artifacts could lead to further
exploitation of users and reinforcing oppressive practices. A practical way of ac-
counting for unintended consequences may involve answering questions such
as what is the inevitable reality? What issues does it cause? How to anticipate
or mitigate such issues? What circumstances might still be inevitable? How can
potential, desirable solutions counter or favor economic forces?
Policy opportunities One way of countering prevailing economic forces is
via policy intervention. While the US government has historically chosen to fa-
vor innovation over enforcing strict policies on digital technologies, a moment
might come where it becomes a question of shared responsibility to impose
certain restrictions. For example, the data labeled in crowdsourcing platforms
might go on to be used in machine learning models that have broader societal
impacts, such as discriminating certain groups in the domains of finance, law
enforcement, and healthcare [32]. Secondary use in the smart home is both al-
ready a reality and a societal issue, with Amazon selling doorbell camera data to
local law enforcement [95]. However, policy in itself can be ineffective without
the specifics. For instance, the GDPR aimed at inspiring a shift in control and
mitigating underlying power imbalances of the digital data economy, yet efforts
have been shown to largely focus on compliance, since much was left in the air
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with regards to the specifics of how transparency and control must be exercised
in practice [149].
Most importantly, using the example of a prevailing economic force around
smart home adoption, in the not so distant future, it may be that no more non-
Internet connected devices are available for purchase, and this might become
an inevitable reality should policymakers not take a stance with this regard,
such as enforcing that non-smart alternatives are offered to consumers. Using
yet another case study from this dissertation, an example of unpacking and ad-
dressing societal implications might be to require crowdsourcing platforms to
implement bias-mitigating processes with the assumption that resulting algo-
rithms will play a role in society in the long term, and due to their potential for
harm, such anticipations are necessary.
6.2.4 Embrace mismatched expectations
The need Users may have certain expectations which are often misaligned with
the reality. For instance, requesters in crowdsourcing platforms may think of
labeled data as inherently truthful, with conceptions of “gold standard” and
“ground truth” being commonly adopted, yet these may be far from reality con-
sidering the ways in which biases from many sources can make into such data.
Smart home users may not expect or may even strongly oppose secondary use
of their data, despite it being a common practice. Internet users may naively
think that their ad-targeting is mostly informed by browsing and online shop-
ping captured by their computer browser. Perhaps these are illusions that ought
to be shattered by algorithmic interventions [108], or perhaps the expansion of
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algorithmic thought towards accounting for and embracing underlying realities
might find users unwilling to change their views about how technologies must
work in the first place.
Expected challenges Using the example of the case study in Chapter 5, it is
likely that users expect profiling to take place without much control and that
that is “the way” of the data economy. Users may also be unsure whether OBA
controls might even work, or that whether they even should, in principle, be
supposed to have direct control over profiles that are accepted to be composed
by traces of their primary activities left behind. These speak to the challenges of
a potential mismatch in user expectations about how the realities ought to be,
regardless of it being in favor of users or not.
Research opportunities An important question to investigate is to what ex-
tent algorithmic reality can be effective in light of the already deeply rooted ef-
fects of algorithmic formalism and authority in society? Perhaps interventions
will be seen as unnecessary friction by both users and developers. Perhaps the
conformism and resignation of users has led them to adopt a mode of thinking
similar to suspension of disbelief exercised in works of fiction: could it be that
for the sake of enjoyment and convenience, users might intentionally avoid crit-
ical thinking or logic about the reality of the underlying algorithmic processes?
6.2.5 Promote shared accountability and collective effort
The need The data economy by definition consists of transactions between
agents with different interests: users want to benefit from free services, while
companies want to grow a profitable business from collecting, processing, us-
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ing, and selling user data. With the current power imbalances, such interests
might be at conflict. For example, it might be in the best interest of ad net-
works to keep profiling opaque to users, while users are increasingly interested
in managing their online privacy, and imposed limitations on how they could
do so may lead them to be feel helpless or to abandon a service entirely as a re-
sult of frustration and distrust. Consumers may also choose not to adopt certain
technologies they fear will augment their exposure to undesired privacy threats.
A common counterargument brings to light the privacy paradox, which recent
works have alluded to as a misleading logical leap in the interpretation of peo-
ple’s attitudes and behaviors in specific contexts to broader context [47]. Others
have argued that users have the desire and demonstrated behavior to protect
their privacy through individual action, yet the realizations of these intentions
get cancelled out by the underpinnings of psychological and economic factors,
making it extremely difficult to attain desired levels of privacy protection with-
out policy intervention [5]. Accordingly, the path to anticipating and mitigating
algorithmic harm may rely on realizations of shared coordination, responsibil-
ities, and accountability from consumers, service providers, and policymakers
to the levels of those needed to fight climate change or an infectious disease
pandemic. Perhaps it is a question of shared responsibility to protect the pri-
vacy of people’s homes, or to make sure the algorithms we will depend on are
fair. If anything, when questions of shared responsibilities become forefront in
people’s lives, outcomes can be far from ideal. For instance, the COVID-19 pan-
demic showed that government nonintervention and the politicization of coun-
termeasures such as wearing face coverings, social distancing, and necessary
lockdown, and quarantine efforts – which all required shared responsibility, ac-
countability and collective effort – have hindered progress and led to poten-
261
tially preventable and unnecessary harm to the lives of individuals and society
at large. This observation begs the question of what might be needed in order to
promote the sense of shared responsibilities in preventing harms resulting from
our reliance on technology? I see this as an important thread of research for the
data economy, which should make the leap beyond individual action and look
into intersections of conflicting interests and the assumption that collective ef-
fort is unlikely in societies where individualism is so central to the underlying
economy.
Expected challenges In further exploring algorithmic realism interventions,
conflicts may emerge with regards to responsibility and accountability. For ex-
ample, if a crowdsourcing platform chooses to optimize the wage of their con-
tributors by default, it may lead to slower completion times for tasks, perhaps
an undesired effect for requesters. In the case of the smart home, users who
purchase a device may be looking forward to installing and using them, and
answering a questionnaire about privacy preferences on random information
flows may get in the way of that and even introduce unnecessary friction. Sim-
ilarly, in OBA, mitigating undesired experiences, distrust, and incorrect mental
models of profiling may require users to be invited into an algorithmic process
that is traditionally and perhaps expected to be opaque and non-participatory.
Research opportunities Future works could investigate the role of empathy
and other aspects in exercising shared accountability and participation in the
data economy. Empathy alone may not be enough, and as some argue, pol-
icy intervention may be necessary to counter these issues, but even then, such
efforts may be countervailed by the psychological and economic forces that op-
pose them, in a reality where those with power are able to dispense enormous
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amounts of resources into lobbying and influencing policymakers [5]. How-
ever, future works could investigate the role of empathy in exercising shared
accountability and participation in the data economy, and more research effort
could be placed at the intersection of conflicting interests. For example, prior re-
search suggests users accept and empathize with online tracking as an exchange
for free services [54]. Promoting empathy might mean to make revelations that
could lead to unnecessary friction. However, such a friction may be preferable
over the individual and societal harm that could be realized in absence of it.
Ultimately, empathy may help boost trust and alleviate tensions.
Design opportunities In design, a way to promote shared accountability
and collective effort might be to to explore how empathy might play a role in
realizing successful realism interventions. Using the crowdsourcing platform
as an example, empathetic strategies may involve informative prompts about
why the task is taking longer to complete, explaining that the delay is due to
giving contributors the ability to get the most compensation for their time with-
out having them compete fiercely for good work. In the case of the smart home,
developers who wish to collect privacy preferences upon device installation can
provide information that they do not anticipate any of such information flows
being a reality, but in the case they ponder that in the future, they wish to respect
the users’ preferences. Finally, in the case of profiling in OBA, upon seeing an
“unskippable” ad before watching a video, the user could be invited to review
their ad-targeting profile in order to allow the service provider to offer more
accurate or desirable ads in the future. As seen in the three case studies pre-
sented, often empathy will be necessary from users toward businesses, which
may pose certain challenges if users are “too far out” in a spectrum of distrust.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.1: Summary of future directions and associated opportunities for
research, design, and policy
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for smart home devices to also threaten the privacy of bystanders [175], further
highlighting the importance of collecting privacy preferences.
Policy opportunities As the fabric of society evolves, one might also won-
der whether users are aware of their costs in data economy transactions, will-
ingly trading their data for free services, or conforming with potentially un-
ethical practices in exchange for fundamental needs such as communication,
self-expression, and validation through the use of technologies. Perhaps policy-
makers ought to steer away from behavior valuation modes of thinking in that
consumers are able to rationally engage benefits and costs in their decisions, and
instead accept that consumers are prone to behavior distortions and the realities
of power imbalances, the ever-growing quest for convenience, ineffective con-
sent architectures, dependence, and even addiction, as the reality to legislate for.
Going back to the framework of critical realism, policymakers are arguably the
most likely to have an interest in enforcing that the real and the actual become
more prominent in data economy technologies.
A summary of these directions and their associated opportunities in re-
search, design, and policy can be found in Table 6.1. Most importantly, in con-
trast with what any one of the case studies in isolation may unearth, this disser-
tation as a whole affords a view into the overlap of research opportunities and
challenges in exploring realism approaches in the data economy, presented in
Table 6.2. While future work could shed further light on the challenges ahead,
the need for acknowledging and embracing underlying economic forces and
promoting shared accountability has surfaced in all of the three case studies
presented in this dissertation, which suggests these phenomena may be related

















ML labeling - X X - X
Smart home X - X X X
OBA X X X X X
Table 6.2: Overlapping research opportunities across the data economy.
6.3 Conclusion
The three data economy case studies presented in this dissertation each ac-
counted for and embraced the inevitable realities of their underlying social
world, unearthing pragmatic directions which can help mitigate ethical prob-
lems and power imbalances. While these outcomes are desirable, challenges lie
ahead which make it unclear to what extent algorithmic realism can be success-
ful in light of highly decentralized data economy systems and their underlying
powerful, prevailing economic forces. The path forward may require design,
research, and policy engagement around feasibility, breaking down established
algorithmic authority, countering prevailing economic forces, embracing mis-
matched expectations, and promoting shared accountability and collective ef-
fort in data economy systems. These are important subjects of study in the quest
to anticipate new issues and mitigate existing ones that challenge essential in-
dividual and societal constructs of freedom, privacy, and agency of participants
of the data economy. As learned from the three case studies, a promising ap-
proach seems to be able to engage the reality not in ways of conforming, but
in ways that introduce critical artifacts that facilitate the unearthing of practical
and feasible steps forward despite the prevailing, arguably inevitable realities
of the data economy. The main takeaway is that the realist approach shows
promise, but also raises new challenges.
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[78] Ben Green and Salomé Viljoen. Algorithmic realism: expanding the
boundaries of algorithmic thought. In Proceedings of the 2020 Conference
on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pages 19–31, 2020.
[79] Jens Grossklags and Alessandro Acquisti. When 25 cents is too much:
An experiment on willingness-to-sell and willingness-to-protect personal
information. In WEIS, 2007.
[80] Kotaro Hara, Abigail Adams, Kristy Milland, Saiph Savage, Chris
Callison-Burch, and Jeffrey P Bigham. A data-driven analysis of work-
ers’ earnings on amazon mechanical turk. In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, page 449. ACM, 2018.
[81] Nazir S Hawi and Maya Samaha. The relations among social media addic-
tion, self-esteem, and life satisfaction in university students. Social Science
Computer Review, 35(5):576–586, 2017.
[82] Lisa Anne Hendricks, Kaylee Burns, Kate Saenko, Trevor Darrell, and
Anna Rohrbach. Women also snowboard: Overcoming bias in caption-
ing models. In European Conference on Computer Vision, pages 793–811.
Springer, 2018.
274
[83] Jason Hong. The privacy landscape of pervasive computing. IEEE Perva-
sive Computing, 16(3):40–48, 2017.
[84] Zaeem Hussain, Mingda Zhang, Xiaozhong Zhang, Keren Ye, Christo-
pher Thomas, Zuha Agha, Nathan Ong, and Adriana Kovashka. Auto-
matic understanding of image and video advertisements. In Proceedings
of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages
1705–1715, 2017.
[85] Hilary Hutchinson, Wendy Mackay, Bo Westerlund, Benjamin B Bed-
erson, Allison Druin, Catherine Plaisant, Michel Beaudouin-Lafon,
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The vignettes used in our survey were randomly generated from a list of con-
textual factors, namely attributes, purposes, and devices. Random generation
of information flows is a practice relied upon by prior works investigating IoT
preferences [117, 16, 103], and allows the collection of responses for a large com-
bination of factors. While we acknowledge that some combinations may not
make sense at first, such as age of people at home from doorbell camera for
targeted advertising, learning such preferences can protect the user from data
practices that may attempt to use the data in unexpected or unforeseen ways
in the future. In the review step, situational factors were used to understand
which ones could make users more or less comfortable with the given informa-
tion flow. Below we explain our component choices.
Devices. We identified the most popular smart home devices on shopping
websites such as Amazon and Best Buy, as well as popular consumer blogs.
From this step, we identified a list of six devices: doorbell camera, smart lights,
smart lock, security camera, smart thermostat, and voice assistant/hub.
Attributes. We looked at product descriptions from devices identified in
the previous step in order to understand their advertised features and iden-
tify potential personal and home attributes that could be directly collected as
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well as those that could be inferred, since inferred attributes were deemed more
concerning by users in the context of the IoT [117]. For example, we posited
that the developer/manufacturer of a doorbell camera could infer the number
of people at home at a certain point in time. We also posited that the manu-
facturer of a security camera could infer the gender and age of people inside
the home. Likewise, a smart lock could hint at habits and lifestyle, such as
the time a person leaves and returns to their home. Other attributes were deter-
mined directly from the description of such products, for example, “voice-control
your music” is a feature described for Amazon’s Alexa, resulting in the “Music,
shows, or movies” attribute. Other attributes could be determined indirectly,
such as one’s home location being obtained from the device’s public IP address.
Table A.1 (appendix) shows all attributes used in our survey along with their
descriptions as shown in the survey.
Purposes. For purposes of data use, we considered those that are pri-
mary to the smart home, such as home control, home automation, and home
safety/security, in addition to purposes identified in prior work on online be-
havioral advertising [114], based on the rationale that the smart home can be
seen as an extension of the web, since devices are connected and controlled
over the Internet, and manufacturers of the most popular smart home devices
are major Internet companies (e.g., Google and Amazon). Table A.1 (appendix)
shows all the purposes used in our survey along with their respective descrip-
tions, exactly as seen by participants. While some purposes are closely related,
for example, identity linking and targeted advertising, each purpose of use was
presented alongside their description to prevent any ambiguity and overlap.
For example, for identity linking, the description is focused around the associ-
ation of data with one’s identity, and for targeted advertising, the description
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Attribute Description
Activity what you do inside your home such as cooking, studying, singing, exercising
Age of people at home the age of all the people who visit and live in your home
Apps used apps that you downloaded to perform functions on your TV, voice assistant, or mobile phone
Calendar events, alarms, and
timers
calendar events or reminders that you have set up on voice assistants
Communications calls made with your smart devices or text messages you sent or received from others
Destinations places you visit immediately after leaving your home
Device actions when the device is switched on or off, when the device is used or controlled
Device brand/model the manufacturer, model, and make of your device
Device events when the device’s sensors are activated due to activity in the home
Device states the current status of your device such as whether it is on or off, activated or deac-
tivated, lock or unlocked, open or closed
Energy use how much energy you are currently using as well as your energy use history
Gender of people at home the gender of all the people who visit or live in your home
Habits and Lifestyle how frequently you shop, eat out, travel, and do other things indicative of your lifestyle
Indoor location the precise location such as the room you are in (e.g., bathroom, living room)
Inside temperature the temperature inside of your home
Music, shows, or movies entertainment that you may engage with through smart speakers, voice assistants,
smart TVs, and gaming consoles
Noise levels the level of auditory noise and activity inside your home
Number of people at home the number of people that live in and visit your home
Outside temperature the temperature outside of your home
Sleep data the number of hours slept and the quality of your sleep, including history data
Weather outside climate features such as whether it is cloudy, rainy, snowy, etc.
Purpose Description
Company revenue for the profit of a company who is behind your smart device (e.g., manufacturer, retailer, etc.)
Customized experi-
ences/personalization
to save you time and recommend/target content and features based on your needs
Home automation to automate how items in and around the house work without your intervention
Home control to switch devices on and off or manage and control objects, appliances, and electronics in your home
Home safety/security to ensure the safety and physical security of your home or in case of an emergency
Identity linking to associate other collected data with your identity
Legal actions to use your data for a lawsuit that you may or may not be involved in
Price discrimination to give you discounts, sales, coupons, or determine the price of something based on your needs
Targeted ads to suggest products and services most tailored to you
User tracking and profiling to create a virtual profile of your person that most accurately represents you
Situational Factor More comfortable Less comfortable
Entity If the manufacturer was well known If the manufacturer was unknown
Consent If I gave consent to collect data If I did not give consent to collect data
Frequency If information was collected less frequently If information was collected more frequently
Sensitive If the information involved was not sensitive If the information involved was sensitive
Benefit If I could benefit from it (e.g., discounts, serendipitous
opportunities)
If I could not benefit from it (e.g., discounts, serendipi-
tous opportunities)
Retention If the information was stored for a short period of time,
then deleted
If the information was stored for a longer period of
time, or never deleted
Purpose If the information was only used for the intended pur-
pose
If the information was used beyond the intended pur-
pose
Awareness If I was aware of how the data were being used If I was not aware of how the data were being used
Safety If the data collection was useful for personal and home
safety
If the data collection was not useful for personal and
home safety
Improvement If the data were used for improving products and ser-
vices
If the data were not used for improving products and
services
Common Good If the data were used for the common good (e.g., bene-
fit the society at large)
If the data were not used for the common good (e.g.,
benefit the society at large)
Control If I could control the data (e.g., access, copy, and delete) If I could not control the data (e.g., access, copy, and
delete)
Secure If data were handled and secured properly If data were not handled and secured properly
Table A.1: Attributes, Purposes, and Situational Factors used in survey,
along with examples provided exactly as seen by participants.
287
focuses on tailored offering of products.
Situational Factors. Finally, we also considered situational factors that
are known to affect users’ privacy preferences in other application domains
[104, 114, 163], such as mobile apps and Web browsing. These situational factors
were presented in our survey in order to identify what factors could sway par-
ticipants from their original preferences. For example, when they provided their
subjective comfort level with a scenario, we asked them to select up to three cir-
cumstances that could change their preferences, making them either more or
less comfortable. For example, if they indicated being comfortable with a cer-
tain scenario (3-5 score), we would ask them what circumstances would make
them less comfortable, such as “if data were not handled securely,” “if data were
used beyond primary purposes,” or “if the manufacturer/developer was unknown.” Ta-
ble A.1 (appendix) shows all the situational factors used in our survey, along
with their respective descriptions.
A.2 Machine Learning Details
Data Preparation. We made modifications to our data sets in order to prepare
them for our machine learning pipeline. For the first data set, we added the
average comfort level grouped by participant to each row, for manufacturer,
third party, government, and identity. We also added to each row the aver-
age notification level given by each participant (e.g., avg comfort manufacturer,
avg comfort third party, avg notified, etc.). We did this because in a practical
setting, we ideally would like to calculate comfort levels from a small num-
ber of scenarios, and be able to use it to predict preferences for a large num-
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Survey Participant Demographics
Gender Own SH device
Female 339 (48.6%) No 356 (51%)
Male 356 (51%) Yes 342 (49%)
Other 3 (0.4%)
Age Education
18-25 113 (16.2%) < High school 1 (0.1%)
26-35 315 (45.1%) High school 60 (8.6%)
36-45 147 (21.1%) Associate 89 (12.8%)
46-55 69 (9.9%) Some college 141 (20.2%)
56-65 54 (7.7%) Bachelor’s 285 (40.8%)




<10k 31 (4.4%) Control
10k-39k 211 (30.2%) Mean [SD] 6.01 [0.99]
40k-69k 210 (30.1%) Median 6
70k-100k 134 (19.2%) Awareness
100k-149k 74 (10.6%) Mean [SD] 6.38 [0.94]
>150k 38 (5.4%) Median 7
Collection
Have children Mean [SD] 5.9 [1.15]





Mean [SD] 43.41 [28.64] Never married 307 (44%)




Table A.2: Demographics of survey participants. 49% of participants
claimed to own a smart home device. SH = Smart Home.
ber of scenarios (e.g., number of purposes X number of attributes X number of
devices, given average comfort levels from four scenarios). Considering prior
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works by Bahirat et al. [19], we also modified this data set to include the cluster
value of participants. We included columns from 5-to-3 clusters derived from
k-means clustering from IUIPC constructs alone, then adding entity comfort
levels (i.e., manufacturer, third party, and government), adding identity com-
fort, and adding notification level as features for the clustering. Given their re-
sults, we wanted to compare if a clustered approach would yield better results.
For the second data set (economics data set), we added the IUIPC values and
the average comfort levels from the participant for manufacturer, third party,
government, and identity, as well as the notification frequency. Given the loss
aversion observed in previous works in regards to privacy valuations (e.g., [79]),
we also added a categorical variable indicating whether the user already “had”
privacy or not, according to the scenario condition. Finally, we removed any
rows indicating a dollar amount greater than the price of the voice assistant,
that is, greater than $49 or equal to $0 (273 rows), because they would prevent
the model from capturing realistic discounts/costs.
Feature Engineering. For both data sets, numerical features (e.g., IUIPC)
were scaled with min-max scaling1. For categorical features such as attributes,
purposes of data use, and devices, the columns were one-hot encoded2, with






Top Coefficients Deny Top Coefficients Allow
Legal Actions(P) -1.026 Comfort Manuf. 1.237
Communications(A) -.960 Outside Temp.(A) .787
Identity Linking(P) -.952 Weather(A) .737
Age of people(A) -.798 Inside Temp.(A) .668
Targeted Ads(P) -.727 Personalization(P) .632
Gender of people(A) -.662 Home Safety(P) .543
Destinations(A) -.533 Device model(A) .528
Tracking and Profiling(P) -.442 Energy use(A) .414
Company Revenue(P) -.436 Smart Lights(D) .381
Noise levels(A) -.239 Home control(P) .338
scikit-learn
Top Coefficients Deny Top Coefficients Allow
Communications(A) -1.251 Comfort Manuf. 6.346
Legal Actions(P) -1.139 Inside Temp.(A) 1.191
Age of people(A) -1.128 Weather(A) 1.030
Identity Linking(P) -.828 Home Safety(P) .943
Targeted Ads(P) -.760 Outside Temp.(A) .932
Gender of people(A) -.718 Personalization(P) .814
Destinations(A) -.634 Home Control(P) .742
IUIPC Collection -.565 Energy Use(A) .639
Habits and Lifestyle(A) -.380 Not specified(P) .625
Not specified(D) -.320 IUIPC Awareness .527
Table A.3: Top coefficients toward either “Deny” (negative) or “Allow”
(positive). A = attribute, P = purpose, D = device.
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Predict Allow/Deny
Features Best Algorithm AUC
PySpark MLlib scikit-learn PySpark MLlib scikit-learn
IUIPC Random Forest Logistic Regression 0.656 0.646
+ Attribute Random Forest Logistic Regression 0.685 0.674
+ Purpose Logistic Regression Logistic Regression 0.723 0.736
+ Device Logistic Regression Logistic Regression 0.731 0.739
IUIPC Random Forest Logistic Regression 0.656 0.646
+ Comfort toward Manufacturer Logistic Regression Multilayer Perceptron 0.829 0.817
+ Comfort toward Third Party Logistic Regression Support Vector Machine 0.827 0.816
+ Comfort toward Government Logistic Regression Stochastic Gradient Descent 0.828 0.816
+ Comfort with Identity Logistic Regression Stochastic Gradient Descent 0.825 0.814
+ Notification Frequency Logistic Regression Multilayer Perceptron 0.826 0.817
IUIPC, Attribute, Purpose, Device Logistic Regression Logistic Regression 0.731 0.739
+ Comfort toward Manufacturer Logistic Regression Logistic Regression 0.86 0.861
+ Comfort toward Third Party Logistic Regression Logistic Regression 0.86 0.861
+ Comfort toward Government Logistic Regression Logistic Regression 0.861 0.861
+ Comfort with Identity Logistic Regression Logistic Regression 0.858 0.859
+ Notification Frequency Logistic Regression Logistic Regression 0.858 0.859
Predict Preference Changes
Features Best Algorithm AUC
PySpark MLlib scikit-learn PySpark MLlib scikit-learn
IUIPC, Attribute, Purpose, Device - - - -
+ Comfort toward Manufacturer - Logistic Regression - 0.912
+ Comfort toward Third Party - - - -
+ Comfort toward Government Logistic Regression - 0.895 -
Predict Privacy Value
Features Best Algorithm RMSE
PySpark MLlib scikit-learn PySpark MLlib scikit-learn
IUIPC Linear Regression Stochastic Gradient Descent 16.541 15.814
+ Economic Scenario Linear Regression Stochastic Gradient Descent 15.683 14.803
+ Comfort toward Manufacturer Linear Regression Stochastic Gradient Descent 15.772 14.666
+ Comfort toward Third Party Linear Regression Stochastic Gradient Descent 15.964 14.769
+ Comfort toward Government Linear Regression Stochastic Gradient Descent 15.844 14.733
+ Comfort with Identity Linear Regression Stochastic Gradient Descent 15.974 15.07
+ Notification Frequency Linear Regression Stochastic Gradient Descent 16.253 15.121
Table A.4: Results from model selection based on best performance on val-
idation set. Same features from Allow/Deny were used to pre-





B.1 Probe Inferencing Processes
This section explains in detail how the different inferences were made by the
probe system.
From the pages visited on the computer browser, a an inference is made
about the interest from Google AdWords that is most closely related to the title
and content of the page visited by the user. This relationship is determined by
a calculation of the AdWords category with the highest Cosine Similarity from
sentence encoding embeddings between AdWords categories and the title and
a summary of the content of the page (i.e., a Word2Vec approach). Upon se-
lecting the category with the highest similarity, items in its hierarchy are also
added. For example, if the highest similarity category is “Thriller, Crime &
Mystery Films” and its hierarchy is “Arts & Entertainment ¿ Movies ¿ Thriller,
Crime & Mystery Films,” each item in the hierarchy leading up to the selected
item is also added as a profile item. On the profile visualization, “Arts &
Entertainment” becomes a major group, which can be expanded to find both
“Movies” and “Thriller, Crime, Mystery Films” inside. This means that if in-
stead only “Movies” is the most closely related item, “Arts & Entertainment”
and “Movies” would be added. The similarity calculation is performed on the
server-side, where the sentence embeddings for the AdWord interests are stored
and pre-processed for fast computation. An inference is triggered only when the
Cosine Similarity of the most closely related item is greater than 0.5. If the com-
fort value (as provided by [167]) of the selected AdWords category is negative,
293
the item is marked as sensitive by default upon insertion. If either the top-level
category or any of the lower-level items have a negative value for comfort, a
notification is shown to the user on the browser about the item being added to
their profile. Only notifications involving potentially sensitive items are shown
in order not to overwhelm users with notifications at every page visited. These
AdWord interests are added under the “You may see ads about” section.
From physical locations visited, a reverse geocoding request is sent to the
Google Maps API, from which a point of interest is captured. The point of in-
terest is further looked up on the Google Places API in order to collect its types,
such as art gallery, bakery, doctor, etc. Once the point of interest is identified, the
Yelp Fusion API is also used to collect more specific tags from the point of inter-
est, such as “vegetarian food,” “coffee & tea,” in addition to the price point for
each point of interest, used as an inference associated with a person’s income
or purchase power. The Overpass API is also used to detect any underlying
cuisines, diets, and franchise operators for a given point of interest. All of these
are checked for duplicates and added as profile items under the “You may see
ads about” profile section. In order for an inference about a visit to a point of
interest to be made, at least two requests to the reverse geocoding API have to
return the same point of interest, which means that two requests separated by
2 and a half minutes have to map to the same point of interest. This is made
to prevent detecting points of interests that the user just happens to drive or
walk by. Locations were also used to make inferences about user’s travel habits,
adding “traveler” under “You may be ad-targeted as” if the location sensor de-
tects the user in a new city. When traveling, the item “Visiting [city name]” is
also added under “Hints about your intents today.”
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A list of tags were also marked as sensitive by default by comparing their
semantic similarity (measured by Cosine Similarity of sentence embeddings)
with sensitive AdWord categories and manually inspecting potential matches.
For example, “Doctors” in Google AdWords and “Doctors” on Yelp is a perfect
match, but “Pharmacies” and “Drug Stores” have a only a strong relationship.
Perfect matches were automatically tagged as sensitive, while the highest scores
were ordered and manually inspected until the relationships became weaker,
and a threshold was chosen, 0.7. This process resulted in 149 Google and Yelp
tags being marked as sensitive by default, according to their relationships with
the Google AdWords sensitive categories.
From a running sum of the length of time users use the phone on a given
day, the inference “Heavy smartphone user” can be added to a profile under
“You may be targeted as” once they use their phone for more than three hours
on a single day, which is the average length of time US-based users are known
to use their phone per day.
From physical motion, inferences are made about how users can be targeted.
The following items can be added to the “You may see ads about” section upon
a related activity detection: “Vehicle commuter,” ”Runner,” ”Physicaly active,”
(once the user walks for a number of minutes) and ”Cyclist.” In addition, once
the “Runner,” “Cyclist,” or “Vehicle commuter” inferences are made, “Sports
Apparel,” “Cycling apparel” and “Auto Insurance” are also added under “You
may see ads about,” respectively. Finally, “Exercised today” is added as an item
under “Hints about your intents today.” With activity tracking happening every
two minutes, the inferences above were only made after detecting a streak of
three, such as walking, running, and cycling being detected on a streak for six
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minutes. This again was a heuristic implemented to mitigate items that could
be added because of sensing errors or from short-lived physical effort, such as a
quick run to catch the bus.
Upon app installation, the phone manufacturer’s brand and the phone’s
operating system are added to “You may see ads about” and “You may be ad-
targeted as,” respectively.
From local weather information, as provided by the AWARE framework’s
integration with OpenWeather API, maximum and minimum temperatures and
weather conditions are used. When detecting maximum temperatures over 30C
(86F) or minimum temperatures under 8C (46.4F), “Hot weather where you are”
and “Cold weather where you are” are added to “Hints about your intents to-
day” section, respectively. The OpenWeatherAPI also provides a succinct de-
scription of weather conditions, such as “clear” or ”heavy rain,” which were
added as “[condition] where you are” under “Hints about your intents today.”
From tracking device charging activity, an inference is made about the
user’s sleep activity based on the following heuristics: if the charging session
starts between 9pm and 2am, and ends between 5:01am and 12:59pm, and if
the charging session lasted over four hours, the length of the session was cal-
culated. If the length equals to or exceeds seven hours, the item “Had enough
sleep” is added to the “Hints about your intents today” section, otherwise “Had
little sleep” is added.
From apps used on Android, the app’s ID is sent to an unofficial Google
Play API to gather the app’s store category, which is added under “You may see
ads about.” For example, using the Chase Banking app leads adding “Finance.”
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From keystrokes on Android, keyboard input is captured to (1) predict a
user’s mood and languages spoken from sentiment analysis of words entered
in messaging apps and (2) predict a user’s potential destination from terms en-
tered into Google Maps. The inferences made from the messaging apps are all
performed locally on the mobile device, using open source libraries for language
detection and sentiment analysis. A Place Autocomplete search is performed
with the terms entered into the Google Maps in order to detect the nearby search
results for the term and make inferences such as “looking for auto parts store.”
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